

MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

December, 1941

LEO SPITZER. <i>L'Impératif des Marins</i>	531
LESTER GILBERT KRAKEUR. <i>The Problem of Malesherbes' Intervention</i>	551
SAMUEL L. WOLFE. <i>Milton's "Advocatum Nescio Quem": Milton, Salmasius, and John Cook</i>	559
ROBERT WARNOCK. <i>Boswell and Andrew Lumisden</i>	601
CHANDLER B. BEALL. <i>A Tasso Quotation in Shelley</i>	609
AUGUST CLOSS. <i>Wurzeln der Romantik bei Herder</i> ..	611
FREDERICK A. KLEMM. <i>The Dead-Hand Motive as a Phase of Gerhart Hauptmann's Romanticism</i>	619
MERRELL R. DAVIS. <i>The Flower Symbolism in "Mardi"</i>	625
REVIEWS	639

Volume Two

Number Four

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS
SEATTLE

MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

Edited by

RAY HEFFNER
Managing Editor

DUDLEY D. GRIFFITH

FREDERICK M. PADELFORD

CURTIS C. D. VAIL

HOWARD LEE NOSTRAND

Direct contributions to
Managing Editor, Modern Language Quarterly,
Parrington Hall
University of Washington
Seattle.

Direct business correspondence to
Director of Publications, University of Washington Press
Subscription price \$2.00 per year :: Single copies \$.75
Issued in March, June, September, December

Entered as second-class matter May 6, 1940, at the post office at Seattle, Washington,
under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Printed in U.S.A.

MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

Volume Two

December, 1941

Number Four

ARTICLES

- Leo Spitzer. *L'Impératif des Marins*..... 531
- Lester Gilbert Krakeur. *The Problem of Malesherbes'*
Intervention 551
- Samuel L. Wolff. *Milton's "Advocatum Nescio Quem": Milton,*
Salmasius, and John Cook..... 559
- Robert Warnock. *Boswell and Andrew Lumisden*..... 601
- Chandler B. Beall. *A Tasso Quotation in Shelley*..... 609
- August Closs. *Wurzeln der Romantik bei Herder*..... 611
- Frederick A. Klemm. *The Dead-Hand Motive as a Phase of*
Gerhart Hauptmann's Romanticism..... 619
- Merrell R. Davis. *The Flower Symbolism in *Mardi**..... 625

REVIEWS

- Donald S. Schier. *Louis-Bertrand Castel, Anti-Newtonian Sci-*
entist. [George R. Havens]..... 639
- Robert A. Hall, Jr. *Bibliography of Italian Linguistics*
[Leo Spitzer] 646
- Mario A. Pei. *The Italian Language. [Herbert H. Vaughan]* 643
- Paul Patrick Rogers. *Goldoni in Spain. [D. Vittorini]*..... 644
- C. R. Thompson. *The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and*
St. Thomas More. [William Nelson]..... 647
- Paul V. Kreider. *Repetition in Shakespeare's Plays.*
[Hardin Craig] 648
- James M. Osborn. *John Dryden: Some Biographical Facts and*
Problems. [Richard H. Perkinson]..... 650
- James L. Clifford. *Hester Lynch Piozzi (Mrs. Thrale).*
[A. T. Hazen]..... 652

Bernard De Voto (ed.) Mark Twain in Eruption. [E. H. Eby]	654
F. O. Matthiessen. American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman. [E. H. Eby].....	655
A. E. Zucker (trans.). The Redentin Easter Play. [Carl F. Bayerschmidt].....	656
Friedrich Josef Schmitz. Lessings Stellung in der Entfaltung des Individualismus. [William Guild Howard].....	658
Fred O. Nolte. Lessing's <i>Laokoon</i> . [Sophus Keith Winther]	659
Some Studies of Medieval Literature and History. [Herbert Meritt]	660
Philip Babcock Gove. The Imaginary Voyage in Prose Fiction. [Thomas B. Stroup].....	662
Fernand Baldensperger. La Littérature française entre deux guerres, 1919-1939. [Albert Schinz].....	664
Books Received	669

L'IMPÉRATIF DES MARINS

By LEO SPITZER

M. Ch. de Boer, dans un article des *Mélanges* . . . Bally (1939) intitulé "Un peu de 'comparatisme'" se fait l'avocat d'un comparatisme, différent de celui, traditionnel, qui manie "vingt-cinq langues à la fois," se contentant plutôt de deux où trois langues que le linguiste connaît bien, et au point de vue morphologique et syntaxique; en prêchant par exemple, il compare le français au hollandais, sa langue maternelle. Il attend des résultats nouveaux de ce comparatisme nouveau. Son premier exemple est le suivant (*loc. cit.*, p. 102.):

En français, on peut recontrer des phrases comme celles-ci:

- a) *Couche-toi de travers, les enfants, pour qu'on puisse passer!*
- b) *Combien es-tu là-haut?*
- c) *Eh bien, bande de fainéants, descends la moitié!*
- d) *As-tu entendu, les tribordais?*¹

Ce sont des phrases de marin, si je ne me trompe.

Voilà donc des impératifs, et même des formes interrogatives, au singulier, tandis qu'il s'agit nettement de plusieurs personnes. Quelle que soit l'explication de ce phénomène, il ne saurait être inutile, pour celui qui voudrait tâcher de l'expliquer, de savoir qu'il y a au moins une langue moderne européenne, le néerlandais, qui

¹ Voici le passage entier d'où celui-ci a été tiré: Loti, *Mon Frère Yves*:

Et puis on entend en bas dans le faux-pont, une vingtaine de voix chanter l'une après l'autre—en cascade comme on fait pour Frère Jacques—une sorte d'air très ancien, qui est joyeux et moqueur:

"As-tu entendu, les tribordais, debout au quart, debout, debout! . . .
As-tu entendu, les tribordais, debout au quart, debout, debout, debout, debout!"

Après la commande, inexorable:—En haut, les tribordais à l'appel! Malheureusement, M. de Boer, en ne nous révélant pas la situation, ne nous a pas mis en mesure de bien construire le passage: *As-tu entendu*: "Les tribordais, debout au quart. . . ." La question à la seconde personne du singulier s'adresse donc, de la part de certains membres de l'équipage, à certains de leurs camarades: le *as-tu entendu* n'a donc rien à faire syntaxiquement avec *les tribordais*.

C'est la voix intérieure des marins qui chante *as-tu entendu*, avec la nuance d'intimité dont ces êtres, qui se voient individus, ne veulent pas être privés, et avec la note "joyeuse et moqueuse" d'une vieille rengaine qui leur est familière. Cf. le passage à la page 312 qui explique comment même le rythme de commandements authentiques peut se transformer en poésie:

A chaque demi-heure, on tressaille en entendant la cloche qui vibre; et alors deux voix viennent de l'avant du navire, chantant l'une après l'autre, sur une sorte de rythme lent: "Ouvre l'œil au bossoir . . . tribord!" dit l'une. "Ouvre l'œil au bossoir . . . bâbord!" répond l'autre. On est surpris par ce bruit qui paraît une clameur effrayante dans tout ce silence, et puis les vibrations des voix et de la cloche tombent, et on n'entend plus rien.

a complètement perdu, dans la langue parlée, le pluriel de l'impératif, et où il y a une tendance à remplacer, dans les interrogations, la seconde personne du pluriel par le singulier. Ce qui prouve que le pluriel de l'impératif est, au fond, dans une langue, une espèce de "luxe," puisque même un peuple moderne civilisé peut très bien s'en passer. Et il se pourrait donc que l'emploi des impératifs au singulier cités plus haut représente quelque chose de plus qu'un cas tout à fait spécial; une comparaison avec le néerlandais prouve que l'explication ne saurait refuser de tenir compte de la possibilité qu'il y ait, dans ces constructions françaises, à côté de causes peut-être très spéciales, les débuts, très hésitants, bien entendu, et encore fortement "localisés," d'une tendance générale *moderne européenne*, puisque le phénomène en question se retrouve, fortement accentué et à un état très avancé, dans au moins une langue européenne moderne.

J'avoue dès l'abord ne pas pouvoir croire à une tendance générale *moderne européenne* de réduire l'impératif à la deuxième personne du singulier—mais plutôt à une tendance *ancienne marine*. En effet, le savant hollandais me semble faire bon marché de la provenance marine de ses exemples français ("ce sont des phrases de marin, si je ne me trompe"), puisqu'il se met *tout de suite*, sans s'inquiéter du caractère circonscrit de ce trait de langue, à les comparer avec une langue commune européenne. L'internationalisme de ce comparatisme ne comporte pas chez lui de tempéraments par ce second internationalisme que je qualifierais volontiers de "sociologique" ou "argotique" et qui pourtant est une réalité—l'internationalisme, linguistique et autre, non seulement des politiciens socialistes et communistes, mais aussi des gueux, des merciers, des soldats, des prostituées et souteneurs, du théâtre et du cinéma est là pour le prouver. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de ces mots migrants empruntés à la langue spéciale d'un seul pays par les langues spéciales d'autres pays (p. ex., *réalisation* ou *production* dans la langue du cinéma d'autres pays, d'après celle du cinéma américain), mais de la mentalité sociale commune qui informe telle langue spéciale dans les milieux linguistiques les plus différents (cf. les périphrases semi-cryptographiques de substantifs par des adjectifs, qu'on constate dans à peu près tous les argots de malfaiteurs).

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, le vrai comparatisme aurait dû être d'abord un "comparatisme argotique" et, seulement dans le cas où un argot serait en passe de devenir une parlure acceptée par une communauté linguistique européenne, la comparaison directe d'un argot et d'une langue commune serait licite. Le langage spécial des marins français me semble loin de cette condition-là, le langage international du fascisme a évidemment beaucoup plus de chances!

Le comparatisme de M. de Boer, s'affranchissant des cloisons étanches déterminées par le morcellement social, me semble encore entaché de ce macroscopisme niveleur qu'affectionnaient les indo-européanisants d'avant Meillet et Bally: au contraire, *ne peuvent être comparées que des parlures de même milieu (social, stylistique)* —et il peut très bien se faire que, si les parlures comparées sont toutes des langues communes, elles soient comparables sans déroga-tion à la loi que je viens d'énoncer: leur signalement stylistique est alors précisément l'absence de spécialisation de milieu, leur état d'indifférentation stylistique (une notion comme "père" ou "main" n'a pas beaucoup de chances d'être accaparée par une section particulière d'une communauté linguistique).

Dans les phrases citées par M. de Boer je ne vois donc que le style des marins—et il a noté lui-même qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement d'impératifs de la deuxième personne du singulier employés à côté de noms au pluriel, mais aussi d'interrogations. Une phrase comme celle que Loti met dans la bouche d'un de ses marins (*Le Matelot*, p. 201):

... et ils [les albatros] criaient sans trêve de leur vilaine voix gémissante, qui semble le grincement d'une girouette ou d'une poulie rouée. Et le quartier-maître de l'arrière, outré de toujours les entendre, leur disait, son sifflet serré entre les dents et leur montrant le poing:

—Tu ferais pas mal de graisser un peu ta poulie, toi, les deux grands sales moineaux, là-bas!

Le fait est qu'ils avaient l'air de chanter à la mort, ces deux albatros...

prouve le bien fondé de notre assertion: voilà un quartier-maître qui parle à deux albatros qui l'énervent, comme il parlerait à des matelots ("en leur montrant le poing"), ses subordonnés, qui n'auraient pas accompli leur tâche ("tu ferais pas mal de graisser un peu ta poulie, toi")—et il emploie le tutoiement dans une sorte de conseil ironique. C'est donc le même cas que *couche-toi de travers, les enfants*²... et *eh bien, bande de fainéants, descends la moitié—*

² Ce *les enfants* (de même... *les albatros*) pourrait indiquer qu'il ne s'agit pas d'allocation dirigée à quelqu'un, mais d'une exclamation au sujet de quel-qu'un, de sorte qu'il n'y aurait pas d'inconcinnité syntaxique (*couche-toi... les enfants!*); dans le langage marin, comme en général dans l'usage populaire français, le tour est déjà pétrifié. Cf. *Pêcheurs d'Islande*, p. 5: "Yann! Yann!... Eh, l'homme!—L'homme répondit rudeinent du dehors" (*l'homme*, apostrophe impersonnelle et typique, est souligné par l'auteur); p. 85: "Eh ben! *les enfants*, ça sent-il le renfermé, là-haut?" On pourrait dire pourtant que la combinaison de l'exclamation *les enfants* avec la deuxième du singulier n'est pas un hasard: l'exclamation est une façon plus relâchée de s'adresser à quel-

ce dernier cas montre d'ailleurs la grammaticalisation en marche, puisque *la moitié* (qui logiquement ne devrait aller de pair qu'avec *descendez*) se trouve dans le même morceau de phrase avec l'impératif au singulier (ou faudrait-il admettre une construction *καθ' ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος* et interponctuer *bande de fainéants, descends*, [sc.] *la moitié*?). L'exemple interrogatif *combien es-tu là-haut?* pourrait, à lui seul, être une fausse extraction de *combien êtes-vous là-haut?*, dit d'abord à une pluralité de personnes, mais interprété comme s'adressant à une personne qu'on "vousoie" et transposé en style marin où le tutoiement est de rigueur (cf. le cas analogue pour la première personne du pluriel: *nous sommes ainsi des milliers*, Sandfeld, *Syntaxe du français contemporain*, I, 34; et aussi la troisième: *ils partent toute une bande*, Loti, *Mon frère Yves*, p. 314) —mais, ensemble avec *descends la moitié et as-tu entendu, les tribordais?*, il atteste bien l'équivalence d'une deuxième du singulier avec le pluriel.

Quelle est la raison de style, spécifique, qui engage le marin à substituer au pluriel le singulier dans ses impératifs interrogations, 'conseils'? On ne fera pas fausse route en admettant que ce doit être une habitude de la vie de bord—qui, de son côté, remonte à la camaraderie, qui s'étend jusqu'aux ordres, souvent donnés par les supérieurs à la deuxième personne du singulier. Avant de montrer combien ces ordres au singulier sont répandus dans la marine de beaucoup de peuples, j'en dirai ici la raison rationnelle: un ordre comme *Hale le bout à bord, Goulven . . . Hale à bord, Goulven, hale!* (Loti, *Mon frère Yves*, p. 316)—un ordre donné dans un "accostage difficile" doit nécessairement s'adresser à une personne responsable entre toutes, parce que le travail des marins, parqués dans l'espace réduit au minimum d'un bateau, ne se développe pas sur un terrain comme celui de l'armée de terre: le matelot a un travail beaucoup plus

qu'un, qui ne comporte pas les servitudes grammaticales ordinaires: *les enfants!* est un peu en dehors de la phrase, une remarque qui suit la réaction spontanée et par conséquent mise à la deuxième du singulier, *couche-toi*. M. H. L. Koppelman (*Ursachen des Lautwandels* [Leiden, 1939], p. 143) pense que la préférence de la langue populaire en général pour le type *Et toi, la vieille, tu es pas trop lâche (Coppée)* ou *ohé, la belle!* est due à la tendance à l'oxytonaison et au iambisme du français: **toi, vieille*, ou **ohé, belle* ferait se suivre deux syllabes à intonation forte. Sans vouloir bagatelliser ce facteur rythmique, je crois voir dans l'attitude "relâchée" une sorte d'affirmation d'indépendance: avec un **ohé, belle!* on s'engage directement, avec *ohé, la belle!* on apparaît dégagé, "casual," comme dirait l'Anglais (cf. la réaction américaine au téléphone: *This is Mr. Smith speaking* avec l'expression distante de l'Anglais: *That is Mr. Smith speaking*). Cf. mon article dans *Revista filologică*, I, 71 et celui de Puscariu *Études de linguistique romaine*, p. 458. [The name Puscariu is correctly spelled "s" with cedilla. The character, ordered especially, had not arrived by press time.—Editor.]

spécialisé que le soldat, qui, lui, fait bloc avec son unité. Cf. aussi

Richepin, *La Mer*, p. 118: . . . ce sinistre cri: *Pare!* un homme à la mer!

Sainéan, *Le langage parisien*, p. 172: *souque dur!* 'se dit à un rameur pour forcer sur les avirons' (pour l'étymologie cf. le travail, cité à la note 13, de Mme. Kahane).

Dans l'exemple avec *pare!* on ne sait plus si le commandement s'adresse à une personne exclusivement, ou est déjà formalisé. Une manœuvre nautique se compose d'activités différentes, concurremment exécutées par l'équipage, non pas de mouvements égaux exécutés par une masse comme dans l'armée:³ de là vient le pluriel dans les commandements de troupe: français *présentez armes, marquez le pas*, etc.; allemand d'Autriche: *habt Acht!, kehrt euch!, präsentiert das Gewehr!*, même dits à un seul homme. Quand le singulier se trouve dans des commandements militaires (*en avant, marche!*), l'unité est censée se mouvoir comme un seul homme. Au contraire, le commandement *hale!* s'adresse à un seul marin qui est au centre de l'attention de son commandant—je ne crois pas que, dans ce cas-ci au moins, l'impératif soit adressé à l'équipage entier ou au bateau considéré comme une unité. D'ailleurs, il doit y avoir, précisément à cause du travail hautement spécialisé se développant dans l'espace restreint d'un bateau au milieu de la mer, un rapport d'intimité et de solidarité plus prononcé entre les officiers et chaque homme de l'équipage⁴ (rapport qui se montre aussi, à un degré sensiblement plus élevé, dans l'armée de terre, quand les rangs de la vie de caserne sont rompus—au front, en face de l'ennemi, où chacun a sa tâche personnelle, en harmonie avec l'ensemble de la troupe—voir le tutoiement continuuel dans les romans de guerre tels

³ Ceci n'est naturellement vrai que pour les voiliers et bateaux à vapeur, pas pour le bateau à rames où tout l'équipage, à l'exception du capitaine-timonier, exécute la même manœuvre: nous ne serons donc pas étonnés de trouver des commandements adressés à des rameurs à la deuxième du pluriel dans *les Grenouilles* d'Aristophane.

⁴ C'est grâce à cette tradition vieille de siècles et toujours vivante que des actes d'héroïsme et de solidarité maritime s'entourent d'une étiquette soigneusement gardée, où la phrase conventionnelle elle-même devient une manifestation de l'esprit héroïque: d'après un rapport d'un matelot Ronald Gold du vaisseau "Scotstoun" (torpillé par un sous-marin) dans le *Life* du 15 juillet 1940, le capitaine, qui avait, comme de juste, quitté le dernier le bateau coulé et avait été sauvé le premier par un avion britannique, était debout, nu-tête et mouillé, au *railing* pour saluer un à un les autres membres sauvés de son équipage: "Glad to see you, Gold," disait-il à l'auteur de l'article.

que *le Feu* de Barbusse).⁵ De cette façon, un officier de bord s'habitue à s'adresser toujours à des individus bien déterminés, et bien en vue dans chaque manœuvre, en anticipant, naturellement, le concours actif et harmonieux des autres membres du groupe nécessaires à la manœuvre. Les ordres étant au singulier, tout discours s'adressant à une collectivité apparaît sous forme individuelle⁶—et les pluriels évoquant les groupes ne seront que le reste de ce que j'appelais tantôt "l'anticipation," par l'officier, de l'activité du groupe. Le manque d'accord grammatical est dû à une psychologie spéciale qui voit dans toute activité collective un homme responsable plus un groupe collaborant volontiers—le manque d'accord grammatical est basé sur un accord psychologique tacite qui s'appelle: la subordination. Le type *Couche-toi de travers, les enfants*, est donc un signe patent de l'empiètement de la langue officielle du commandement sur la vie de tous les jours à bord d'un bateau. Même deux albatros se voient traités comme un marin (+ une vague unité de deux marins) responsable de sa poulie, celle qu'il est seul à savoir et devoir manier.⁷

Loti lui-même a décrit d'une façon magistrale dans *Le Matelot* (pp. 87-89) le fonctionnement de l'organisme total d'un équipage, en insistant plutôt sur le travail déhumanisé et automatique de ces "numéros" vivants:

... l'équipage, c'est-à-dire quelques centaines d'hommes que le hasard a rassemblés, dont les noms sont tout à coup devenus des numéros, et dont les personnalités s'absorbent dans les fonctions remplies. Chez ces jeunes et ces simples, qui vivent là isolés du reste du monde, l'être individuel s'annihile, autant que dans les com-

⁵ D'autre part, on trouve dans "le Poilu tel qu'il se parle" le *on* collectif au lieu de *nous* et même de *je*: dans ce cas le soldat s'efface devant la fatalité militaire impersonnelle ("*Es befiehlt und man gehorcht*," écrivais-je dans *Aufsätze zur rom. Syntax u. Stilistik*), mais cet usage "poilu" remonte au parler et à la mentalité du paysan, collectiviste par nature; voir mon article sur *se défendre* dans *MLN*, 1941, p. 81.

⁶ J'ai noté dans *MLN*, 1941, p. 81, que le mot général *débrouillard*, d'après un passage de Loti, semble provenir de milieux marins, où l'indépendance relative de l'individu mène à la débrouillardise.

⁷ Le travail de F. Weymann, "Syntaktische Eigentümlichkeiten der Sprache des Pierre Loti," programme de Schweinfurt, 1913-14, ne contient pas d'allusion à notre phénomène. Sa conclusion (que, malgré la fréquence de marins et de soldats parmi les protagonistes de Loti, ses romans ne contiennent par beaucoup d'éléments populaires ou familiers) peut malgré tout être juste. Dans le roman *Pêcheur d'Islande*, où Loti, conscient de son art, stylise davantage les propos de ses marins, je ne trouve pas le trait de langue en question, témoin ce dialogue pourtant imprécatoire (p. 205):

- Aussi, pourquoi ne sonnerez-vous pas de votre trompe, bande de sauvages? ...
- Eh bien, et vous donc, bande de pirates et d'écumeurs, *mauvaise poison* de la mer?

munautés religieuses; les préoccupations de la vie quotidienne se réduisent pour eux à se demander si l'exercice de manœuvre a marché vite, si le *loch* a été *filé* à l'heure, si le *ris de chasse* a été bien pris le soir. Chacun, dans ce tout si minutieusement combiné, se borne à jouer son rôle spécial et toujours pareil; il est le générateur de force physique qu'il faut à tel ou tel point précis, le ressort vivant qui raidit telle corde et jamais telle autre; il est aussi la main qui chaque jour, à l'instant fixé, nettoie et fait reluire telle poulie de bois ou telle boucle de fer; il accomplit automatiquement la série d'actes que d'autres avant lui—des inconnus qui portaient le même numéro—accomplissaient aux mêmes moments et aux mêmes places.

Dans le repos des soirs, un tel, qui était par exemple: "*218, bras de masaine bâbord*," redevient le Pierre ou le Jean-Marie de ses premières années et s'en va s'asseoir à côté d'un autre garçon de son pays, qui lui-même a repris son être d'autrefois.

Mais le *218, bras de misaine bâbord* est, bien qu'étiqueté d'une façon mécanique, un individu bien précis, "le générateur de force qu'il faut à tel ou tel point précis, le ressort vivant qui raidit telle corde et jamais telle autre"—il est inéchangeable et indispensable et il est solidaire avec ses compagnons, tous tutoyés dans la subordination au tout. Le *tu* égalitaire et pourtant personnel que lui adresse un supérieur agit comme la présence de Xerxès sur son trône, dans le récit d'Hérodote sur les soldats perses qui combattaient bravement parceque chacun, individuellement, croyait l'œil du monarque reposer sur lui. Cervantès a résumé dans *Persiles y Segismunda* cette situation par ces mots: "Dichoso el soldado que, cuando está peleando, sabe que le está mirando su principe."

Il faut noter qu'il y a aussi soit le type de commandement de la deuxième personne du pluriel:

Clubin, impassible, continua, dans cette vieille langue de commandement que ne comprendraient pas les marins d'à présent:⁸

Abraquez. — Faites une marguerite si le cabestan est entravé. — Assez de virage. — Amenez. — Ne laissez pas se joindre les poulies des francs-funains. — Affalez. — Amenez vivement des deux bouts. — Ensemble. — Gare qu'elle ne pique. — Il y a trop de frottement. — Touchez les garants de la caliorne. — Attention

— V. Hugo, *Les travailleurs de la mer*, tome I, livre VI.

Hardi! les haleurs! oh! les haleurs! halez!

— Richepin, *La mer*, p. 182 ("Les haleurs"),

⁸ V. Hugo avait expliqué au livre II que quarante ans avant la publication de son œuvre les matelots de Jersey parlaient encore "l'idiome marin classique," qui ne serait plus compris depuis; mais ceci semble, d'après les exemples donnés (p.ex., le *abraquez* du texte cité plus haut, archaïque pour *embraquez*), ne se rapporter qu'au lexique.

soit le type avec à + infinitif: Loti, *Mon frère Yves*, p. 67: *À larguer le ris de chasse!*; p. 165: "on avait sifflé: *Les tribordais à ramasser les plats*" (ici, à plus proprement dire, un signal par sifflement est interprété par un commandement); p. 314: *Chefs et chargeurs à réveiller au quart!* Loti explique en note: "Commandement réglementaire.—À bord, l'équipage est divisé en un certain nombre de *séries*, formant chacune l'armement d'une pièce de canon. — Le chef et les chargeurs de cette pièce doivent conduire les hommes de leur série, et réveiller ceux qui les remplacent pour le quart." Ici, le commandement s'adresse clairement aux groupes, aux *séries*.

L'usage de la deuxième personne du pluriel qui semble contredire ce que nous avons avancé plus haut, n'est pourtant pas celui de Rabelais, ni celui qu'on trouve dans les langues méditerranéennes et germaniques: avant tout il faut citer la célèbre scène de la tempête dans Rabelais, livre IV, chapitres XIX-XXII: on voit bien l'intérêt personnel que prend frère Jean des Entommeures, commandant du vaisseau, aussi bien à l'individu auquel il adresse ses ordres qu'à la manœuvre qu'il indique:

(XIX) *Mousse*, ho, de par tous les diables, garde l'escantoula. *T'es tu blessé?* Vertus Dieu, *attache* à l'un des bitous. Ici, de là, de par le diable! Ainsi, mon enfant.

(XX) Uretacque, hau! cria le pilot [Jamet Brahier], uretacque! La main à l'insail. *Amene*, uretacque! *Bressine*, *guare* la pane! Hau *amure*, *amure bas*. Hau, uretacque! cap en houlle! *Desmanche* le haulme. *Accapaye*.

On peut observer que frère Jean, avec une sorte d'ubiquité psychologique, varie ses pronoms selon l'ordre d'idées auquel appartiennent ses différentes injonctions:

Deça, hau, dist frere Jean, de par tous les diables! A poge. Accapaye, on, nom de Dieu! Desmanche le heaulme, hau! Accapaye, accapaye. Beuvons hau! Je dis du meilleur et du plus stomachal. Entendez vous, hau, majourdome. Produisez, exhibez. Aussi bien s'en va ceci à tous les millions de diables. Apportez cy, hau, page, mon tiroir (ainsi nommoit il son breviaire). Attendez! tire, mon amy, ainsi! Vertus Dieu, voicy bien greslé et foutroyé, vraiment. Tenez bien là hault, je vous en prie. Quant aurons nous le feste de Tous Saints! Je croy qu'aujourd'huy est l'infeste feste de tous les millions de diables.

Les commandements réglementaires sont exclusivement à la deuxième du singulier—mais un personnage comme frère Jean qui se doit d'adoucir ce qu'il y a de trop raide et de trop impersonnel dans le rituel militaire, les entoure d'interjections et de jurons. Pendant le

court répit que lui laisse le tempête, il réfléchira—à la première du pluriel—sur la situation générale et l'état d'âme de l'équipage (*beuvons, quand aurons . . .*); l'attention donnée par le commandant à la boisson, calculée à calmer les autres, se nuance d'un "vous" s'adressant à un personnage plus haut placé dans l'hierarchie du bord (le majordome) et d'un "toi" au page—cette attention à l'étiquette au moment du danger suprême a une influence rassurante. D'autre part, *l'attendez et le tenez bien la hault* (*scilicet*: pendant que je bois) est dit à l'équipage entier, mais n'est pas un commandement officiel. Les différents vousoiements et tutoiements ne sont pas sur le même niveau, mais obéissent à des courants de sentiment finement nuancés: on dirait que la finesse psychologique ne quitte ce Français pas même *in articulis mortis*!

XXII Courage, *enfants*, dist le pilot, le courant est refoncé. Au trinquet de gabie. *Inse, inse*. Aux boulingues de contre-mejane. Le cable au capestan. *Vire, vire, vire*. La main à l'insail. *Inse, inse, inse*. Plante le heaulme. *Tiens fort à* garantir. *Pare* les couetz. *Pare* les escoutes. *Pare* les bolines. *Amure* babord. Le heaulme sous le vent. *Casse* escoute⁹ de tribord, filz de putain (*Tu es bien aise, homme de bien*, dist frere Jean au matelot, d'entendre nouvelle de ta mere) *Vien* du lo! Prés et plein! *Hault* la barre. (*Haulte* est, respondoient les matelotz.) *Taillevie*, le cap au seuil! *Malettes*, hau! que l'on coue bonnette. *Inse, inse*. — C'est bien dict et advisé, disoit frere Jean. *Sus, sus, sus, enfants*, diligemment. Bon. *Inse, inse*. — A poge. — C'est bien dit et advisé. . . . — *Mole!* — C'est bien et doctement parlé. *Mole, mole!* Ici, de par Dieu, gentil Ponocrates. . . . — *Inse, inse*. — C'est bien dict. *Inse!* de par Dieu, *inse, inse*.¹⁰

⁹ De là, comme dans tant de cas, le nom d'un ustensile nautique: cf. A. Rohe, *Die Terminologie der Fischersprache von Grau d'Agde* (Hérault: Leipzig, 1934), p. 27: *casse-écoute* "bitton, taquet de touage" (*casser* "haler vigoureusement un cordage" = *captiare*). Cf. l'ital. (de Gênes) *cassacavallo* = *caccia a cavallo*! "perchè chiavarda che s'incavalca sopra le costiere," *buttafuori* (*caccianfuori*) "bras d'une vergue" (= *butta, caccia in fuori*).

¹⁰ Sainéan, *La langue de Rabelais*, I, 94, cite ce même passage comme témoignage du fait que Rabelais a puisé sa nomenclature nautique "aux sources même, aux différents ports qu'il a visités, aux matelots qu'il a fréquentés et interrogés. C'est ce qui explique la vie qui règne d'un bout à l'autre du "naviguaige," le réalisme des commandements et des cris de manœuvres, des injures de matelots." Il ajoute que le juron *filz de putain* est "encore usuel parmi les marins de la Loire qui s'en servent partout pour appuyer un ordre ou pour appeler très spécialement l'attention." C'est aussi Sainéan qui explique les différents termes et montre le caractère composite du vocabulaire nautique de Rabelais (acquisitions personnelles aux Sables d'Olonne, contingents de mots de la marine de la Loire, de termes océaniques, normands ou bretons, de termes méditerranéens: catalans, provençaux, vénitiens, et quelques réminiscences anciennes pour faire plus "archéologique").

On voit chez ces marins une familiarité n'entamant pas la discipline : Frère Jean se permet de commenter et, par là, renforcer les ordres du pilote, le pilote s'adresse à ses hommes individuellement et sait administrer à l'échéance une bonne dose de plaisanterie débraillée (celle suivant l'injure bon enfant *filz de putain* et s'adressant au *matelot*, à un matelot bien déterminé qui est censé être un *homme de bien*), et l'équipage se permet une réponse à l'ordre (*Haulte est*). Nous avons là le milieu sentimental qui crée le syntagme que nous avons trouvé dans Loti : *enfants*, cette allocution collective et patriarcale, pourrait déjà ici très bien s'accoler à des commandements au singulier comme *inse!* ou *mole!*

Je passe maintenant à ma collection d'exemples tirés d'autres langues de la 2^e pers. sing. servant de commandement nautique et je suppose que, en plus du motif psychologique suggéré plus haut, cet usage, dans tant de langues, s'explique aussi par la qualité acoustique de l'impératif de la deuxième personne, qui en général, est plus court donc plus énergique que celui de la deuxième du pluriel, et qui est, particulièrement en roman, accentué sur la syllabe tonique du verbe, sur celle, par conséquent, qui est essentielle pour la compréhension et dont la voyelle principale résonne au loin — qui a enfin, tous les caractères de ce que M. Koppelman appelle une *Rufsprache*.

Je copie d'abord les exemples de commandements à la deuxième personne du singulier que donne, rien que sous la lettre A, le *Dizionario di Marina* de l'Académie d'Italie (1937) — une foule d'exemples : *abbatti!*, *abbriva!*, *addenta catena!*, *agguanta!*, *ala!* (= fr. *hale!*), *albera (alza) remi!*, *alleva!*, *ammaina!*, *arranca!*, *arremba!*, *assumma (-o)*, dont plusieurs décèlent une origine espagnole (*¡aguanta!*, *¡arranca!*).^{10a}

Puis des exemples catalans tirés de J. Ruyra, *Marines y boscatjes*, p. 166 : *Issa! Amarra!*,¹¹ p. 235 : *Arrissa la mitjana! Au, a la feyna tothóm!*; p. 242 : *Aguanta y fora, l'avi* [cf. le commandement adressé à un homme particulier dans Loti : *Hale le bout à bord, Goulven!*]; p. 270 : *Tothóm a rems y da'l fort* (les types avec impératif et avec à conjoints!); p. 275 : *Vira, vira . . . ohé, ohé!* En

^{10a} M. Öhmann, *Neuphil. Mitt.*, 1940, p. 155, a signalé chez le poète allemand Oswald von Volkenstein (14^e siècle) des commandements italiens *katza! karga! chala!* qui ne sont autre chose que des impératifs du sing. pétrifiés.

¹¹ Il s'agit de l'application des expressions nautiques à toutes sortes d'affaires non-nautiques, p.ex., ici à la conclusion d'un marché : "Pronunciada la paraula 'amarra,' ja la venda estava feta" — trait commun aux argots de marins d'un peu partout : la *Sotileza* de Pereda et les *Travailleurs de la mer* de V. Hugo en offrent des exemples probants. Les dénominations des choses de la mer manifestent une singulière puissance d'expansion — il y a une sorte d'omniprésence de la mer dans la pensée et, par conséquent, l'expression verbale du marin.

catalan, on peut constater l'extension de ces commandements maritimes à la langue générale: je me permets de répéter ici certaines phrases que j'ai citées naguère dans mon article sur l'impératif de narration et l'impératif gérondival (*Aufsätze zur rom. Syntax u. Stilistik*, n° 13): *sortia jo de la vila y hala, hala per la carretera* "et en avant sur la chaussée" avec *hala* = fr. *hale!*; *varem reprendre 'ls rems y tira cap a llevant* "et en avant"; *aquell tira y amolla de tots els nirvis* le commandement *tira y amolla* est substantivisé et employé métaphoriquement; à la base il y a le commandement d'origine italienne *tira (e)-molla!* "manovra di cavi eseguita in modo che se ne tirano uno o più, mentre che se ne mollano uno a più" (*Diz. di marina*), s'employant aussi en vénitien au sens métaphorique: *Mi ghe rispondo che go da andar via, insoma, tira, molla, come se fa, come no se fa, finchè ghe digo: la senta . . .* — l'aller et venir de la pensée est figuré par la comparaison du resserrement ou relâchement d'un cable;¹² ital. *molla* seul a aussi pénétré en français, cf. plus haut le texte rabelaisien. Le commandement naval *hala* comme un peu partout *marche!*, le commandement militaire, a pris dans des récits le sens "en avant" > "il (elle, etc.) avança . . ." (cf. Maupassant: "Ils sont là tous dans un champ: et *marche* en avant et *marche* en arrière et *tourne* par-ci et *tourne* par-là").

Pour les commandements en portugais cf. Gomez de Anedrim, *O amor da patria*, pass. (p. ex., *leva rumôr* etc.).

En néogrec ἀμόλα ou ἀπόλα "lâche, large, laisse aller" est emprunté au terme vénitien *mola!* (on a eu un verb ἀμολά(ρ)ω et de même ἀπολά(ρ)ω dont le π, selon G. Meyer, *Neugriech. Studien*, IV, 9, est dû à une contamination avec l'autochtone ἀπολύω); cf. les reflets turcs (*amola!* "en avant") et arabe d'Egypte (*mola* "let go") cités par Vidos, *Storia delle parole marinaresche ital. passate in franc.*, p. 486. De même ἐλα πόγριζα "arrivez" [= ital. *poggia!*].

¹² Mme Renée Kahane, dans son article "Italienische Marinewörter im Neugriechischen" (*Arch. rom.*, XXII, 4), atteste τραιμόλα en néogrec au sens "die Segeltaue ziehen, damit das Schiff sich dreht (Befehl des Kapitän)" "geh zurück!" La coalescence de deux impératifs signifiant des activités concomitantes et donnant naissance à un verbe nouveau se constate aussi dans des cas comme fr. *tournevierer*, dérivé des impératifs *tourne!* *vire!*, qui se trouvent à l'état indépendant dans Rabelais.—Comme un commandement "ne vient jamais seul," on comprend que, aussi bien pour les impératifs gérondivaux (ital. *corri corri venne a Napoli*) que pour les dérivés verbaux et nominaux (fr. *tournevierer* —ital. *un pigia pigia* "une foule") on emploie deux formes d'impératif à la suite, soit le même impératif répété (*pigia! pigia!*), soit un impératif + une variante (*tourne! vire!*)—ce qui donne aussi plus de consistance et de clarté étymologique aux formations nouvelles (**un pigia* ne serait pas une foule "qui se continue"). Pour l'impératif de narration ce redoublement est moins nécessaire: soit un vocatif (. . . et *fouette, cocher!*) soit une indication de lieu (. . . y *hala per la carretera*) situent bien le verbe au point de vue grammatical.

En allemand je puis signaler *hol über* (néerl. *haal over*) ad nautas (*προφύε! trajice! transfreta!*), m.h.a. *nū hol mich hie, verge!* Nib. 1490,2 (J. Grimm, *Deutsche Gramm.*, III, 299) et le mot d'emprunt fr. *hallope* "vaste filet de pêche qui traîne sur le fond" que Behrens, *Beiträge*, p. 128, a reconduit à un impératif bas-all. *hal up!* "relève (le filet)!"

Je trouve dans la riche collection lexicologique de F. Kluge, *Seemannssprache* (1911), lettres A-F, les commandements suivants:

- p. 3 *lass ganz abfallen* "Befehl an den Stuermann, das Schiff ganz abfallen zu lassen. . ."
- p. 4 *halt ab* "Befehl an den Steuermann, das Schiff nicht mehr bei dem Winde zu halten. . ."
- p. 16 *haal dat Tau better an*
- p. 143 *brass de Raal* "Ausruf des Elbschiffers und Kommandeurs, wenn dem Segel ein anderer Stand gegeben werden soll" (à côté de *brassst auf, brassst auf! brassst voll!*, p. 144).
- p. 241 *Fall! Fall in's Boot* "Kommando oder Befehl an das Volk, in's Boot zu gehen. . ."
- p. 250 *Fier weg, hallte das Kommando* "Tau oder Kette nachlassen."

Les commandements s'adressant au pilote nous montrent que, vraiment, c'est à un personnage *responsable* entre tous que s'adresse à l'origine l'impératif du singulier, mais ensuite ce tour s'est généralisé et embrassera aussi l'équipage ("das Volk"). Naturellement, l'infinitif à nuance impérative se trouve aussi (p. ex., p. 87) *Enter auf! Segelbergen! Segelreffen!*, qui me semble plus impersonnel et plus récent, et aussi, dans une poésie de Freiligrath, le pluriel de l'impératif s'adressant à des rameurs (p. 223): *Rud'rer werft die Enterhaken! Bretter legt von Schiff zu Schiffe.*

Du reste, la tendance du hollandais de n'employer que la deuxième du singulier de l'impératif, est peut-être un reste d'un état de langue originaire et qui est susceptible de se renouveler partout. Ainsi deux états de civilisation peuvent se superposer: l'état dont nous avons parlé jusqu'ici, où, dans un système complet (deuxième du singulier de l'impératif + deuxième du pluriel) on choisit délibérément la première de ces formes, plus un état où la personne adressée par l'impératif n'est *pas encore* distinguée, comme

nous allons le voir tout de suite. On sait de reste que l'indo-européen primitif n'avait qu'une seule personne: **lege*, **bhere*, la forme interjectionnelle du radical équivalent à celle du vocatif des noms (lat. *amice*),¹³ et que la forme de la deuxième du pluriel était à l'origine celle de l'injonctif (*legete* = *ἐλέγετε* sans augment). Cette forme ambiguë est même assez proche d'un infinitif, comme le suggère M. Benveniste, *Origines de la formation des mots en indo-européen*, I, 132: "... le thème **ag* ou le thème **deiks* n'est par lui-même ni nominal ni verbal, pouvant l'être l'un ou l'autre selon l'emploi qu'on en fait et les désinences qu'il reçoit. Si on le prend nominalement, ce sera le nom verbal, apte à constituer l'*infinitif*. Si on le prend verbalement, ce sera la forme qui revêt normalement l'aspect du thème nu, sans suffixe ni désinence, c'est-à-dire l'*impératif*." De cette nature indéterminée de la forme radicale vient d'après M. Benveniste l'emploi de l'infinitif grec et indo-iranien au sens de l'impératif et le futur latin à l'origine composé *amā-bō* (*amā-* étant une sorte d'infinitif à la forme "nue"). L'impératif de la deuxième du singulier est encore la seule originaire en a.h.all. où la deuxième du pluriel *nem-et* (*nem-at*) est une forme de l'indicatif (au contraire de *nim*, deuxième du singulier impératif), comme d'ailleurs en a.fr. *chantez!*, en prov. *cantatz*, et en roum. *cantati* = *cantatis* (au contraire de *chante!* *canta!* *canta!* = *canta*), l'italien *cantate* et à l'impératif et à l'indicatif étant ambigu. On peut aussi reconnaître la dissociation de la deuxième du singulier et de celle du pluriel de l'impératif dans le prohibitif ancien roman (qui se continue en roumain et qui continue lui-même un état indo-eur.): a.fr. *ne chanter!* "ne chante pas!"—*ne chantez!* "ne chantez pas!"

La deuxième du singulier de l'impératif a partout une tendance à l'interjectionnalisation et à l'isolement: lat. *em* "voilà" (= *eme* "prends"), *age* "... *abite* "sus, allez-vous-en," *cave dirumpatis, tene*; all. *halt!* *siehe*; fr. *tiens, vous avez un nouveau chapeau! gare! va (te promener)!*; prov. *té*, "forme de débit rapide pour *ten(e)* impératif singulier de 'tenir,' s'est détaché de la flexion verbale comme p. ex. it. *té*, port. *chete* à côté de l'impératif *chegate* ... pour devenir une exclamation de surprise, un appel à l'attention ... sans distinction

¹³ Cf. ce que nous avons appris, par la récente étude de M. Sommerfelt, *La langue et la société* (Oslo, 1938), sur l'impératif signifié dans la langue primitive des Aranta par *-ai*: cet *ai* (p. 93) "est une exclamation que l'on met à la fin d'un groupe pour attirer l'attention. Elle correspond aussi bien au vocatif qu'à l'impératif des langues indo-européennes ... *ai* peut correspondre au sens hortatif du latin *eamus*." Il faut se rappeler que l'Aranta est une langue qui ne connaît pas de différence entre noms, pronoms, verbes, et que les catégories grammaticales s'y indiquent par l'addition de mots pleins. *Ai* est donc un mot plein qui exprime et le vocatif et l'impératif—comme le *-e* indo-européen.

entre 'tu' et 'vous,' et *ve* < *vide* peut s'employer dans des sens analogues même en s'adressant à plusieurs personnes ou à une personne qu'on ne tutoie pas" (J. Ronjat, *Gramm. ist. des parl. prov. mod.*, III, 628); ital. *to!*, *ve(h)!*, *va là, dagli* (Spitzer, *Ital. Umgangsspr.*); esp. *¡dalle!*, *¡atiza!*, *¡aprieta!*, *¡arrea!* (Beinhauer, *Span. Umgangsspr.*, p. 37). Il est entendu que beaucoup de ces impératifs interjectionnalisés sont nés dans un milieu bien déterminé (comme les *inse!* et *mole!* que nous avons trouvés tantôt dans le langage marin¹⁴) : p. ex., l'esp. *¡aprieta!*, exclamation de réprobation, évoque l'équitation (litt. "presse [le cheval] en appuyant les cuisses!"—"hâte-toi [d'aller dans une autre direction]!"), l'esp. *dalle* (*Quij. : y si vos queréis porfiar y espolear y dalle . . .*, expression de l'insistance) vient d'une atmosphère de jeu : *da bola* "jette la boule," mais ces cas nous prouvent encore combien l'attention du sujet parlant est centrée sur un seul personnage exécutant une activité, une manœuvre. L'interjectionnalisation d'autres personnes de l'impératif se trouve aussi, mais à un degré moindre, et particulièrement quand il s'agit de donner un public à un état de choses jugé surprenant : *voyez-moi cet imbécile* (même si on s'adresse à une personne qu'on est accoutumé de tutoyer), *tenez!*, *allez partez!*, *allons donc!*, et d'ailleurs même des interjections primitives se voient pourvues de

¹⁴ P.ex., il faut tenir compte de certains moules métriques imposés par des chansons populaires : soit le tour syntaxique (Goncourt, *Germinie Lacerteux*) : "Là-dessus, naturellement, nous avons consolé notre café, *consolé consoleras-tu*;" (Duhamel, *Deux hommes*, p. 59) : "Et je commence à *gratier*, *gratieras-tu* et à *frotter*, *frotteras-tu*"—évident écho de chansons comme (Thureau, *Der Refrain in der frz. Chanson*, p. 190) :

Remu', remu', te r'mueras-tu pas,

Te remueras-tu pas, jeuness', te remueras-tu pas?

ou (Sahlin, *Étude sur la carole médiévale*, p. 124) :

Criaulé est très bien chanté, chanterons-nous?

Criaulé, chanterons-nous, jouirons-nous?—

le chant alterné qui fait répéter la même idée par des personnes différentes, de ce chef nous la grave dans la mémoire et l'intensifie. A noter la persistance dans le moule syntaxique *consolé consoleras-tu* de la deuxième du singulier : en fait *consoleras-tu?*, *ne remueras-tu pas?* sont des variantes d'impératifs. En espagnol et en portugais nous avons un moule "faire quelque chose *burla burlando*, *zomba zombando*" qui doit provenir de chants populaires où à un "fais quelque chose! *burla!* (impératif : 'plaisante') " s'opposait un autre chœur "fais quelque chose en plaisantant (*burlando*)," cf. chez Pitre, *Canti pop. ital.*, I, 237, un chant calabrais *Jetta-jettannu Pija-pijannu E jutu a li puorci . . .* : le type doit être ancien puisque nous trouvons en a.prov. *bat-baten* "en toute hâte" (à côté de *baten* "id."; cf. la reduplication de l'impératif *sec* "suis" dans a.prov. *secsec* "consécutivement, de suite") et que la Pléiade a probablement puisé dans ce même fonds populaire en créant ses célèbres formes verbales, censées rendre en fr. la reduplication des verbes gréco-romains, du type *babattre* (*flofloter*, etc.) : comme on trouve le participe *bat batant peu à peu* (*mon coeur*) chez Chassignet en 1594, je suppose que le verbe *babattre* (et les dérivés nominaux *babat[ement]*) sont des extractions artificielles de *bat-battant*. (Incidentement, un a.fr. *babatre* que cite FEW, I, 292, n'existe pas : tous les exemples de God. datent du XV^e siècle.)

désinences flexionnelles de la deuxième du pluriel à une époque postérieure (gr. *deũporẽ* de *deũpo* 'ici,' *τῆρε* de *τῆ*; lat. *eiare* [S. Augustin]; all. *dat!* pluriel de *da!* [Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen*, p. 72]; a. fr. *estes le vos*).¹⁵

Deux autres fonctions courantes de l'impératif, dans à peu près toutes les langues et qui l'apparentent à l'interjection, sont l'emploi comme narratif animé et l'emploi gérondival. J'en ai parlé à différentes reprises (p. ex., *Aufsätze*, loc. cit., et, sur le turc, dans *Bull. de la société de lingu.*, XXXV, 84). C'est d'un côté le type: Maupassant: *et puis je grimpe sur mon impériale, j'ouvre mon ombrelle et fouette cocher* (litt. *et fouette, cocher!* > "et en avant, marche!") > "et la voiture se mit vite en marche"; locution, de nouveau, se rattachant à une activité bien précise, mais qui pourrait s'employer aujourd'hui d'une façon stéréotypée même quand il n'y a pas de voiture du tout dans la situation ou s'il s'agissait d'une automobile), et la phrase catalane citée plus haut *sortia jo de la vila al cap de la soleyada y hala per la carretera* (phrase d'origine maritime, comme nous avons dit); d'autre part le type: Gyp: *vous habiller, pour vous, c'est enfiler*, va comme je te pousse, *une housse*; cat. *y puja que pujaras s'enfila costes amunt*; nèogr. *τὸκαμε ἄψε σβύσε* "il l'a fait en un clin d'œil (litt. 'allume, éteins')." "

¹⁵ La parenté de l'impératif singulier et de l'interjection est aussi illustrée par le procédé inverse—à savoir le passage d'une interjection à un commandement à l'impératif: le verbe *hisser* (cf. *inse* que nous avons trouvé dans Rabelais) semble être issu d'une exclamation, bien qu'aujourd'hui on sente dans *hisser* un impératif de *hisser*.

Kluge, *Seemannssprache*, 512, explique le mot bas-allemand *hissen* qui est à l'origine de la famille romane *hisser*, par une onomatopée exprimant un bruit sifflant. Nous tenons ici le chaînon rattachant le commandement (au singulier) *hisser!* à l'interjection primitive *hisser!* La parlure marine se montre dans toute sa primitivité archaïque. M. J. A. Walz dans son magistral article, "The Interjection 'Hurrah'" (*Journal of English and German Philology*, XXXIX, 71), cite d'après Willaumez, *Dict. de Marine* (1825), un *Hissa, O, Ha, Hisse!* "chant de l'homme qui donne la voix pour réunir les efforts de plusieurs autres sur un même cordage afin de produire un plus grand effet," et ce même *hissa*, c'est-à-dire l'impératif de *hisser* (je dirais plutôt l'interjection *hisser!* qui a donné naissance au verb *hisser*) + un -a! exclamatif, se retrouve en anglais (*hissa*) et est apparenté à l'angl. *huzzat!*—(et à son doublet phonétique *hurrah!*), "a hoisting cry that originated among English sailors": Willaumez enregistre aussi un *hou-ra* au même sens: "Mot que les matelots répètent quelquefois à haute voix, en hâlant ensemble par saccade, sur un cordage quelconque." Le même travail de hâler en groupe un cordage est accompagné des interjections *hoo, hoo; hu hu hu; hou hou hou* (représentant à l'origine l'effort d'haleine), chez des marins écossais, espagnols, et français (Walz, p. 68); je puis ajouter que les terraciers allemands (et même autrichiens) connaissent un cri bisyllabique *ho-r-up* (avec le maximum d'effort venant tomber sur la dernière syllabe dont l'explosive finale figure l'explosion de l'effort, la première servant d'annonce-ment préparatoire), qui doit bien provenir de milieux de marins bas-allemands: *hor-up!* = *hör auf* = écoute!, cf. le sens originnaire de l'all. *aufhören*, "cesser [de parler] pour mieux écouter!" Ce serait encore un de ces singuliers s'adressant à des groupes.

Dans les deux cas de l'impératif narratif et gérondival, une interjection pourrait (au moins syntaxiquement) en prendre le place: *allez ouste! dare dare!*, etc. Un *hala que hala* correspond à un *erre que erre* (l'interjection des *arrierros*, muletiers *arre!*). Et quelquefois l'impératif devient "une sorte d'infinitif," cf. le passage plautinien:¹⁶ *quod manu non queunt tangere, tantum fas habent quo manus abstineant; cetera "rape trahe fuge late"* (Hofmann, *Latein. Umgangssprache*, pp. 100-01) qui correspond à une phrase française comme *du matin au soir, c'était bûche, bûche, bûche* (L. Hémon, cité par Damourette-Pichon, *Essai de gramm. franç.*, IV, §1445) = c'était raver . . . bûcher; ou le néogr. τὸ πρᾶγμα δὲν εἶναι παῖξε γέλασε "ce n'est pas: joue, ris," la nécessité ou consistance d'un système de vie étant dans ces phrases figurée par l'impératif. On assiste, dans ces sens dérivés l'impératif, qui découlent de son caractère animé et dynamique, à l'usage prépondérant de la seconde personne du singulier, parce qu'elle seule (et pas la deuxième du pluriel) offre ce je ne sais quoi de direct et d'actif, d'interjectionnel en somme, dont le sujet parlant exploite l'effet sur l'interlocuteur.

Il n'est que naturel que la deuxième du singulier de l'impératif soit la première forme verbale qu'apprennent les enfants: cela a été constaté pour des enfants français, slaves, et hongrois (v. Balassa, *Magyar Nyelvőr* [1920], p. 59). Comme l'impératif du singulier seul est une manifestation tout à fait spontanée, nous ne nous étonnons pas de voir cette forme seule, si elle est caractéristique, empruntée par d'autres peuples: en Amérique du Sud *didones* "les Français" (= "les dis-donc"); all. *kusch* dit à un ou plusieurs chiens (= fr. *couche* [-toi]); néogr. *βάρδα*, turc. *varda* "gare, attention, place!" (dit par des portefaix et des cochers, = it. *guarda*, vén. *varda*); néogr. *μωρέ, μρέ, βρέ!*, interj. = vén. *guara* "gare!", d'après G. Meyer. Il y a encore ce que Schuchardt a appelé l'emploi de l'impératif comme "forme passe-partout," c'est-à-dire représentant le verbe entier dans une langue à type "créole"; p. ex., les Chinois de Kiachta et Maimatschin emploient l'impératif d'un verbe russe comme forme unique de tel verbe; les Coptes ont toujours adopté les verbes grecs à l'impératif (*Aufsätze*, p. 217); dans la langue des chamorros (Iles Mariannes) la forme passe-partout sous laquelle apparaissent les verbes espagnols est une forme *canta, mide, consiente*, qui devient même nominale ("ils fêtaient leur victoire par *baila* et *canta*" = "par des danses et des chants") et que K. Wulff dans *Festschrift V. Thomsen* (1912), p. 49 seq., analyse comme

¹⁶ Le grammairien-romancier italien Panzini aurait-il pensé à des exemples de cet aloi quand il affirme dans son *Guida alla grammatica italiana*, p. 51: "Gli antichi romani, che comandavano al mondo, facevano molto uso del modo imperativo"?

troisième du singulier de l'indicatif présent, mais qui, d'après les autres analogies créoles que nous possédons, sera la deuxième de l'impératif: il est évident que l'indigène, plus ou moins esclave de l'europpéen, entend cette forme le plus dans la bouche de son supérieur, mais aussi qu'elle résonne en lui plus fortement à cause de son caractère dynamique. Le verbe indo-européen exprimant une vue activiste de l'homme dans le monde (*je vois*, non pas *visum mihi est*, est la forme typiquement indo-européenne), l'impératif fait apparaître ce trait dominant à l'intensité maximum.

Quelquefois on peut hésiter si on a à faire à l'ancien primitivisme ou au choix délibéré plus moderne. La deuxième de l'impératif singulier dans les proverbes de tous les pays (et, sous l'influence de l'hébreu, dans les futurs impératif aux des dix commandements) ainsi que, sous l'influence du latin, dans les presscriptions médicales et les *parfaits cuisiniers* plus anciens (*solve*, *misce*, *recipe* = *prends*, etc.), fait voir que des ordres s'adressant à de grandes communautés sont donnés de préférence à un seul individu. On pourrait penser qu'il s'agit d'un représentatif de la communauté et que la qualité abstraite de l'enseignement est atténuée à l'origine par la fiction d'un allocutaire concret avec lequel le donneur de l'ordre est familier: "Sprüche, die eine Lehre enthalten, werden am wärmsten [je souligne] in der zweiten Person vorge-tragen, vor dem Vater steht das Kind, vor dem Meister der Jünger, die den Spruch vernehmen und sich einprägen" (J. Grimm, *Über den Personenwechsel in der Rede*).¹⁷ Mais qui sait si ce choix d'un représentant du groupe ne se greffe sur un ancien usage de l'impératif à personne indistincte. Cf. encore lat. *cave canem*, dit comme à un seul passant, et le tour opposé, s'adressant à un groupe nettement cultuel: *favete linguis*.^{17a}

Parmi les langues modernes, le hollandais n'est d'ailleurs nullement isolé dans la préférence donnée à la deuxième du singulier impératif, v. Wackernagel, *Indg. Forsch.*, XXXI, 260, et E. Fränkel, *Mém. de la soc. de ling.* (1914), p. 15: à une époque postérieure dans plusieurs langues slaves (le russe, le serbe, le slovène), la forme de deuxième du singulier impératif remplit souvent la fonction des autres nombres—et rejoint par-là certains faits parallèles plus anciens du grec et des langues baltiques, cf. Wackernagel, *loc. cit.* L' "indifférence au nombre" (et d'ailleurs aussi à la diathèse) que

¹⁷ De là le type de substantif composé formé par un impératif + substantif (type *porte-feuille*, *porte-faix*, *casse-croûte*, *casse-cou*, à *étripe-cheval*, à *tue-tête*, etc.) qui n'offre que rarement et à une époque plus récente la deuxième du pluriel: un *décrochez-moi-ça*, *rendez-vous*, etc.

^{17a} Sur les alternations des impératifs du singulier et du pluriel dans la poésie du culte ancienne voir E. Norden, *Aus römischen Priesterbüchern* (1939), p. 195.

revendique Wackernagel pour l'impératif proto-indo-européen et qui revient à la surface dans tant de langues modernes,¹⁸ soit sous forme de généralisation de la deuxième du singulier impératif, soit de pétrification de cette forme pour certains verbes, doit s'expliquer par un fait général de la psychologie humaine: un être primitif ne formulera un impératif comme expression de son désir d'influencer quelqu'un (un homme ou une force en dehors de lui) qu'à condition que le sujet parlant ait l'assurance que cette influence est possible; il se limitera donc à un allocutaire pour ne pas disperser son énergie morale (et, dans des temps primitifs où la notion de la "participation mystique" était encore prépondérante, cet allocutaire unique peut avoir été une divinité, un clan, etc.). L' "indifférence au nombre" de l'impératif est donc une sorte de concentration de la part du primitif, de son effort mental sur son objet, sur un *objet* bien circonscrit. Et ce primitivisme peut toujours renaître, parce que tout homme est jusqu'à un certain degré un primitif.¹⁹ Les commandements traditionnels de la marine dont nous avons traité s'insèrent donc dans un ordre de faits beaucoup plus vaste, généralement humain — seulement nous n'avons rien à gagner à sauter les échelons intermédiaires en rattachant immédiatement un fait explicable dans un milieu social bien défini à un fait d'ordre général.

¹⁸ On pourrait encore rappeler que le judéo-espagnol de Salonique n'a qu'une deuxième personne du singulier de l'impératif et remplace la deuxième du pluriel, d'après mon explication dans *ZRPh*, XLII, 207, par le gérondif impératif: *diziendo* au lieu de *decid* (d'après des cas comme esp. *landando!* "marche," à l'origine *¡vamos!* *andando!*, s'adressant à un groupe). D'autre part, l'impératif négatif du singulier en ancien roman et en italien moderne est exprimé, *seulement au singulier*, par le type *non timere!* "ne crains pas!" alors qu'au fond l'infinitif au sens de l'impératif pourrait aussi bien s'adresser à un groupe. Ces deux faits, si opposés entre eux dans le détail, se laissent pourtant reconduire à une seule tendance bien marquée, celle de distinguer la seconde du pluriel de la seconde du singulier de l'impératif par un *minus* de spontanéité.

¹⁹ Le primitif est toujours prêt à émerger, même à une époque récente. M. S. Puscariu, *Etudes de linguistique roumaine*, p. 154, nous apprend qu'en istroroumain, où tout *-i* final dévocalisé a totalement disparu, la deuxième personne de l'indicatif est *mori* "tu meurs," avec un *-i* conservé contre l'exigence de la loi phonétique, ce qui permet de distinguer la première et la deuxième personne de l'indicatif (*mor* = **mori* "je meurs," avec *-u-* également tombé de **mor* "tu meurs") — alors que l'impératif de la deuxième personne du singulier est *mor* "meurs!" — sans danger de confusion, vu les situations différentes, avec *mor* "je meurs." "Ce maintien de *i* à la deuxième personne [de l'indicatif] joue donc le même rôle qu'en français l'emploi obligatoire du pronom *tu* devant *meurs*. . . . Les formes *mori* à l'indicatif et *mor* à l'impératif sont le résultat d'une sélection; ce sont des formes qui ont vécu parce qu'elles supprimaient l'équivoque." M. Puscariu ne nous dit pas pourquoi c'est l'impératif qui n'a pas été la victime de ce besoin de distinction. Or, ce n'est pas un hasard que la forme de l'impératif istroroumain soit celle qui maintient l'ancien état phonétique, de même que le fr. *meurs!*, sans pronom, maintient l'ancien état syntaxique. L'impératif est relativement mieux défendu contre les altérations de la langue que l'indicatif.

Pour les raisons spécifiques, intra-hollandaises, de la chute de l'impératif du pluriel, je me suis adressé au meilleur connaisseur de cette langue que nous ayons aux États-Unis, le professeur Barnouw de Columbia University, et voici sa réponse, aussi courtoise qu'informatrice:

The tendency to fuse singular and plural in the second person is not confined to the imperative. The medieval pronoun *du* (= Gm. *du*, Eng. *thou*), which became extinct c.1600, was replaced by *je* (used in addressing a person the speaker knows intimately) and by *u* (in polite address), and the verbal form that follows serves for both the singular and plural:

sg. *je* $\left. \begin{matrix} u \\ \end{matrix} \right\} bent$ (= HG *du bist*) pl. *je lui* (i.e., you people) $\left. \begin{matrix} u \\ \end{matrix} \right\} bent$

Another circumstance that doubtless encouraged the fusion is the loss of the -t ending in the inversion: the Hollander says *je komt*, *jelui komt*, but *kom je?* *kom jelui?* Hence, in questions, the verbal stem without ending serves for both singular and plural, and it was a simple step to extend this uninflected form to the imperative also. Besides, nine times out of ten the imperative is addressed to a single person. Its preponderant use in the singular aided the tendency to reduce it to one standard form; in writing, the inflected form (*komt*) is still in use, but to use it in speaking would be the height of pedantry. It is superfluous, as the person or persons addressed can tell from the look and gestures of the speaker whether the group, or only one of the group, is being spoken to. In short, the elimination of the plural imperative is only one phase of a general process of simplification affecting verbal conjugation in Dutch. It has gone the limit in South African Dutch—which uses the verbal stem for all persons—which, in other words, has ceased altogether to inflect the verb.

Le nivellement des formes de l'impératif en hollandais est donc solidaire du nivellement des formes de la conjugaison entière. Or, dans la prépondérance de la deuxième du singulier dans la langue des marins il ne s'agit pas de nivellement grammatical dû à un effort d'économie, mais d'un certain rapport humain, plein de confiance et d'effusion, avec les membres du groupe.

Je crois en somme que l'ancien comparatisme, le comparatisme, "vieux jeu" auquel M. de Boer désire donner un compagnon plus jeune et moins affectif, est encore efficace pour la solution du problème qu'il a lui-même choisi, et que, d'autre part, ce comparatisme doit être complété et raffiné par un comparatisme de linguistique sociale—car, je dirais en employant le mode en apparence tautologique: *ne peuvent être comparés que des états de langue com-*

parables: comparer le hollandais général au langage particulier des marins français n'est pas de bonne méthode; il faut comparer, soit les langues générales entre elles, soit les langages particuliers entre eux, soit, à la rigueur, les possibles rapports différents de langue générale à langage particulier entre eux.²⁰

Pour que l'impératif du singulier, devint le remplaçant général de l'impératif du pluriel en français, il faudrait des impulsions plus puissantes que le langage particulier des marins. Je suppose que même un dictateur style Mussolini, qui prendrait à coeur de régler à sa guise l'usage des pronoms allocutoires en français n'oserait prescrire comme norme des phrases aussi peu harmoniques comme *descends, les gars!* L'amorce qu'il pourrait trouver—c'est la seule que j'aie trouvée en dehors des milieux marins—dans des tournures populaires comme *tiens ça, vous!* (attesté par Bauche, *Le langage populaire*, p. 123) est assez faible: le locuteur qui emploie cette *inconcinnitas* a pensé en deux actes: il s'adresse peut-être, dans son impatience d'être débarrassé d'un objet gênant par n'importe qui, au personnage le plus proche (*tiens ça!*), et puis il se rend compte de la présence d'un groupe, sans retoucher la phrase déjà énoncée—c'est donc la même structure de phrase à retouches comme dans *J'ai voulu profiter du dernier beau jour pour faire un tour en forêt, nous deux. Veux-tu?* (Daudet, cité par Tobler, *Verm. Beitr.*, III², 20, pour expliquer le tour populaire *nous en causerons, nous deux le professeur* = "moi et le professeur"). La plus grande spontanéité inhérente à la seconde personne du singulier de l'impératif est un fait humain, nous l'avons vu, mais, pour aboutir à la "grammaticalisation" dans une grande langue de civilisation, le souci de la correction logique de la phrase, si profondément ancrée dans les français, devrait être abolie—et alors le français ne serait plus le français.

The Johns Hopkins University

²⁰ On a ainsi comparé et retrouvé les mêmes procédés dans la sémantique et la formation des mots des argots de malfaiteurs de langues différentes, des différentes langues mixtes de juifs—on pourrait même comparer la phonétique "internationale" de certaines classes sociales: la prononciation "voyou," à élégances faubouriennes, de certains milieux urbains, semi-prolétaires, p.ex., un changement *a > e*, comme dans le parisien *Madame > Mèdème*, qu'on trouve, en dehors de Paris, dans les milieux homologues de Prague, Istanbul, La Haye.

THE PROBLEM OF MALESHERBES' INTERVENTION

By LESTER GILBERT KRAKEUR

Did Lamoignon de Malesherbes, *Directeur de la Librairie*, betray his office and "save the *Encyclopedia*" by transporting its confiscated manuscripts to his own home? If so, at what point in the history of the great work did this "fifth column" activity take place? A complete statement of the problem, together with an impartial appraisal of the conflicting clues, has never been attempted. Such an analysis is not only urgent, in the absence of any known solution, but may itself point the way to an explanation.

A glance at the *état présent* of the problem reveals much confusion in critical opinion. Modern historians—such as J.-P. Belin, André Billy, Joseph Legras, various writers in encyclopedias and manuals of literature—generally accept the most common version of the episode: that Malesherbes, in February, 1752, had the manuscripts of the *Encyclopedia* taken to his own house for safe-keeping, at the very time that he was charged with seizing them. Other writers, possibly because they were able to reach no conclusion on the question, have chosen to ignore it entirely. This group includes Delisle de Sales, Cousin d'Avallon, Boissy d'Anglas, Lord Morley, and, more recently, John Allison.¹ Only one historian, Maurice Pellisson, has categorically rejected the story.² Pellisson, it must be added, is not impartial—he is eulogizing Malesherbes and attempting to prove him a faithful officer of the king. We cannot give much weight to his argument that one of the witnesses, Mme de Vandeul, writing thirty years after the event, is unworthy of credence. Mere passage of time is no reason to assume that so startling an episode has been suddenly invented.

As the problem has been understood up till now, there are five pieces of evidence. Three confirm the episode, two deny it. Barbier, Mme de Vandeul, and Diderot³ relate such an intervention on the part of Malesherbes. Grimm and d'Argenson present an opposing version that would exclude its possibility. Considering these contradictory accounts of contemporaries and the lack of official docu-

¹ Delisle de Sales, *Life of Malesherbes* (London, 1814); Cousin d'Avallon, *Malesherbiana* (Paris, 1802); Boissy d'Anglas, *Essai sur la vie, les écrits, et les opinions de M. de Malesherbes* (Paris, 1819); John M. S. Allison, *Lamoignon de Malesherbes* (New Haven, 1938); J. Morley, *Diderot and the Encyclopedists* (London, 1878).

² *Les Hommes de lettres au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1911), p. 69 n.b.

³ The Diderot evidence (cf. *infra*), published in 1931, was not available to most of the writers who have approached this problem.

ments,⁴ it is not surprising to find confusion among modern writers; to find Pellisson denying that the event ever took place, and others ignoring the entire subject.

Let us compare the stories of our five witnesses. On February 9, 1752, the second volume of the *Encyclopédie* had been suppressed; and on February 21, seizure of the manuscripts was attempted. At the end of the same month, Barbier made the following entry in his diary:

On dit que le 21 de ce mois M. de Malesherbes . . . est venu chez Le Breton, imprimeur, un des associés, porteur d'une lettre de cachet pour saisir tous les manuscrits originaux du *Dictionnaire de l'Encyclopédie* et les planches de gravures, ce qui marque le dessein d'arrêter toute impression au delà des deux premiers tomes. Le Breton n'avait pas ces manuscrits, même pour le troisième tome. Il est certain que M. Diderot, le principal éditeur, et un des libraires ont porté et remis tous les manuscrits à M. de Lamoignon de Malesherbes. Diderot a eu peur d'être une seconde fois à la Bastille.⁵

Diderot's daughter, Mme de Vandeuil, relates the intervention with specific detail:

Quelque temps après, l'*Encyclopédie* fut encore arrêtée. M. de Malesherbes prévint mon père qu'il donnerait le lendemain ordre d'enlever ses papiers et ses cartons. "Ce que vous m'annoncez là me chagrine horriblement; jamais je n'aurai le temps de déménager tous mes manuscrits, et d'ailleurs il n'est pas facile de trouver en vingt-quatre heures des gens qui veuillent s'en charger et chez qui ils soient en sûreté."

"Envoyez-les tous chez moi, lui répondit M. de Malesherbes, l'on ne viendra pas les y chercher."⁶

Final witness for the affirmative is Diderot himself. In a recently published letter to Grimm, he tells us of the actual removal of the manuscripts, although he is apparently too discreet to mention Malesherbes by name.

Tout cela s'exécutait; le Baron feuilletait ses livres; les copistes multipliés gémissaient sous le chevalier; les verrous de ma porte

⁴ A search through Ernest Coyecque's *Inventaire de la Collection Anisson* (Paris, 1900) reveals no papers that might throw additional light on the problem.

⁵ E. J. F. Barbier, *Journal* (Paris, 1857), V, 169. As "avocat au Parlement de Paris," Barbier enjoyed many influential relations from whom he extracted all sorts of gossip and inside information. His journal has proved valuable to scholars.

⁶ *Mémoires*, in Diderot, *Œuvres*, éd. Assézat et Tourniaux (Paris, 1875-7), I, xlv.

étaient fermés depuis six heures du matin jusqu'à deux heures après-midi, et la besogne avançait, lorsqu'un de ces événements auxquels on ne s'attend point m'a précipité dans les alarmes. Il a fallu tout à coup enlever pendant la nuit les manuscrits, se sauver de chez soi, découcher, chercher un asile, et songer à se pourvoir d'une chaise de poste et à marcher tant que terre me porterait.⁷

This passage derives added interest, as we shall see, from its date. Unique among the five, it refers specifically to the year 1759. It was then that the scandal over the *Mémoire pour Abraham Chaumeix*, whose authorship was attributed to Diderot, threw him, as he says, into alarm and forced him to hide for a day or two, in order to escape an expected *lettre de cachet*.

The witnesses in the negative are d'Argenson and Grimm. By reporting that the papers relating to the *Encyclopédie* were actually seized by the authorities, d'Argenson seems to eliminate the possibility of Malesherbes' having rescued them.

Le sieur Diderot est celui des auteurs de l'*Encyclopédie* qu'on accusait le plus de travailler contre la religion, l'autorité et les mœurs: il vient de prendre la fuite, sachant qu'on allait l'arrêter, et l'on a mis la main sur ses papiers.⁸

Much weight is added to d'Argenson's version by Grimm's concurrence:

Il suffit de rappeler qu'après la publication du second volume, l'*Encyclopédie* fut arrêtée, et qu'on obligea M. Diderot de rendre tous les matériaux préparés pour cet ouvrage immense. Les jésuites espéraient, moyennant cette dépouille, se mettre au lieu et place des éditeurs; ils furent un peu déconcertés quand ils ne trouvèrent dans les cartons enlevés que des fragments, des réclames, des signes intelligibles pour tout autre que pour l'auteur. Au bout de trois mois, on rendit à M. Diderot ses matériaux, et l'on permit la continuation de l'ouvrage.⁹

According to the current interpretation, then, it is a matter of choosing between Grimm and d'Argenson on one hand, and Bar-

⁷ Diderot, *Correspondance inédite*, éd. Babelon (Paris, 1931), II, 24 (1 mai, 1759).

⁸ D'Argenson, *Journal* (Paris, 1865), VII, 122 (février, 1752).

⁹ *Correspondance littéraire* (Paris, 1879), IX, 205-6. The following passage, from the letter of November, 1753, is even better known. "Tout était concerté; on avait déjà enlevé les papiers de M. Diderot. C'est ainsi que les Jésuites comptaient défaire une *Encyclopédie* déjà toute faite; c'est ainsi qu'ils comptaient avoir la gloire de toute cette entreprise, en arrangeant et en mettant en ordre les articles qu'ils croyaient tout prêts. Mais ils avaient oublié d'enlever au philosophe sa tête et son génie, et de lui demander la clef d'un grand nombre d'articles, que, bien loin de comprendre, ils s'efforçaient en vain de déchiffrer."

bier, Mme de Vandeul, and Diderot on the other (always remembering that the Diderot evidence was not available to those who wrote before 1931). Thus both Morley and Tourneux, apparently having judged the episode insufficiently substantiated, quote Grimm's words but make no reference at all to those of Barbier and Mme de Vandeul.¹⁰

What seems not to have been realized is that the essential confusion is one of date, rather than fact. This confusion is visible in at least two accounts of the history of the *Encyclopædia*. The author¹¹ of the article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, at the opposite extreme from Pellisson, has Malesherbes coming to the rescue not once, but twice. He takes the Barbier evidence as justification for one intervention, in 1752, and assumes that the passage from Mme de Vandeul's memoirs refers to another in 1759. André Billy likewise relates a double intervention of Malesherbes;¹² he takes both Barbier and Mme de Vandeul as basis for the first time, in 1752, and justifies the second by Diderot's letter to Grimm.¹³ This is typical of the existing confusion.

It is our contention that Diderot's words, in conjunction with those of Mme de Vandeul, are sufficient substantiation for the tradition of Malesherbes' intervention; that they do not conflict with the accounts of Grimm and d'Argenson; and that the apparent contradiction between Barbier, on one hand, and Grimm and d'Argenson on the other, is due to a misinterpretation of Barbier's words. The intervention did take place, but it took place in 1759.

Let us examine the evidence *chronologically*. Of the five accounts, three relate specifically to the 1752 suppression—those of Barbier, Grimm, and d'Argenson. One, that of Diderot, refers to the encyclopedic difficulties of 1759. The remaining witness, Mme de Vandeul, who relates the intervention with realistic detail, is extremely vague as to time. After speaking of her father's imprisonment at Vincennes, she introduces the episode with these words: "Quelque temps après, l'*Encyclopédie* fut encore arrêtée." What is the value of the word *encore*? The only interruption previously mentioned is that occasioned by Diderot's imprisonment, in 1749.

¹⁰ Morley, *op. cit.*, p. 148; Diderot, *Œuvres*, XIII, 109-128.

¹¹ Ponsonby A. Lyons. The article appeared originally in the ninth edition (1891).

¹² Diderot (Paris, 1932), pp. 174-5, 246.

¹³ Billy is evidently ill at ease with the question, for he finds it necessary to invent a new interpretation of Diderot's words; he has Diderot take the manuscripts with him in his flight. Such a conclusion is not only unwarranted by the text, but is highly improbable. The packages would scarcely have been safe in his possession, in case he were apprehended.

Her words, then, would seem to indicate the 1752 suppression. On the other hand, she makes no mention whatsoever of the second suppression, in 1759; instead, she follows the Malesherbes story with those of Le Breton's deletion of the text and d'Alembert's defection, both of which resulted from the difficulties encountered in the latter period. The only possible conclusion is that Mme de Vandeuil's words can be given no weight insofar as the *time* of the event is concerned.

Turning first to the testimony pertaining to 1752, we find Grimm and d'Argenson in impressive accord. Both write with evident knowledge—d'Argenson's brother was immediately concerned with the proceedings, while Grimm was Diderot's closest friend. D'Argenson mentions what seems to be two facts: Diderot has fled, and his papers have been seized. Grimm not only concurs, but tells us of the eventual disposition of the confiscated papers. They were sent to the Jesuits, he informs us, who planned to make their own use of them, but who were disappointed and baffled by what they found. It is also significant that Grimm's story receives a sort of confirmation before the fact in another entry in d'Argenson's journal: "On ne doute pas que les jésuites ne reprennent et ne continuent l'ouvrage pour dédommager les souscripteurs."¹⁴ D'Argenson and Grimm therefore agree on both points.

Is this impressive agreement really contradicted by Barbier? It is, if we admit the accepted reading of the latter's testimony. "Barbier semble confirmer le récit de Mme de Vandeuil," writes Belin.¹⁵ Joseph Legras gives us the typical version of this reading.¹⁶ Malesherbes, he tells us, was charged with seizing all papers. Immediately he notified Diderot, and then suggested that the manuscripts be taken to his own house for safekeeping. After this had been done, Malesherbes proceeded to perform a sham search. As Belin puts it, "naturellement il ne trouva rien, puisque tout était chez lui."

Careful examination of the Barbier passage, however, suggests an entirely different interpretation. For the sake of convenience, let us repeat his testimony:

¹⁴ *Journal*, VII, 112 (14 février, 1752). If the Jesuits actually tried to utilize the manuscripts, it was probably for a new edition of their own *Dictionnaire de Trévoux*, rather than in the hope of continuing the *Encyclopédie*, the very name of which was distasteful to them. Two entries in the Jesuit periodical, the *Mémoires de Trévoux*, are of interest. One announces the first volume of a new edition of their *Dictionnaire* (*Mémoires de Trévoux*, 1752, II, 1147-8), the other declares the completion of the *Encyclopédie* to be impossible and calls the project ridiculous (*ibid.*, III, 750).

¹⁵ J.-P. Belin, *Le Mouvement philosophique de 1748 à 1789* (Paris, 1913), p. 63.

¹⁶ *Diderot et l'Encyclopédie* (Paris, 1928), p. 83.

On dit que le 21 de ce mois M. de Malesherbes . . . est venu chez Le Breton, imprimeur, un des associés, porteur d'une lettre de cachet pour saisir tous les manuscrits originaux du *Dictionnaire de l'Encyclopédie* et les planches de gravures, ce qui marque le dessein d'arrêter toute impression au delà des deux premiers tomes. Le Breton n'avait pas ces manuscrits, même pour le troisième tome. Il est certain que M. Diderot, le principal éditeur, et un des libraires ont porté et remis tous les manuscrits à M. de Lamoignon de Malesherbes. Diderot a eu peur d'être une seconde fois à la Bastille.

In these lines Barbier has said nothing of any intervention on the part of Malesherbes in order to save the manuscripts of the *Encyclopedia*. He is telling us something quite different. He is telling us that Diderot and the publishers had already given up their papers when the search took place. The connotation of the entire phrase, *Diderot . . . et un des libraires ont porté et remis les manuscrits*, indicates a surrender and not a collusion. The last sentence is evidently intended as motivation for the surrender: "Diderot a eu peur d'être une seconde fois à la Bastille."¹⁷ Otherwise it is pointless and out of place. The searchers found nothing—because they had been forestalled by Diderot's fear, and not because Malesherbes had intervened to save the manuscripts. Had Barbier intended the latter, he could have had no reason, in his secret diary, for not saying so in clear and unequivocal terms, instead of using such a "dark" phrase as "Le Breton n'avait pas ces manuscrits"; that phrase, written by a man under no restraint, is not a natural way to express such an intention.

If the authorities already had the manuscripts, then why the search? The answer lies in an oversight that historians have unanimously made. This is the essential clue to the mystery. They have not perceived that it is not a question of *one* Malesherbes, in this passage, but of *two*. "M. de Malesherbes" made the search, but the papers had been surrendered to "M. de Lamoignon de Malesherbes." The use of "M. de Malesherbes" in the first part, and of "M. de Lamoignon de Malesherbes" in the second, is a clear sign that Barbier is distinguishing father and son.

The elder Malesherbes, at the moment, occupied the office of Chancellor. The edicts condemning the first two volumes of the *Encyclopedia* and authorizing seizure of its papers were both issued by the *Conseil du roi*.¹⁸ The Chancellor was a member of the *Conseil du roi* and, moreover, had the special function of controlling the press. He evidently had a direct hand in the affair.

¹⁷ "Bastille" is an evident error for "Vincennes."

¹⁸ Cf. Legras, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

Which name refers to the elder Malesherbes and which to the younger? According to Michaud, the son was known simply as "Malesherbes," and the father as "Lamoignon."¹⁹ This coincides with Mme de Vandeuil's reference to the son as "M. de Malesherbes." The order of the *Conseil du roi* was sent for execution, then, just as later, in 1759, to the son, *Directeur de la Librairie*. During the interval between issuance and execution, Diderot, prompted by fear of imprisonment (and possibly forewarned by Malesherbes *fil*s), surrendered his papers to the man who was likely to order his arrest—the Chancellor Malesherbes. Either Malesherbes *fil*s was ignorant of Diderot's step, and simply did his duty; or, having advised the surrender, he had received from the *Conseil* no official recognition of it and no revocation of the *lettre de cachet*, and consequently proceeded to a search. Since the papers, in any case, were taken to the father, this again belies the story that the son saved them by having them brought to his house.

If this be the correct reading of Barbier, then he is in essential accord with Grimm and d'Argenson. The three pieces would fit together. D'Argenson informs us, in a general fashion, that "on a mis la main sur ses papiers." Barbier tells us how it was done, how Diderot anticipated seizure by surrender. Finally, Grimm gives us the subsequent history of the papers. The supposed intervention of Malesherbes, in February, 1752, is therefore eliminated.

The story of the intervention must rest, then, on the evidence of the other two witnesses, Diderot and Mme de Vandeuil. Their accounts are entirely complementary, and in no way contradict each other. Diderot's story fits in perfectly with his daughter's. In particular, his phrase, "il a fallu . . . enlever *pendant la nuit* les manuscrits," tallies with her phrase, "M. de Malesherbes prévint mon père qu'il donnerait *le lendemain* ordre d'enlever ses papiers."

Malesherbes' intervention must therefore have taken place towards the end of April, 1759, at the time of the Chaumeix scandal, during the surreptitious continuance of work on the outlawed *Encyclopédie*. Diderot's letter bears that date, and his daughter says nothing to prevent our applying the same date to her account.

One more fact supports this conclusion. In February, 1752, there was little reason for rescue work on the part of Malesherbes, and every reason for Diderot to make the gesture of bowing to authority. The second volume had just been completed. It came

¹⁹ *Biographie universelle* (Paris, 1865), article "Lamoignon."

off the press in January, and in February followed the order of suppression. As yet only a portion of the work could have been done in preparation for the next volumes. This fact Grimm confirms. There was nothing important. Diderot had little to lose. Furthermore, as Barbier himself relates, the *Encyclopædia*, at that moment, appeared to be finally condemned. Malesherbes had not yet made his efforts to secure limitation of the decree to the first two volumes, and Diderot, consequently, probably had no hope that the enterprise could be continued. He had nothing to think of but his own security. In 1759, on the contrary, a considerable part of the last volumes had been completed, and seizure would undoubtedly have meant final disaster. Frantically, Diderot appealed to Malesherbes, who put loyalty to his ideas above loyalty to his office.

Queens College

MILTON'S "ADVOCATUM NESCIO QUEM": MILTON,
SALMASIUS, AND JOHN COOK

By SAMUEL L. WOLFF*

Milton's (First) *Defence of the English People—Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio* (Prima)—1651, has been disparaged of late, and certainly reasons for not being interested in it are easy to find. Its structure and sequence, for example, are confessedly not its own but those of the work which it refutes, the *Defensio Regia* of Salmasius, 1649. As it follows this work closely, and does not shape itself from within, it does not attract the reader to its own contents; rather it distracts him from them by keeping him conscious that they are for the most part prescribed from without. This distraction might have been lessened had Milton recited with adequate fullness the matter he was refuting; but far too often his quotations and abstracts from Salmasius are quite inadequate—a mere word or phrase, touch and go—so brief and allusive as to leave the meaning obscure, and the reader wondering what the argument is all about. Milton may have assumed, perhaps justifiably, that his contemporary readers would have Salmasius's work at hand for constant reference. Modern students since Masson appear to have declined the labor of such reference: merely bored or bothered rather than interested, they seem not to have felt themselves "put upon inquiry," and have been willing to let Milton remain obscure.

I

Among Milton's obscurities which a reading of Salmasius clarifies are a number of allusions to an "Advocate," whom Salmasius has been reviling, and whom Milton, without naming him, supports. This advocate is identified by reference to the corresponding passages in Salmasius, which designate him unmistakably, and then name him. He is John Cook (1608-1660),¹ of Gray's Inn, the Solicitor-General appointed by the High Court of Justice which tried Charles I. Though associated with three other counsel,² Cook was the sole active prosecutor in open court: he presented (20 January, 1649) the official Charge against the king, and made from day to day the several motions which mark the progress of the trial, including the motion (23 January) for "sentence and judgment." The preamble ("Whereas," etc.) of the sentence itself (27 January) recites

* Deceased August 16, 1941.

¹ *D.N.B.*, s.n. (article by Sir Charles Harding Firth).

² These were "William Steele of Gray's Inn, who at once sent word that he was ill and escaped this task; one Aske"; and the ill-fated Isaac Dorislaus. See J. C. Muddiman, *Trial of King Charles I* (Edinburgh and London, 1928), pp. 65, 205.

Cook's Charge almost verbatim, and embodies by reference the portions it does not so repeat.³

Our present concern is less with these official acts than with an act which Cook meant to be official but which turned out otherwise. He had composed a speech to be delivered at the trial by way of summing up for the prosecution; but as the king refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court by pleading to the Charge, the court, after taking testimony, gave sentence without hearing counsel; so that Cook's speech remained unspoken. On February 9,⁴ however, ten days after the king's death, Cook published the speech, with additions, as a pamphlet of forty-three pages octavo, under the title:

KING CHARLS HIS CASE

or, an

APPEAL

To all Rational Men,

Concerning His

Tryal

at the

High Court of Iustice.

Being for the most part that which was intended to have been delivered at the Bar, if the King had Pleased to the Charge . . .

With an additional Opinion concerning The Death of King *James*,
The loss of *Rochel*, and, The Blood of *Ireland*.

By John Cook of Grays-Inn, *Barrester*.

.....
London, Printed by *Peter Cole*, at the sign of the Printing-Press in
Cornhil, near the Royal Exchange, for *Giles Calvert*, at the
Black Spread Eagle at the West-end of *Pauls*. 1649

For the present study Cook's importance lies in the relations of this tract to Salmasius and to Milton.

Salmasius in the *Defensio Regia* draws upon Cook's tract for a considerable portion of the matter which he refutes, and gives numerous and extensive passages to the refutation of it. He comes back to it again and again; and only three of his twelve chapters (the sixth, the seventh, and the tenth) are quite free, as far as I can now judge, from argument against it, or allusion to it, or denunciation of it or of its author for the sentiments it expresses or is supposed to express. Salmasius finds it a convenient repertory of matter to refute; he refers to it oftener than to any other single con-

³ Muddiman, pp. 78-79, 97, 126-128.

⁴ Muddiman, p. 233, citing Thomason Tract E. 542 (3).

temporary anti-royalist work; and among contemporary anti-royalist or regicide authors he names none but Cook. Salmasius's *Defensio Regia* thus turns out to be not a mere general *apologia* for Charles or for royalty, but, quite specifically, a *plea*, literary if not legal, to Cook's Charge at the trial as expanded in Cook's *King Charles His Case*. Salmasius's *Defensio*, to be sure, contains a great bulk of adventitious matter; but then so does Cook's tract. Allowing for the diffuseness and irrelevancy of contemporary legal procedure and legal literature, it is no great exaggeration to say that had the king at his trial pleaded to Cook's Charge, and taken Salmasius for his advocate, then, just as the expanded form of the Charge against the king actually is Cook's tract, so the expanded form of the king's Plea or Defence might well have been something very like Salmasius's *Defensio Regia*.

Milton in replying to Salmasius frequently selects for general approval or specific argumentative support the materials from Cook which Salmasius's text exhibits and refutes; so that Milton's First Defence is to an appreciable extent a *rebuttal* of Salmasius's *plea* against Cook; and Cook is, to that extent at the very least, a source of Milton. Several passages in Milton become clearer in the light of these facts.

In aim, scope, and method the present study is mainly descriptive and expository—factual and interpretative of facts—not intentionally argumentative. In particular, it does not attempt anything like a demonstration of Milton's indebtedness to Cook. To be sure, some of Milton's passages dealing with the matter from Cook which Salmasius places before him are such as to exclude any other possibility; here Milton repeats and confirms Cook's matter with express consciousness that what he is dealing with has come to him from beyond Salmasius—from the writer whom Milton actually mentions in these passages as Salmasius's "Advocate." Such cases speak for themselves. They are, moreover, so numerous and striking as to raise a presumption that Milton's conscious connection with Cook extends to other cases in which he does not mention the Advocate. In such cases, I have not, at least consciously, argued the presumption.

In both types of cases, however, both the obvious and the presumptive, I have allowed myself as much comment as seemed necessary to make clear the meaning of the texts under examination, and to call attention to their significant points. The evidence is thus presented for what it is worth.

II

There now follow some groups of corresponding passages from the three authors—Milton, Salmasius, and Cook—in number and content sufficient to establish their nexus as a fact, and to show how references to Cook illuminate dark or otherwise uninteresting portions of Milton's text. Normally each group offers, first, a passage from Milton pointing, *via* Salmasius, to Cook; next, the corresponding passage from Salmasius refuting or vilifying Cook; and finally, the passage from Cook that lies behind and gives the key to both. A different order is adopted when it makes matters clearer.

Cook's tract, though it has a discoverable general structure as an expansion and development of his Charge at the king's trial, is confused and incoherent in detail. Often a single paragraph or even a single sentence presents a number of arguments tangled together, without articulations or transitions, into an involution of parentheses and a series of afterthoughts and postscripts. So it happens more than once that several distinct lines of refutation in Salmasius and of rebuttal in Milton start from the same passage in Cook, each line from one of the several points or arguments, images or dicta, which Cook has jumbled into his single passage. What might otherwise seem to be needless repetitions in the present article are thus explained.

Passages cannot always be quoted in full. Some are presented by way of abstract, analysis, or summary in my own language, with frequent short quotations. All have exact references to the original texts.⁵

⁵ Texts and references:

Milton's *Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio* Prima is referred to by chapter and page of *The Works of John Milton*, Columbia University Press, Vol. VII (1932), where the text, based upon the edition of 1658, is accompanied by my translation, on facing pages. A typical reference would be "Milton, III, 179-181."

Salmasius's *Defensio Regia* is referred to by chapter and page in three editions, all 1649. These are designated respectively as F (= Folio, the first edition, or Madan No. 1; 338 pages + 1 unnumbered page of Errata); M2 (= Madan No. 2; 12mo, 720 pages); and M4 (= Madan No. 4; 12mo, 444 pages). See F. F. Madan, *Milton, Salmasius, and Dugard*, Transactions of the Bibliographical Society (= *The Library*, IV [1923], 119-145. A typical reference would be "Def. Reg., IX: F, 221; M2, 469-470; M4, 290-291." Milton's own references to pages of the *Defensio Regia* are always to F.

To save space, passages from Salmasius and from Milton are given in my English translation only, but references carry the reader to the Latin texts as above. No English translation of the whole of the *Defensio Regia*, as far as I know, has ever been published. I am now preparing one with introduction and notes.

The versions of Milton offered in the present article often differ, for the better, I hope, from my earlier versions in the *Columbia Milton*.

Cook's *King Charles His Case* is quoted from a photostat of the original pamphlet in the McAlpin collection in the library of the Union Theological Seminary, New York. References are to pages of the original pamphlet, e.g.,

Group A. "The Right of Kings."

Milton first mentions the Advocate while discussing an Old Testament text which regicides and royalists alike regarded as relevant and authoritative, viz., 1 Sam. 8. Here, it will be remembered, the Israelites, being disgusted with the corrupt judges who ruled them, ask Samuel for a king; and God, through Samuel, warns them that a king will commit many oppressive acts (which are mentioned in detail), and that the Israelites will then cry out to God, but in vain. According to the royalists, God was here, through Samuel, declaring what a king has a right to do—*jus regum* or *jus regium*, the "right of kings" or "royal right"—and was thus sanctioning unlimited monarchy even when oppressive. According to the Puritans, God was giving the Israelites a king in his wrath, and warning them against kingship itself as certain to prove oppressive. Milton's passage leads off with "*advocatum nescio quem*," and brings in the advocate three times more.

Milton, II, 121-125:

Next you rage against *some advocate or other, whom you call "bloodthirsty," and go at it body and soul to refute his closing speech*. Let him look to that; I will endeavor to be as short as I can in what I have undertaken to perform. Yet some things I cannot pass by,—first your extraordinary self-contradictions. On your thirtieth page you say: "The Israelites are not seeking to avert an unjust, violent, rapacious king, such as kings are at their worst" and yet, page 42, you rail at the *Advocate* for maintaining that the Israelites asked for a tyrant. "Would they have chosen," say you, "to leap headlong out of the frying-pan into the fire, and risk the cruelty of the worst tyrants, rather than suffer the bad judges to whom they were by now grown accustomed?" First you said the Hebrews preferred tyrants to judges; here you say they preferred judges to tyrants, and "a tyrant was the thing they least desired." So that the *advocate will answer you out of your own book*, for according to you every king is by royal right a tyrant. . . .

For my part I am not angry with you, for either you are mad or you are on our side. . . . *Unless it is you, rather than the Advocate, who are blinded by that stupidity in which you say he is "sunk," you shall now feel that you are yourself "become a very brute."*

"Cook, 8." Mr. Muddiman's *Trial of King Charles* contains (pp. 233-260) a reprint of Cook's tract, perhaps the most generally accessible of the several reprints which have been made from time to time, but very untrustworthy by reason of bad proofreading.

In matter quoted here from any text, such italics as were used originally to indicate quotation or paraphrase are replaced by quotation marks. Cook's italics, when employed for proper names, are not retained; when employed for emphasis they are retained, with the note "italics original." *All italics without this note are mine.*

Salmasius's first important mention of the Advocate occurs in his corresponding passage on 1 Sam. 8.

Def. Reg., II: F,41; M2, 84; M4, 54-55:

That this passage from the Prophet was wrongfully offered by the King of England in his own defence is reported by an *Advocate* belonging to that gang of robbers and assassins who shuddered not at offering up a guiltless and godly king as a victim to their own desire for tyrannical power. *I mean that Advocate who in their blood-thirsty assembly of Alastors had the job of summing up against the king in a peroration which made him out guilty of every infamous crime. In order to inflame the judges, wicked men like himself, to condemn the king,—judges who of their own accord were sufficiently roused and enkindled to that purpose—he collected in a pamphlet the numerous accusations upon which the king was to be condemned to death if he deigned to answer the charges brought against him. In this pamphlet he says that the king was forbidden to adduce the argument from Samuel.*

Salmasius thus, though he does not yet name Cook, identifies Milton's "Advocate" as Cook by describing his office and activities, and by citing a statement as made in Cook's pamphlet. The statement is found there, and its citation by Salmasius verified.

Cook, 8:

It seems that one passage which the king would have offered to the Court (which was not permitted him . . .) was, That 1 Sam. 8 is a copy of the king's Commission, by vertue whereof, he as king might rule and govern as he list.⁶

And Cook proceeds to paraphrase 1 Sam. 8, verses 11-17, detailing the oppressive acts of the prospective king of Israel. The nexus Cook: Salmasius: Milton is, therefore, evident in group A.

⁶ No account of the trial that I have seen mentions this supposed offer, which may be a fabrication of Cook's, shrewdly guarded by his "It seems." Yet it would be rash to conclude that the king did not make the offer. The reports of his trial abound in places where his words were interrupted at the trial or suppressed in the report. At one such place Clement Walker, a royalist, near the end of his own account of the trial, remarks: "Whether these breaches and interruptions were made by Bradshaw, or whether they are omissions and expunctions of some material parts of the King's Speech which this licensed Penman durst not set downe; I know not: I heard much of the King's Argument is omitted, and much depraved, none but Licensed men being suffered to take Notes." Walker, *The History of Independency*, 1649, Part II, p. 98. Salmasius, too, it should be observed, does not deny that the king offered to use the passage from Samuel, but only, as we shall see, argues against Cook's exegesis.

Group B. Saul and David—Were they “extraordinary”?

Group B is significant in two ways. First, it exhibits how the *Defensio Regia*, through repeated revilings of the Advocate and his argument, culminating in a pun on Cook's name, brings his argument and name home to Milton, who, thereupon, though he does not repeat the name, alludes unmistakably to the argument; so that the group again exhibits the nexus Cook: Salmasius: Milton. Secondly, the Group exemplifies the usefulness of this nexus in clarifying Milton; for Milton's text here, taken by itself, is undeniably obscure, and actually depends for its meaning upon the material derived by Salmasius from Cook.

Milton, II, 83, in maintaining that a king's actions may be questioned, quotes (as Salmasius had quoted) Eccl. 8:4, “Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may say unto him, What doest thou?”; but he turns this text against Salmasius by the example of Samuel:

And yet we read of one [i.e., Samuel] that did say to a king not only “What hast thou done?” but “Thou has done foolishly.” 1 Sam. 13. *But Samuel, you may say, was an extraordinary person.* I answer you with your own words further on, from your forty-ninth page. “*What was there extraordinary,*” say you, “*in Saul or David?*” And so say I, What was there in Samuel extraordinary? . . .

Surely a dark saying. To the reader this “extraordinary”-ness of Saul and David is quite meaningless, and perhaps remains so even after he finds it *quoted from Cook* by Salmasius at (a) in the following passages. These continue the passage last quoted from Salmasius's second chapter. Here Salmasius, in answering Cook, systematizes Cook's arguments, reviles him, and finally plays upon his name.⁷

Def. Reg., II: F,41 ff.:

The king [so the Advocate reports] was forbidden to adduce the argument from Samuel: First, because [the Advocate] says, what is there described is a tyrant. Secondly, because what is there intimated is not what a good king ought to do, but what a bad king generally does. Thirdly, because the (a) *choice of Saul and of David to be king was extraordinary, all power being now, on the contrary, derived to the king from the people.* Lastly because Saul was given to the people for a punishment, inasmuch as they had

⁷ Salmasius's passages in Group B, as quoted here, are much abridged from his Folio, pp. 41, 42, 43, 48-49, and 52. His mentions of Cook, and enough of the argument to point to Cook's clarification of Milton's passage, are, however, retained.

begged for a king after the fashion of the kings of the other nations—and these were all tyrants.

To answer the last point first. What he says is utterly ridiculous, and worthy of the brutish stupidity in which that sort of fanatics are sunk. . . . They ask for a king, says he, like the kings of the rest of the nations; and these kings were all tyrants. But did not the Jews know this at the time? Did they really not know [for example] whether the kings of Egypt were tyrants? (F,42) If, then, it was not unknown to them what royal government was like among these familiar neighboring nations, is it likely that they would long to be ruled in the same manner, being perfectly aware that these were ruled tyrannically? Would they have chosen to leap headlong out of the frying-pan into the fire, and risk the cruelty of the worst tyrants, rather than suffer the bad judges to whom they were by now grown accustomed? . . .

But *the bloodthirsty Lawyer* will answer again that God . . . warned them of the mistake they were making through ignorance of the right that kings generally exercised over their subjects,—yet that they wished to take a king even against God's will. . . .

(F,43) Besides, the assertion which *the Advocate from their herd of bigots* lays down as if it were admitted—that all the kings who ruled in those days were tyrants—is false. . . .

(F,48-49) Let all this be said to *the frantic Advocate in that gang of butchers*, for answer to his objection that God gave the Israelites a king by way of punishment because they asked for a king like the kings of the other nations, and to his other assertion that the kings of the first four monarchies were tyrants at first—till they won their people's goodwill. These arguments befit a raving madman.

Nor is a saner mind indicated by what *this same Hangmen's Lawyer* sets down in the third place: that (a) *the choice of Saul and of David was extraordinary*. . . . (a) *What, I ask, is extraordinary in the calling of Saul and David to the kingship?* . . .

(F,52) As for the first and second points pressed by *the bullying Advocate* . . . viz., that what is there described by the prophet is a tyrant, and that what is explained is not what a good king would do, but what a bad king could do [Cook, 8]: what inference from it would he yawn in our faces? Suppose we grant him all this: *so much the better will our little ladle keel this Cook's boiling pot. (Tanto melius olla hujus Coqui fervens parva trua confutabitur.)*⁸

Certainly! What the prophet is there attacking is the right and license of a tyrant. . . . Yes, but does he go on to say that one who proved such, and ruled thus, should be brought to trial and delivered to slaughter? Had the prophet said this, he would have conferred a

⁸ Cook is named again at least eight times in the *Defensio Regia*: IX: F, 227; M2, 482-483; M4, 298-299 (twice); XI: F, 281-282; M2, 600-601; M4, 370-371 (four times); F, 283; M2, 605; M4, 373 (once); X: F, 270; M2, 576; M4, 356 (once).

special favor upon the bloody *Defender of the Scaffold*, whose job would thereby have been done to his hand, and his case summed up to perfection. But what does the prophet go on to say? That when they were suffering all these hardships and cruelties under a tyrant, they were going to cry out for God's help, but in vain, for that God would not give ear to them. What else does it all mean—what else does it shout aloud—than this: that a king, even one who plays the tyrant, is yet going to stay king, through thick and thin, and not going to give an account of his deeds to anyone but God?

With this argument Salmasius closes his second chapter, which refers explicitly to Cook's arguments, repeatedly "calls him names," and at last actually names him.

We now turn to Cook's confused but pregnant page or two of matter, which Salmasius digests into systematic arguments, takes so much trouble to refute, and in refuting transmits to Milton. The present excerpt from Cook continues the previous excerpt.

Cook, 8-9:

It seems that one passage which the King would have offered to the Court (which was not permitted him to dispute the Supreme Authority in the Nation, and standing mute, the Charge being for High Treason, it is a conviction in Law) was, That 1 *Sam.* 8 is a Copy of the Kings Commission, by vertue whereof, he as King might rule and govern as he list, that he might take the peoples Sons and appoint them for himself for his Chariots, and to be his Horsemen, and take their Daughters to be his Confectionaries, and take their Fields, and Vineyards, and Olive-yards, even the best of them, and their goodliest young men, and their Asses, and give them to his Officers, and to his Servants; which indeed is a Copy and Patern of an absolute Tyrant, and absolute Slaves, where the people have no more than the Tyrant will afford them: *The holy Spirit in that Chapter does not insinuate what a good King ought to do, but what a wicked King would presume to do. Besides, Saul and David had extraordinary callings,⁹ but all just power is now derived from, and*

⁹ I.e., were set upon the throne by God's direct appointment. See below, Groups C and D.

For the use of "extraordinary" with the same connotation, cf. *Eikonoklastes* (1649), ch. XVII (Columbia Milton, V, 229). Milton is distinguishing episcopacy from apostleship: "this [i.e., apostleship] being Universal, *extraordinaire*, and immediate from God; that [i.e., episcopacy] being an *ordinaire* fixt & particular charge, the continual inspection over a certain Flock."

Cf. also *Tenure* (1649) in Columbia Milton, V, 28, quoted below, note 16. "Extraordinary" continues in use to designate direct action by God. John Keill, *An Examination of Dr. Burnetts Theory of the Earth*, 1698, pp. 19-20, so uses it in opposing the hypothesis that all things are produced and regulated "by the necessary laws of mechanism, without any *extraordinary* concurrence of the divine power." Quoted by S. P. Lamprecht, *The Role of Descartes in Seventeenth Century England*, Studies in the History of Ideas, Columbia University Press, III (1935), 227 and n. 128.

conferred by the people; yet in the case of Saul, it is observable, that the people out of pride to be like other Nations, desired a King, and *such a King as the Heathens had, which were all Tyrants*; for they that know any thing in History, know that the first four Monarchs were all Tyrants at first, til they gained the peoples consent. . . . Samuel was a good Judge, and there was nothing could be objected against him, therefore God was displeased at their inordinate desire of a King; and it seems to me that the Lord declares his dislike of all such Kings as the heathens were, that is, Kings with an unlimited power, that are not tied by laws; for he gave them a King in his wrath. . . .

The passage from Cook rounds out Group B—which not only confirms *nominatim* the nexus Milton: Salmasius: Cook, but exemplifies as well the use of the nexus in elucidating its opening passage from Milton.

The passage from Cook is important, too, in that it shapes Salmasius's whole second chapter, the long chapter from which the much abridged matter above is quoted. This chapter, consisting of twenty-four folio pages (F,29-52 incl.), gives portions of ten pages to the refutation of the matter just quoted from Cook. Of the ten, two (29-30) are at the beginning of the chapter, four (40-44) at the middle, and four (48-52) at the end. Cook's dicta, thus opposed at such length, occupy portions of only two octavo pages (8-9) in his pamphlet, and, as already observed, are presented in a fragmentary and disorderly manner; yet it is fair to say that Cook's two disorderly pages have prescribed for Salmasius's long and orderly chapter a substantial portion of its contents, and, essentially, its argumentative structure and emphasis.

To all this matter in Cook and Salmasius, here drastically abridged in Groups A and B, Milton in his second chapter gives only the two passages (II, 83; 121-125) quoted above—brief but unmistakably linked with Cook the Advocate.

Group C. "*What He 'works,' and what He 'suffers to be wrought' with high providence.*"¹⁰

Certain other dicta of Cook's (which in his text are entangled with those in Groups A and B) elicit from Milton, when he finds them contradicted by Salmasius, a set of confirmatory arguments on God's relation to human affairs—in particular to tyranny and its abolition. Cook's dicta, partly disentangled, and lettered for reference, are this time presented first.

¹⁰ 1642, *Reason of Church Government*, Book II. Preface, Columbia Milton, III, Part 1, p. 238.

Cook, 8, 9, 10:

... All power, as it is originally in the people ... so it is given forth for their good, nothing for their destruction; *for a King to rule by lust and not by Law*, is a Creature that was (γ) *never of God's making, not of God's approbation, but his permission*. ... The holy Spirit in that Chapter [1 Sam. 8] does not insinuate what a good King ought to do, but what a wicked King would presume to do. Besides, (α) *Saul and David had extraordinary callings*, but all just power is (β) *now derived from, and conferred by the people*; ... the first four Monarchs in history were all Tyrants at first, til they gained the peoples consent. ... Nimrod ... the first Tyrant and Conquerer ... had no Title, & so were all Kingdoms ... 'tis a continuation of a Conquest till the people consent and voluntarily submit to a Government, *they are but slaves, & in reason they* (δ) *may free themselves if they can* ... (p. 9). The Jewes would have a King for Majestie and Splendor, like the Heathens; (γ) *God permits this, he approves it not*; ... besides God told (p. 10) *those Kings* ... *what their* (η) *duty was; not to* (η) *exalt themselves overmuch above their brethren, to delight themselves in the Law of God* [Deut. 17:19, 20]: *out of which* (η) *I inferre* that the Turkes, Tarters, Muscovites, French, Spaniards, and all people that live at the beck and nod of tyrannical men, (δ) *may and* (ϵ) *ought to free themselves from that tyranny, if, and when they can*; for such Tyrants that so domineer with a rod of iron, (γ) *do not governe by Gods permissive hand of approbation or benediction, but by the permissive hand of his Providence, suffering them to scourge the People, for ends best knowne to himselfe, until he* (ζ) *open a way for the people to work out their owne enfranchisements*.

In this passage the governing thesis, lettered (γ), which is laid down three times, is that there is a decisive difference between what God "makes," "works," appoints, or "approves," and what God merely "permits" or "suffers." Seen in connection with this, the old proposition (α) that Saul and David were "extraordinary," i.e., appointed directly by God, gains fresh import, which Cook brings out in several express or plainly implied contrasts and inferences: "Now" (β)—now that Biblical times are over—power is conferred upon kings no longer by God's direct or "extraordinary" appointment, but by the people. The first important implication, then, is that post-Biblical kings, not owing their appointment directly to God, cannot claim the immunity which divine appointment would have conferred upon them; indeed, if they are tyrants, God (γ), not having actively appointed them, merely *suffers or permits* them as his punitive instruments. But (δ) God's *permission* of tyrants does not forbid their *abolition* by any human power that can accomplish

it.¹¹ (ε) Rather the contrary: as evils, they "ought"—observe (ε and η) the *ethical* implication—to be abolished by the nations they oppress. To these "enfranchisements" God (ζ) "opens a way"; for (η) he is a moral God, favoring liberty rather than tyranny.

Salmasius perceives the danger of allowing any practical effect to Cook's distinction between "extraordinary" and ordinary. If God's protection can be claimed by those kings only who have an "extraordinary" or direct appointment from God, what becomes of the Divine Right of *all* kings? What, in particular, becomes of the immunity claimed by and for Charles, who, admittedly, had no "extraordinary" appointment? Clearly, Cook's distinction must be rendered ineffectual. For this purpose Salmasius will be found offering three arguments, which he confuses more or less as he proceeds. Saul and David were *not* extraordinary, he argues, partly (θ) because all antiquity, like the Jews, looked for supernatural appointment or approval of its kings; next (ι) because not God only, but the people as well, appointed Saul and David; and finally, and chiefly, (κ) because the attempted distinction between kings who have God's immediate appointment and kings who have not is effaced by the doctrine of "First Cause" and "Second Causes" as interpreted and applied by Salmasius.

God, it was agreed, works indirectly as well as directly. Sometimes he manifests his will by creation or miracle, or by inspiration, revelation, vision, or direct speech or sign to mankind: such "extraordinary" occurrences as these he effects as a First Cause. In the vast majority of cases, however, he works indirectly, by means of Second Causes, allowing "nature" (which includes human nature) to take its "ordinary" course; and such is the normal everyday relation of God to terrestrial affairs.¹² Cook's distinction (α) between

¹¹ This is one of the main theses of Milton's *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (published February 13, 1649). Cf. its full title, and pp. 7, 14, 17-19, 25, 27, 40, 47, and 54 (Columbia Milton, V).

¹² A short and lucid contemporary statement of the doctrine of First Cause and Second Causes may be found in Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, 1661, ch. XXIV, pp. 248-249, where it forms part of Glanvill's justification of the "new" experimental sciences: these, though their concern is with second causes only, do not *deny* God as First Cause.

Miracles, however, are wrought by the First Cause alone, without the mediation of second causes, or "nature." Jeremy Taylor, *Life of Christ* (1649), Discourse XIV (*Works*, ed. Heber, 1822, III, 106) declares that the miracle of Christ's giving sight to the born blind "was wholly an effect of a Divine power, for nature did not at all cooperate; or, that I may use the elegant expression of Dante, it was such

—à cui natura

Non scaldò ferro mai, ne [*sic*] battè ancuide,
for which nature never did heat the iron, nor beat the anvil." For this reference I am indebted to K. C. M. Sills, "References to Dante in Seventeenth Century English Literature," *MP*, III (1905), 107 and notes 4 and 5.

Dante's passage, *Par.* XXIV, 101-102, applies this doctrine to the diffusion of Christianity: the conversion of the "natural" man—all the impulses of whose

"extraordinary" kings and kings not extraordinary, with its equivalent, parallel, or corollary distinction (γ) between God's "making" and God's "permission," will now be restated by Salmasius in terms of First Cause and Second Causes; but—and here, apparently, lies his purpose in so restating it—*both kinds of effects are equally*, Salmasius argues, *God's effects*. The effects of Second Causes manifest God's will no less surely than do God's own actions as First Cause; for *all things* (mediate as well as immediate, "ordinary" as well as "extraordinary") *are of God*. It follows that "ordinary" kings—kings who come to the throne in the course of human events—even kings who are appointed by a people (β , ι)—yes, and even tyrants—are there pursuant to God's will and under his protection, just as much as those kings who, by being falsely called "extraordinary," are used as specious arguments to expose the "ordinary" kings to trial and punishment. Such seems to be the point of Salmasius's argument against Cook's dictum that Saul and David are extraordinary.

Def. Reg., II: F, 48-51; M2, 101-105; M4, 65-68:

Nor is a saner mind indicated by what *this same Hangmen's Lawyer* sets down in the third place: that (a) *the election of Saul and of David was extraordinary*. I wish he would explain himself more clearly. But this is the way of Enthusiasts such as he and those like him, gripped by the same fanatical fury: they think it enough to say a thing is so, whose only evidence is derived from the Spirit that tears them. *What, (a) I ask, is extraordinary in the calling of Saul and David to the kingship?* Is it that they were made kings? But this was then the ordinary customary government for most nations. It is precisely on this account that the Jews ask God to appoint them a king such as the *other* nations had. Or did he think it a novelty that they chose to have their form of government changed from the Aristocracy of the Judges into a Monarchy? Nothing is commoner than this change. Or perhaps they think it must be considered more novel for a state to go over from Aristocracy to Monarchy than for it to be *commanded* to move from Monarchy to Democracy! Which I hardly think they will say except when raving after their peculiar fashion. . . .

But perhaps what seems to him extraordinary is the *manner* in which Saul and David were raised to the royal power—namely that the people begged of God, through a prophet of God, to appoint

unregenerate "nature" oppose it—was a miracle in which nature had no part. Scartazzini's edition (Milan, Hoepli, 1903) quotes *ad loc.* *De civitate dei* xxii. 5, and cites, *inter alia*, Bossuet, *Histoire universelle*, Partie II, ch. 20 (*Oeuvres*, ed. Lachat, 1862-1866, XXIV, 477), which quotes and cites *De civitate dei* xxi.7 and xxii.5, and where the miracle under discussion is also the diffusion of Christianity.

them a king. Of course if we look at our own times, this way of choosing a king is quite unusual. But (θ) *if we look back at the customs of that age, and especially of that people, the thing was ordinary and customary.* For in those days the Israelites were wont to undertake nothing of importance without inquiring God's will through his interpreters the prophets. . . . They used to lay all things before God, and have him authorize all they might do. Even today the doing of all things ought no less to be determined according (κ) to his will and (γ) permission,—though this be now (κ) *indistinct and silently implied, not open and outspoken.* After the death of the later prophets Haggai, Zachariah, and Malachi, the Holy Spirit, according to the Rabbis, departed from Israel, and thenceforward they left off their way of consulting God through their prophets, priests, and dreams—the three methods mentioned in the Book of Judges.

Though it be by means of second causes, yet (κ) it is God that is at work, whether commanding or (γ) permitting, whether impliedly or expressly; and this despite the fact that the action is ascribed specifically to the second cause, namely (ι , κ) man. Now God gave the Israelites their first king Saul—a way of appointing a king which, according to the Pettifogger for those robbers and murderers, was (α) extraordinary. And yet Moses in Deuteronomy speaks of the appointing of the prospective king as (β , ι , κ) *the act of the people itself.* The rest of the kings of Israel, though they (κ) *reached their kingship by succession or otherwise, and even (α) now and then by God's express command,* none the less are said in Chronicles and Kings to be set up by (β , ι , κ) the people. So in 1 Chron. 11¹³ it is the Israelites that are (ι) considered to have made Jeroboam king over themselves; though yet in the same chapter God bids Shemaiah announce to Rehoboam King of Judah that (κ) this was done by his will.

When some wicked person slew another equally wicked, it was spoken of as "the hand (κ) of God" and "a judgment of God"; yet this conferred no impunity upon the man that actually did it. . . .

Like (θ) the Israelites, moreover, who took counsel of God through prophets, especially when the matter in question was the settling of the government, as in appointing a judge or setting up a king, so the Nations too under like conditions were wont to take counsel of their gods in divers ways. They used to resort to Astrologers, or to oracles, or to soothsayers or augurs. Others would trust the choice of their kings to lot: and on one occasion too, by agreement, the neighing of a horse made a king.¹⁴ All these methods, to us now extraordinary and unwonted and strange, were formerly ordinary.

But so be it: let us suppose (α) that the choice of Saul and of David was extraordinary. What then? What would that lump of mud of an Advocate—that clod stained with the Royal blood—

¹³ Sic, probably for 2 Chron. (11:2-4).

¹⁴ Darius the Great (Herodotus iii. 84-88).

what would he have us thence infer? *That we must (a) spare those kings only who have been ordained in this extraordinary way, but (δ) may with impunity kill all others?* So (a, γ) *David ought not to be slaughtered, but Solomon ought? Why then was he not slain, or condemned to death, by the people? Was he a better king than Charles I . . . ?*

Milton, in refuting the long passage just quoted, refutes at the same time two other related and much shorter passages from Salmasius, one in Chapter II and one in Chapter III. He divides his refutation locally between his own chapters II and III, the corresponding places of his *Defence*; but its argumentative content is the same in both places, and deals essentially with Salmasius's main argument above. Salmasius's pair of shorter passages should be examined before the passages in which Milton answers all three.

Def. Reg., II: F, 39-40; M2, 81-82; M4, 52-53:

If a king . . . [like Herod], who held his kingdom by favor of another [viz., Mark Antony], ought even in the opinion of his patron to wield a power subject and liable to nobody, what is to be said of those kings who have not their royalty from someone else, but are indebted and obliged for it to God alone? (κ)

Hence it is that the throne upon which the king sits is called "the throne of God" in Holy Writ, for example in 1 Chronicles 29 [:23]: "And Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord as king instead of David his father, and was pleasing unto all, and all Israel obeyed him." Clement in the *Constitutions* says: "Thou shalt fear the king, knowing that this election is of the Lord." The Essenes, according to Porphyry, held the doctrine that without God's will it would fall to nobody's lot to rule. Hence the old poet said that kings were from Jove: "Over the people," says Homer, "there ought to be a single king, whom Jove has appointed." . . .

Did the early propagators of Christian doctrine teach aught else when they were proclaiming the Gospels to the nations? In his Epistle to the Romans, 13 [:1] Paul writes: "There is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God." God is, according to Daniel [2:21] . . . "He who removeth kings, and setteth up kings." *Now if kings are set up by God, if by him they rule, as God himself says, then no other than himself who gave should judge them.* Which truth the Greeks acknowledged no less than did the Jews and the Christians.

Def. Reg., III: F, 58; M2, 120; M4, 76-77:

They [kings] are God's ministers and servants, too, whenever God would chastise peoples, whom they sometimes crush in cruel slavery by God's permission . . . that he may punish them for their sins. Thus God calls Nebuchadnezzar his "Servant" in Jer. 27 [:6]:

"And now have I given all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant." This he repeats elsewhere too [e.g., Jer. 25:9]. In the same chapter also God says through his prophet that the nation and the kingdom which will not serve Nebuchadnezzar, that nation God will punish with the sword, and with the famine, and with the pestilence [Jer. 27:8; slightly paraphrased]. "Bring your necks," he says, "under the yoke of the king of Babylon, and serve him and his people, and live." [Jer. 27:12.]

In the first of these two shorter passages, Salmasius's thesis that kings are *subject to judgment* by God alone is made to rest upon the thesis that they are *appointed* by God alone; which in turn rests upon his main thesis that *even when appointed by the people or other Second Causes, they are still God's appointees*. Milton plainly sees this short argument to be a superstructure upon the longer main argument above, and he will be found answering it as such.

In the second of the shorter passages there appears again, as Milton perceives, one of the old theses—that God (γ) *permits* a tyrant to act as his punitive instrument, a thesis which Cook had coupled with the important chance of escape afforded by (γ) *the distinction between appointing and permitting*, and its parallel, (α) *the distinction between "extraordinary" and ordinary*, but which Salmasius has now repeated without affording any escape. Indeed, as we have seen, it is by means of the doctrine of First Cause and Second Causes that Salmasius tries to block precisely this escape.

Milton throughout his refutation of all three passages will be found supporting Cook. Like Cook, he employs the distinctions just mentioned, which amount to the doctrine of First Cause and Second Causes. Without naming it, Milton accepts this doctrine too, open-eyed, in all its generality, and then with complete cogency establishes exactly contrary conclusions. Amen! says Milton, verily, verily (λ) *all things are of God*. If, then, any particular thing is of God, *so is its opposite!* If God permits tyrants, so does he likewise (δ) permit liberators. If he allows (λ) one person to oppress a people, he equally (δ , λ) allows a people to throw off the oppressor. Nay—if, so far, there is a logical balance between God's permission of tyranny and his permission of liberation through revolt, then—these "other things being equal" in bare logic—yet considerations *ethical* (ϵ , η) turn the balance in favor of liberation. This explicates the (ϵ , η) ethical implication already plainly present in Cook—that God, being a moral God, favors good rather than evil, liberty rather than slavery, and (ξ) therefore so disposes the chain of Second Causes and effects—i.e., the course of human events—as to make liberation possible: He "opens a way." Again, in arguing that even Saul and David owed their appointment as much to (ι , κ) *the people*

(Second Causes) as to God (First Cause), Milton goes beyond Cook, accepts Salmasius's view that a people is instrumental in appointing kings, but argues thence that it may lawfully depose them, and thus scores an additional point for the regicides. Finally, in Milton's contention that though a people know certain evils to be sent of God, it will surely shake them off if it can, "*unless (μ) himself from heaven should command the contrary,*" this and the other saving clauses lettered (μ) support and restate Cook's practical distinction (γ) between God's mere *permission* and God's manifest appointment or *command*—the distinction which Salmasius sought to efface by means of the doctrine of First Cause and Second Causes.

Milton, then, in adopting Salmasius's doctrine, reestablishes Cook's distinction in its practical effects. We may not attempt to change what God makes manifest as his own direct command or immediate appointment ("extraordinary," First Cause); we may properly attempt to change anything else that is evil (ordinary effect of Second Causes). Our efforts, if successful, produce an effect that is likewise of God, nay, an effect which God favors and has made possible—an effect for which, through our efforts and other Second Causes, he has "opened a way."

Milton, though in one point he goes beyond Cook, thus supports against Salmasius all Cook's other points in all their implications. The significance of Milton's passages will now appear without further comment.

Milton, II, 109-111:

"Kings," you say, "hold their authority from no other than God, but are indebted and obliged for it to him alone." What kings, pray? For I deny that there ever were any such kings. Saul, the first king of Israel, had never reigned but that (β) *the people* desired a king even against the will of God, and though he was proclaimed king at Mizpah, yet he lived almost a private life, and came after the herd of his father, till he was created king a second time by (β) *the people* at Gilgal. And what of David? Though anointed by God, was he not anointed a second time in Hebron by (β) *the tribe of Judah, and then by all the Hebrews?* . . . Solomon, you say "sat on the throne of the Lord, and was acceptable to all men," 1 Chron. 29. So that it did use to be something to be well-pleasing in the eyes of (β) *the people!* Jehoiadah, the priest, made Joash king, but first he made him and (β) *the people* enter into a covenant to one another, 2 Kings 11. I acknowledge that these kings and the rest of David's posterity were appointed *both by God and by ($\alpha, \beta, \iota, \kappa$) the people*, but all other kings of what countries soever were appointed, I affirm, by (β) *the people only*. I challenge you to show that they were appointed by God, *except in the sense (κ, λ) that all things, great and small, are said to be made and appointed by him.*

The throne of David, then, is in a *peculiar* [cf. "extraordinary"] *manner* (α) called "the throne of Jehovah," whereas the thrones of other princes are Jehovah's *no otherwise* (λ) *than are all things else*; which you should have learnt out of the same chapter, verses 11, 12 (λ). "*All that is in the heaven and in the earth is thine*; thine is the kingdom, O Lord. Both riches and honor come of thee, and power and might." This is so often repeated, not that kings may be puffed up, but to warn them that though they think themselves gods, yet there is a God above them to whom they owe all. Thus we easily understand what the poets and the Essenes mean when they tell us that "it is by God that kings reign, and they are from Jove"; for Solomon, himself a king, considers that even lesser officers also, namely judges, are from the same God, Prov. 8:15, 16; and from the same Jove Homer, in the first Iliad: "... judges who at Zeus's hand guard the dooms." Surely all we are of God likewise, and God's offspring. Therefore this (λ) *universal right of God's* takes not away (β) *the people's right*; so (μ) *all other kings not named to their* (μ) *office by God* are indebted and obliged for their authority (β) *to the people alone, and consequently are accountable to them for it*.

Milton, II, 113-115:

If it is by God, therefore, that kings nowadays¹⁵ reign, it (λ) *is by God too that peoples assert their liberty, since all things are* (λ) *of him and by him*. Scripture bears like witness both that by him kings reign and that by him they are cast down from their thrones, though yet we perceive that the one and the other are brought about far oftener (β , κ) *by the people* than by God. *The right of the people then is as much* (λ) *from God as is the right of the king*—whatever that is. And *whenever any* (β) *people have appointed a king without some visible designation by* (μ) *God Himself*, they can by the same right (δ) put him down. To depose a tyrant certainly is a *more* (η) *god-like action* than to set one up; and there appears much more of God in the people (β , η) whenever they depose an unjust king than in the king that oppresses an innocent people.

Milton, III, 179-181:

You say that God gave many kingdoms over in slavery to Nebuchadnezzar. I confess he did so for a time, Jer.27.7; but do you make appear if you can that he gave the English nation for a single

¹⁵ Here we find Cook's "now" linked with Salmasius's doctrine that the distinction between First Cause and Second Causes is without practical effect. Milton's *protasis* admits this doctrine in its extreme form ("If, even *now*, in post-Biblical times, kings are of God"), the more completely to refute it in the *apodosis*: ("So is everything else—especially liberation from tyranny").

Milton, III, 169-171, 175-177, 199, 205-207; IV, 221; VI, 355 presents matter in which the arguments in the passages now quoted are implicit but undeveloped and fragmentary.

minute in slavery to Charles Stuart. That God (γ) *permitted* them I would not deny, but I have never heard that he *gave* them. Or if God be said to give a people into slavery whenever a tyrant prevails over the people, why ought he not as well be said to set them free (λ) whenever the people prevail over a tyrant? Shall the tyrant credit and owe his tyranny to God, and not we our liberty? There is no evil in the state that the Lord hath not let in, Amos 3. Famine, plague, sedition, a public enemy—is there a single one of these that the state will not strive with all its might to shake off? Shake them off it surely will if it can, though it know them to be sent of God, unless (μ) himself from heaven should command the contrary.

Upon the same reasoning why may not the state (δ) rid itself of a tyrant if it be stronger than he? Why should we suppose the uncontrolled passions of this one man to be (η , λ) appointed by God for the common ill, rather than (η , λ) the self-controlled power of the whole state for the common weal?

Group D. "To your tents, O Israel."

In Group D, which is closely linked with the preceding, Milton again justifies revolt against kings by showing that this too is of God; and his argument is again directed against Salmasius's use of the doctrine of First Cause and Second Causes; but Group D starts from a point in Cook quite distinct from that which started Group C.

In one of Cook's parentheses the Parliament's long-suffering tenderness of Charles is contrasted favorably with the sharp decisive revolt of Israel led by Jeroboam against King Rehoboam (1 Kings 12).

Cook, 24:

. . . they [the Israelites] never petitioned him [as the Parliament petitioned Charles], but advised him, he refused their counsel, and hearkened to yong Counsellors, and they cry, "To thy tents, O Israel," and make quick and short work of it. . . .

Salmasius's answer branches into several arguments, of which we shall note two. In his first argument he accepts Cook's comparison, and of course turns it to the disadvantage of the English regicides.

Def. Reg., IV: F, 76-78; M2, 160-165; M4, 101-104:

"Those butchers make a point of the revolt of the ten tribes of Israel from Rehoboam." . . . But did the Israelites treat their king "as the English rebels did theirs? Did they indict him, condemn him, order him off to execution?" No indeed!

Yet the troublesome fact remains that the revolt of Israel *had* God's express approval: "this thing is from me" (1 Kings 12:24). Something awkward for Salmasius to explain away! And here, in trying to explain it away by means of a second argument, Salmasius returns to his doctrine of First Cause and Second Causes. He cannot help admitting that God's approval as First Cause justified the people; but he momentarily forgets that Jeroboam had likewise had a divine commission (1 Kings 11:29-38), and he confuses Jeroboam's revolt against Rehoboam with his subsequent idolatry (1 Kings 12:28). So he rounds upon Jeroboam as if, in revolting, Jeroboam had been merely *permitted* and not *commanded*—as if he had been merely a *Second Cause*, and hence a rebel and a reprobate. "Even if God put his decrees into effect by means of second causes, yes, and though he have himself *permitted* the evil they have done, nevertheless he is not wont to let it go unpunished. Having used them as his whip to scourge the wicked, God then breaks his own whip, or puts it in the fire. Hence it is of the utmost importance . . . whether God has commanded an action, or only permitted it." In short, nothing but an express approbation or command by God as First Cause can justify revolt; and the English regicides, though they talk in their fanatical manner about a voice from Heaven that led them on (*Def. Reg.*, IV: F, 78; M2, 165; M4, 104), certainly have no such warrant.

This is the Salmasius who in Group C argued that it makes no difference whether God command or only permit, and whether effects be due immediately to God as First Cause, or mediately to God through Second Causes: all "are of God"! But now the shoe is on the other foot. Whereas in Group C the effects in question were God's *appointment and protection* of kings, which must be maintained no matter how caused, here in Group D the effects in question are men's *revolts against* kings, which must be condemned unless manifestly due to God as First Cause. So now it makes a great difference whether these are commanded or only permitted!

Milton, IV, 227-229, the corresponding passage, overlooks or (by way of exception) waives, the opportunity to score Salmasius's self-contradictions,¹⁰ and addresses himself directly to Salmasius's

¹⁰ Could Milton have remembered an exactly corresponding and of course exactly opposite inconsistency of his own? When the effect under discussion is the *appointment or maintenance* of a king, Milton, as at μ above, has to admit that God's direct intervention in favor of a king or even of a tyrant must be respected: in such a case there is a practical difference between God's mere suffering or permission (ordinary Second Causes) of the tyrant, and God's active appointment of him (extraordinary First Cause). But when the shoe is on the other foot, and the effect under discussion is not the *maintenance* but the *destruction* of a tyrant, then Milton would have us take even God's direct and immediate, but general, commandment to destroy certain types of offenders *not* as

arguments. Having narrated the revolt of Israel—Cook's starting-point—he glances ironically for a moment at the comparison offered by Cook and picked up by Salmasius. True, says Milton, the Israelites did not *quite* kill king Rehoboam! They *only* stoned to death his tax-gatherer Adoram; but perhaps they "were ready to make an example of the king himself had he not made speed to flee" (1 Kings 12:18)! So Milton supports Cook's dictum that Israel "made quick and short work of it." Next he re-emphasizes God's approbation of the revolt, and finally he turns the flank of Salmasius's argument from First Cause and Second Causes almost exactly as he turned it in Group C.

Milton, IV, 229:

You say that *all kings are of God*, and that therefore the people ought not to resist even tyrants. I answer you that the meetings and assemblies of the people, their votes, their acts, endeavors, and decrees, *are likewise of God*, as God himself here bears witness; and consequently, by the authority of God himself, a king likewise ought not to resist the people. For *as certain as it is that at present¹⁷ kings are of God, and as validly as this commands a people's obedience, so certain is it, that at present¹⁷ free assemblies of the people are also of God, and this enforces just as validly their right to keep their kings in order or to cast them off.*

Milton proceeds to close the argument by expressly denying Salmasius's statement (*Def. Reg.*, IV: F, 78; M2, 165; M4, 104) that the English regicides pretended to have been led by a voice from Heaven.

Milton, IV, 231-233:

"This English faction of robbers," say you, "allege that they were put upon their wicked impious undertaking by some sort of voice from Heaven." That the English ever pretended to any such "extraordinary" but as "ordinary"! The removal of a tyrant would therefore not need to be justified by God's direct intervention or mandate as First Cause—for God even without intervening is always in favor of it: this is the regular or "ordinary" state of his will and judgment; hence tyrannicide, whenever *feasible*, is always *right*.

Tenure, Columbia ed., p. 28: "In the yeare 1564. John Knox . . . maintained op'nly . . . that the fact of Jehu and others against their King, having the ground of God's *ordinary* command to put such and such offenders to death, was *not extraordinary*, but to be imitated of all that preffer'd the honour of God to the affection of flesh and wicked Princes. . . ."

Allison, ed. *Tenure*, p. 116, quotes Knox, *History of Reformation in Scotland*, ed. David Laing, 2. 446: "And as touching that ye allege, that the fact was *extraordinarie*, and is nocht to be imitat. I say, that it had ground of Godis *ordinary* judgement, whilk commandis the idolator to deie the deith. . . ."

¹⁷ Cook's "now," once more linked with Salmasius's doctrine, for the more forcible refutation of the latter. Cf. above, note 15.

warrant as a justification of their actions is one of your countless lies and fictions.

The bearing of Milton's denial is clear in view of his argument as a whole. He wastes no time in discussing the supposed actuality of the voice from Heaven, but contends that, whether there was such a voice or not, the regicides nowise rest their case upon any such alleged "extraordinary" commandment from God as First Cause. The whole trend of Milton's argument is that they need no such warrant, their actions being fully justified by the course of Second Causes *per se*, which also "are of God."

The next two groups, E and F, have a common theme, popular sovereignty; yet they are better exhibited separately because they deal with quite different aspects of it.

Group E, which stems from one of Cook's dicta already quoted, ramifies into two passages in Salmasius and two corresponding passages in Milton. In view of this complexity it seems best to take the passages in chronological order, beginning with Cook.

Group E. The People are "now" Sovereign.

Cook, 8, starts the group with the dictum several times quoted above, pp. 567-568, that though Saul and David had extraordinary callings, "all just power is *now* derived from, and conferred by the people."

Salmasius, in his eagerness to confute Cook, seizes upon Cook's *now* for contradiction, declares that the Israelites even in Biblical times exercised full power in appointing a king, and so entraps himself, royalist though he is, into asserting popular sovereignty:

Def. Reg., II: F, 42; M2, 86-87; M4, 56:

Since the Israelites were "resolved to take a king even against God's will" . . . it follows . . . that *sovereignty was in the people even then, and did not begin to be in their hands today or yesterday, as the bloodstained Advocate pretends. So the people were then possessed of quite unlimited power; as the Israelites showed at that time, when without hindrance or compulsion they rejected the judges, their former governors, and chose a king.*

Later, returning to this proposition, Salmasius links it with Deut. 17: 14-20, which (he argues) *authorized* Israel, even as early as the exodus from Egypt, to choose a king.

Def. Reg., II: F, 51; M2, 107; M4, 68:

Extraordinary, quoth the lawyer for the parricides, was David's calling to his kingdom. How so? Because *today* all power

is derived from the people? *Why only just today?* When did it begin to be theirs?—Did the people not have power at the time when Saul was made king? But Scripture witnesses that they had. Was it without power that they deposed their judges—and those, too, their captains in battle—in order to have kings? . . . Why did Moses say that they must appoint them a king immediately upon entering the Holy Land? [Deut. 17:14].

Milton, touching for a moment the first of these passages from Salmasius, twits him with his anti-royalist admission:

Milton, II, 123:

What you say next is very true: "Sovereignty was then in the people, as appears by their rejecting judges and choosing a king." Remember this when I ask you for it again!"

Milton does "ask for it again" in a second passage, which catches up Salmasius's citation of Deut. 17:14, taxes him with garbling it, and again "rubs in" his anti-royalist admissions.

Milton, II, 131-133:

With what shamelessness you counterfeit a supposed *command* of God "to set up a king over them as soon as they should be possessed of the Holy Land," Deut. 17! For you craftily leave out the preceding words, "*When thou . . . shalt say, I will set a king over me.*" And pray call to mind also what you said before, page 42, and what I shall now ask you to recite, viz. "*The people were then possessed of sovereignty.*"

Milton's passage leads on to another of his mentions of the Advocate, and ends with what may be a touch of humor:

Now once more you shall decide whether you are sacrilegious or crazed. "God," you say [*Def. Reg.*, II: F, 45; M2, 93-94; M4, 60], having so long before appointed a kingly government as best and most proper for that people, what shall we say to the Prophet's opposing it, and God's own dealing with the Prophet as if himself were rather against it? How do these things agree?" He sees himself enmeshed, he sees himself entangled; observe now with how great malice against the Prophet, and impiety against God, he seeks to disentangle himself! "We must consider," says he, "that it was Samuel's own sons who then judged the people, and that the people rejected them because of their corruption; now Samuel was loth his sons should be cast aside, and God, to gratify his Prophet, intimated that what the people desired did not please him." Speak out, wretch, and never mince the matter: you mean, Samuel deceived the people, and God Samuel. It is *not that advocate of yours, therefore, but yourself, that are the "frantic" and "raving" one*; who, so you may but honor a king, cast off all reverence to God. Does Samuel seem

to you one that would have preferred his sons' ambition and covetousness before his people's grace and salvation; one that, when the people sought what was right and beneficial, would have imposed upon them with such sly crafty advice, and made them believe things that were not? Does God himself seem to you one that in so disgraceful an affair would stoop to oblige a friend?

Group E thus exhibits Cook's single word *now* exciting Salmasius's anger so violently as to betray him into repeated assertions of popular sovereignty; which, naturally, Milton does not refrain from urging against him. It also exhibits Milton once more mentioning and supporting the Advocate against Salmasius's denunciations.

Group F. The Higher Powers.

Group F moves beyond the question "*When* did the people become sovereign?" to the question "*Who* is sovereign—the king or the people?"—the basic question between Royalists and Puritans.

Cook of course will be found asserting the sovereignty of the people. As a lawyer he asserts it, too, in terms not scriptural but legal and feudalistic: treason, contract, trust, liege lord, and the like. Salmasius, if he perceives this change of venue and of jurisdiction, declines it, and draws the question back under scriptural authority and exegesis, where he has been arguing it all along (A, B, C, D, and E), and where he now transfers it to the New Testament. Milton, like Salmasius, keeps to Scripture, and also goes with him from the Old Testament to the New.

In Cook's assertions (*Cook*, 23-24; *post*, p. 587) that the king is the servant of the people, Salmasius professes to see (a) a denial of Christ's dictum that "the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them" (Matt. 20:25; Luke 22:25); and (β) an implication that "the higher powers" to whom Paul bids all be subject (Rom. 13:1) are not kings or magistrates, but actually *the people*. Accordingly, Salmasius's argument has two branches: one (a) (*Def. Reg.*, III: F, 53; M2, 110-111; M4, 71) setting Christ's dictum against Cook's; the other (β) (*Def. Reg.*, III: F, 57-59; M2, 120-123; M4, 76-78) attempting a *reductio ad absurdum* of the "topsy-turvy" proposition that it is *the people* who are "the higher powers."

Milton's argument branches into two corresponding passages. The first (a) (*Milton*, III, 155-157), by merely recalling Christ's additional words, "But it shall not be so among *you*," easily rebuts the charge that Cook is contradicting Christ, and supports the proposition that a Christian king is indeed the people's servant. The second (β) (*Milton*, III, 181-183, 187) treats Salmasius's *reductio*

ad absurdum as a series of silly paradoxes, "dilemmas," or "riddles," themselves absurd, and so corroborates the main proposition that the people are indeed the higher powers.

These complex relations will appear most clearly, perhaps, if, beginning this time with Salmasius, and proceeding with Milton, we keep branch (a) together and branch (β) together, and close the whole group with Cook.

Salmasius at the beginning of his third chapter argues that the "right of kings" established by the Old Testament is confirmed by the New. Quoting Luke 22:25, "The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them," he proceeds:

Def. Reg., III: F, 53; M2, 110-111; M4, 71:

Christ acknowledges, and the fact is, that the kings who at that time lorded it over the nations were not their servants but their masters. Far opposite to this teaching of Christ is the notion of the raving mastiffs of England, who, *according to their Advocate, the utterly wicked defender of the impious treasonable murder they committed*, teach that *the people is the king's lord, and the king in fact a creature of the people; that the people is as the potter, but the king is as the vessel shaped by the potter upon his wheel. And the wretch adds: "To believe otherwise is treason."*¹⁸

Milton in his third chapter, as he follows Salmasius into the discussion of the New Testament view of kingship, reaches his corresponding passage. Like Salmasius he couples, but unlike him he contrasts, the Old Testament situation in 1 Sam. 8, where the Jews desire a king, with the parallel New Testament situation in Matt. 20:25, Mark 10:42, and Luke 22:25, where the sons of Zebedee desire authority.

Milton, III, 155-157:

The sons of Zebedee were ambitious of the highest places in the kingdom of Christ, which they imagined would shortly be set up on earth. Christ reproved them so as to let all Christians know at once what manner of magistracy and civil government he desired should be set up among them. "Ye know," says he, "that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them and they that are great exercise authority upon them. *But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.*" . . . The Israelites kept asking for a king "like as all the nations that are about" had; God dissuaded them by many arguments, whereof Christ here gives an epitome: "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them"; yet, because

¹⁸ See note 22 below.

the Israelites persisted in asking, God gave them one, though in his wrath. Christ, lest a Christian people should anyway desire one who would exercise dominion over them as did the kings of the Gentiles, prevents them with the caution "*but it shall not be so among you.*" What could be said plainer than this? There shall not be among you that haughty sway of kings, though by a plausible title they be called Euergetes and benefactors. But he that will fain be great amongst you—and who is greater than the prince?—"let him be your minister"; and he that would be "foremost" and "prince" (Matt. 20:26-27), "let him be your servant." So that the Advocate you inveigh against was not wrong, but had Christ's authority, if he said¹⁹ that a Christian king is the people's servant, as every good magistrate certainly is.

Before quoting the passage from Cook which is referred to by both Salmasius and Milton, we take up branch (β) of their arguments.

Def. Reg., III: F, 57-59; M2, 120-123; M4, 76-78:

When the Apostle . . . declares that the king is God's minister [Rom. 13:6], he is repeating what he said a little before in the same chapter: . . . "For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid" [Rom. 13:4]. And for this reason, he goes on, the king "beareth . . . the sword . . . for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil" [Rom. 13:4]. They [kings] are God's ministers and servants whenever God would chastise peoples, whom they sometimes crush in cruel slavery by God's permission . . . to punish them for their sins. Thus God calls Nebuchadnezzar his "Servant" in Jer. 27. . . .

As kings therefore are the servants and ministers of God, so the king's subjects are servants and ministers of the king. But if we believe these New Gospellers and Saints-in-the-making, originators of a theory at once treasonable and Anti-Christian, the king is the minister and servant of the people. He fights not his own battles, but the people's. He is the people's creature, as an earthen vessel is the creature of the potter.

Now if a Monarchy ought to be so conducted that the sovereign is the people's servant, then it would follow *per contra* that in a Democracy, which acknowledges the sovereignty of the people, the people must be, *vice versa*, the servants! But whom shall they serve? Why, brewers, handicraftsmen, tinkers, and other suchlike scurvy tyrannical knaves, who mock at Christ's law. . . . When they are killing kings, they suppose themselves to be butchering not God's servants but the people's. . . . Paul's injunction [Rom. 13:1] bidding all be subject unto the powers, and warning against re-

¹⁹ See p. 588.

sistance to a power ordained of God, is interpreted by these English prophets in a fashion befitting their inspired frenzy: they understand this "power" to mean the people! After that, what would you think impossible?

Who is "the people" whom they would understand to be meant by the term "power"? Is it the whole people, or a part? If the whole, then who will be they who shall be bound to obey them as the lawful power by God established? If a part, then, by their interpretation, what part? One part of the people therefore shall be subject, and another shall rule: how then will they distinguish the ruling part from the subject part? Of course, if they take that part which Paul forbids us to resist as meaning the people's *magistrates*, well and good. . . . [For if so,] it follows that the same [submission] is owed no less to kings, and to magistrates and governors appointed by the king. . . . *Laughable is the fiction of those frenzied bigots, who take "the powers" to mean "the people."*

Who is "the people"? Is it Martin Cobbler, William Skinner, John Tailor? Paul in his epistle to Titus 3.1, saith: "Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey their word." Who are those whom he would have Titus admonish to be subject and obedient to principalities and powers? Are they not individuals among the people whom Titus had as listeners and disciples? And who are the principalities whose word he bids them heed? *Are they the people?* Such is the opinion of that breed of Enthusiasts, who dreamed it when rapt in prophetic delirium!²⁰ And when the Apostle speaks of "*Kings*," shall we take *them* too to mean "*the people*"?

Such is the second branch (β) of Salmasius's argument against Cook's assertion of the people's sovereignty. It makes three points:

(1) Cook's assertion that the king is the *people's* servant is contradicted by scriptural assertions that the king is *God's* servant.

(2) (*Reductio ad absurdum*): If the sovereign is the people's servant, and the people (as in a democracy) is the sovereign, then *the people* is the people's *servant*, etc., etc.

(3) (*Reductio ad absurdum*): If the people is sovereign, then the people must be what is meant by the "higher powers" and the "powers that be" and "the power ordained of God," to which Paul (Rom. 13) bids all be subject. But then the *people* must be *subject* to this power; but no, for the people is this power!

Salmasius thus tries to discredit the doctrine of popular sovereignty by exhibiting the supposed absurdities (paradoxes or

²⁰ Ita censet *Enthusiastarum* natio, quae id somniavit cum propheticis rap-taretur delirii.

"A numerous host of dreaming saints succeed,
Of the true old enthusiastic breed."

1681 *Absalom* and *Achitophel*, lines 529-530.

"dilemmas" or "riddles") to which he professes to think it leads. Milton in the passages now to be quoted dismisses as merely frivolous the objections to the supposed absurdities, and accepts the main proposition as not at all absurd. Moreover, in accepting the people as indeed the "higher powers" of Rom. 13, he alludes once more to a *nescio quem*—apparently Cook—who, according to Salmasius, is supposed to think so too.

Milton, III, 181-183, 187:

I pass by those foolish dilemmas of yours, to indulge in which you make believe that someone or other (*nescio quem* fingis) "*would understand the higher powers to mean the people,*" though for my part I hesitate not to assert that such is the source of all the power that any magistrate has.²¹

.

'Tis because you have not the slightest tincture of the wisdom of the ancients that you account as new, and as the dream of mere "enthusiasts' delirium," a matter which has been perfectly well known through the opinions of the most eminent philosophers and the words of the most farsighted statesmen. Your Martin Cobbler and William Tanner, whom you so despise, you had better take unto yourself as your partners and guides in ignorance; though indeed they will be able to instruct you, and to solve those stupid riddles of yours: "*Since in a Monarchy the king is supposed to be a servant, is the People supposed to be a servant in a Democracy?—All the People, or a part?*" And when they have played Oedipus to you, you have my permission to be Sphinx to them, and go headlong to the devil; else I see no end to your conundrums and follies.

All the passages in Group E so far quoted point back to Cook's fervid assertion of popular sovereignty, an assertion which will close the group.

Cook has been contending that no written law was needed to make the king's acts treason and to require his death. This contention he bases upon the necessity of the people's self-preservation—a law of nature, which, operating through the social contract, leads to the special contract and trust between king and people.

Cook, 23-24:

For when many Families agree, for the preservation of Humane Society, to invest any king or Governor with power and au-

²¹ In *Eikonoklastes* (Chapter XV, *Columbia Milton*, V, 218) published 6 October, 1649, Milton had already identified *Parliament* (as a Magistracy) with the "higher powers" of Rom. 13. "God bids us '*Be subject for conscience sake*' [Rom. 13:5], that is, as to a Magistrate, and in the Laws. . . . And the same *Precept bids him* [the king] *likewise be subject to the Parliament, both his natural and his legal superior.*"

thority, upon the acceptance thereof, there is a mutual Trust and confidence between them, That the king shall improve his power for their good, and make it his work to procure their safeties, and they to provide for his honor . . . ; now as when any one of this people shall compass the death of the Governor, ruling well; this is a Treason punishable with death for the wrong done to the Community, and Anathema be to such an man: so when he or they that are trusted to *fight the Peoples Battels*, and to procure their welfare, shall prevaricate, and act to the enslaving or destroying of *the people, who are their Leige Lords, and all Governors are but the peoples creatures, and the work of their hands*, to be accomptable as their Stewards (and is it not senseless for the vessel to ask the Potter by what Law he cal's it to account) this is high Treason with a witness,²² and far more transcendent than in the former case . . . for a great man of noble Education and knowledge to betray so great a Trust, and abuse so much love as the Parliament shewed to the king by Petitioning him as good Subjects, praying for him as good Christians, advising him as good Counsellors, and treating with him as the great Counsel of the kingdom, with such infinite care and tenderness of his honour . . . *after all this, and much more longanimity and patience* (which God exercises towards man to bring him to repentance) *from the Lord to the Servant*, for him not onely to set up a Standard for War, in defiance of his *dread Sovereign, The People* (*for so they truly were* in Nature, though Names have befool'd us) but to persist so many years in such cruel persecutions, who with a word of his mouth might have made a Peace. If ever there were so superlative a Treason, let the Indians judge; and whosoever shall break and violate such a trust and confidence, *Anathema Maranatha* be unto them.

With this confused but pregnant passage, Cook's leading passage on the sovereignty of the people, Salmasius links himself by direct repetition of its phrases and images (here italicized). Milton links himself with it by still another mention of the Advocate, and still another "nescio quem."

Other matters call for comment.

Cook's declaration that the king is the people's servant is not limited to *Christian* kings, but, being unlimited, includes them. So Cook is again supported by Milton. Yet Milton's limiting qualification "Christian," together with his "if he said," (*ante*, p. 584) suggests that Milton was not willing to approve at second hand Salmasius's report of Cook's dicta in all their generality and inclusiveness, but had himself read Cook's text, and was now putting

²² Salmasius, in the last sentence of his passage (*Def. Reg.*, III: F, 53, etc.) just quoted above, p. 583, misinterprets Cook's present sentence.

in his own *distinguo* between pagan kings and Christian kings against what he considered too sweeping a statement by Cook.

Again, Cook's tract does *not* anywhere actually name Paul, or mention "the higher powers." Salmasius, in ascribing to Cook the doctrine that the higher powers are indeed the people, as implied in Cook's general doctrine of popular sovereignty, is setting up an adversary's supposed thesis in order to knock it down. This particular implication is essentially sound, and its supposition true: Cook doubtless would have agreed that Paul's "higher powers" *are* the people; and Salmasius is employing the implication fairly to score a debating point. The point is valid, however, only until rebutted by a cleverer adversary. Here the cleverer adversary is Milton. He charges Salmasius with having invented somebody ("*nescio quem fingis*") who identifies the higher powers with the people. Like Milton's "*if he said*" (p. 584 above), this charge suggests—and quite strongly—that Milton had read Cook, and knew that Cook actually said no such thing. It is part of Milton's astuteness, however, to support the doctrine ascribed to Cook even if Cook nowhere promulgates it expressly. Milton thus hits Salmasius "coming and going": he appropriates a doctrine which brings St. Paul to the support of popular sovereignty, and at the same time he discredits Salmasius for asserting falsely that Cook expressly supported the doctrine.

Group G. The Charge against Buckingham.

Still another group exhibiting the nexus Cook: Salmasius: Milton deals with the accusation that Charles I connived at the alleged murder of his father James, and then protected the alleged murderer, the Duke of Buckingham.

Cook, 11-13, charges that Charles imprisoned in the Tower

... Sir John Elliot and others (who managed a Conference with the House of Peers concerning the Duke of Buckingham, who amongst other things was charged concerning the death of King James) ...

and thus presumably protected Buckingham. He adds the accusation that Charles, never before friendly to Buckingham, suddenly became so upon James's death, and

... took him into such special protection, grace and favour that upon the matter he divided his kingdom with him. And when the Earl of Bristol had exhibited a Charge against the said Duke, the 13. Article whereof concerned the death of King James, He [Charles] instantly dissolved that Parliament, that so he might protect the

Duke from the justice thereof, and would never suffer any legal inquiry to be made for his Father's death. . . .

This accusation is decked out with scriptural examples. Cook recognizes, however, that Charles's guilt is only "implied," and regards him as "a kind of Accessary to the fact." Cook declares his own willingness to "leave it as a riddle, which at the Day of Judgement will be expounded and unriddled. . . ."

Of direct answer to this charge of Cook's, Salmasius is chary. He seems several times (*Def. Reg.*, II: F, 51; IV: F, 81; V: F, 121) on the point of referring to it, but does not actually do so until near the end of his work (*Def. Reg.*, XII: F, 299; M2, 638-639; M4, 394), and even here he does so only in passing, with no mention of Buckingham by name, but with a clear reference to Cook:

These same [English Neroes], wishing to make the King appear every way crueler than Nero, have dared to fasten upon him also the charge of parricide—parricide, forsooth, which must be reckoned another of their own villainies. But the King and those who have defended him have so cleared him of this charge that the Lawyer for the Independents has been compelled to submit, and at length to confess that this matter is a riddle, which at the day of judgment is finally to be made manifest.

Milton three times names Buckingham: the first time (II, 141), in taking up Salmasius's comparison of Charles with Solomon, he repeats Cook's charge that Charles had protected Buckingham by dissolving Parliament; the second time (IV, 237), in taking up Salmasius's comparison of Charles with David, he merely lumps Charles and Buckingham together as wanton and incontinent; the third time (V, 341-343), in taking up Salmasius's comparison of the English Parliament with Nero, he maintains that Charles was much more like Nero than was the Parliament, since Charles "murdered with poison one that was both his father and his King" and "snatched from the law the Duke that was charged with the poisoning."

Here, then, Cook's charge is all but ignored by Salmasius, who refutes it only as it is left in doubt by Cook himself; while Milton, in refuting Salmasius, twice repeats the charge against Charles. The charge that Buckingham murdered King James and that Charles connived at the murder may still have been "in the air" at any time from 1649 to 1658, and one might reasonably expect to find it reasserted by any parliamentarian, and indignantly denied by any royalist. In the present passages, however, we have more: we have direct evidence that Milton is making use of this material

with unmistakable reference to Salmasius, who, in turn, is just as directly indebted for it to Cook.

Group H. "Forgive enemies—not friends."

Group H is an extreme case. Here Milton's dark sentence does not mention the Advocate, and neither does the corresponding passage in Salmasius. In fact, this itself is just as dark, and does not shed a single ray of light upon Milton. Both passages remain obscure till we have gone behind Salmasius and reached Cook.

In discussing regicide, Milton and Salmasius cite, each in his fourth chapter, a number of cases in which someone refused or did not refuse to kill a king. David's refusal to kill Saul, which Salmasius adduces as a royalist argument, is not, says Milton, a precedent binding the people and Parliament of England, precisely because they are a people and a Parliament, and not, as David then was, a private individual. Suddenly, and out of all connection with this context, Milton bursts forth:

Milton, IV, 225:

I am ashamed and have long been weary, of your lies. Falsely you declare it to be a principle of the English "That enemies are rather to be spared than friends, and that because their king was their friend they ought not to spare him." Impudent liar, what mortal ever heard of such a thing before you invented it?

Salmasius at the corresponding point has been arguing that when David had the opportunity to kill Saul, his enemy, he refused because Saul was the Lord's anointed, and that in his refusal he was actuated by the Spirit of God.

Def. Reg., IV: F, 75; M2, 157-158; M4, 99:

This Spirit was that of the God . . . who in the New Testament commanded us not only to "honour the King" [1 Pet. 2:17] in particular, but in general too to "love our enemies" [Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27, 35].

This the English bigots have seized upon to their own uses, and from it have gathered the distorted and calamitous doctrine that *we ought to spare our enemies rather than our friends*. Thence they infer that *because the king was their friend they ought not to spare him*. *Ergo, they had spared him had he been their enemy*.

Which leaves us still asking, "Has this topsy-turvydom any point or meaning? And what could have made Salmasius imagine so fantastic a fabrication?"

Cook's remarks on King Charles's alleged treachery in failing to relieve La Rochelle (1627) answer our questions.

Cook, 31-32:

Concerning the betraying of Rochel, to the enslaving of the Protestant party in France, I confess, I heard so much of it, and was so shamefully reproached for it in Geneva, and by the Protestant ministers in France, that I could believe no less, then that the King was guilty of it. I have heard fearful exclamations from the French Protestants against the King, and the late Duke of Buckingham, for the betraying of Rochel. . . . And the Protestants have ever since cried out to this day, It is not the French King that did us wrong, for then we could have born it, but it was the King of England, a profest Protestant that betrayed us. And when I have many times intreated Deodati and others, to *have a good opinion of the King*, he would answer me, *That we are commanded to forgive our enemies, but not to forgive our friends.*

Chronologically, then, Group H begins with Cook's report of a bitter ironical saying by Jean Diodati, the Geneva theologian, whose acquaintance Cook may have made in the course of his travels abroad. Having read Cook's anecdote, Salmasius pushes its irony *ad absurdum* by deriving from it a topsy-turvy rule of action, which, as he found his suggestion for it in the work of the regicide Cook, he then sarcastically attributes to the regicides generally in explanation of their horrid deeds. If he has a controversialist's right to do this, Milton has an equal right to ignore the genesis of the sarcasm, and to treat it simply as a lie.

Group J. *The Unwritten Law.*

Milton's chapters I-IV follow the lead of Salmasius's in treating respectively (I) the facts of this particular regicide; and then successively—as to kingship in general—(II) Old Testament law and Jewish theory; (III) New Testament law and Christian theory; (IV) practice, both Jewish and Christian. This sequence, one might well think, would lead both disputants almost irresistibly onward to their next topic: the law, theory, and practice—concerning kings—of the pagan Nations—the *gentes*. Each disputant might thus hope to exhibit his own view of kingship as the view prevailing not only among the "people of God," the Jews and the Christians, but among the Nations or Gentiles too, and hence as the universal Law of Nations, *jus gentium*, which also, indeed, was quite commonly identified with the Law of Nature, *jus naturae*. A rather obvious continuation of the sequence of topics already followed by both disputants was all that would be needed, then, to suggest to each for the subject of his fifth chapter the Law of Nature and of Nations. Yet both Milton and Salmasius acknowledge an

additional and quite different inducement — and this inducement turns out to be Cook.

If we may believe Milton's own statement, he would not have argued about the Law of Nature, but would have omitted the subject as requiring no argument, because the Law of Nature is and must be identical with the Law of God as given to the people of God, and therefore as expounded already in Chapters II, III and IV.

Milton, V, 267:

I am of opinion, Salmasius, and always have been, that the law of God does exactly agree with the law of nature, and that therefore, if I have shown what by God's law is established with respect to kings, and what has been the practice of the people of God, both Jews and Christians, I have at the same time and by the same attempt shown what is most agreeable to the law of nature. Yet because you think that *we* [sc. the English regicides] "*can now be most effectually confuted by the law of nature,*" I will be content to admit to be necessary, what before I had thought superfluous; so in this chapter I shall prove against you that nothing is more suitable to the law of nature than that tyrants be punished.

The italicized words above quoted by Milton from Salmasius close the corresponding passage of Salmasius in the introductory layout of his fifth chapter. Here Salmasius, like Milton, tells *his* additional inducement for bringing to his support the *jus gentium* and *jus naturae*; and it is precisely what Milton's quotation from him intimates—the wish to confute a certain regicide course of reasoning based upon the Law of Nature. But Salmasius, unlike Milton, is specific. He tells us *what* the regicides' or "fanatics'" reasoning is, and the *circumstances in which they introduce it* (see italics below). By so doing he points us to the place where precisely this reasoning is to be found introduced in precisely these circumstances, i.e., Cook's tract.

Def. Reg., V: F, 101; M2, 214; M4, 134:

... The argument [which I propose to draw] . . . from the law and custom of pagan nations is neither weak nor unprofitable. For if we shall prove that these nations, though gifted with the light of nature only, perceived the same law that was held by the Jews, who were instructed of the prophets of God, and that was held by the Christians, who were taught of the Apostles of the Messiah, then I know not what can be thought a stronger or sounder argument than this unanimous agreement²³ of so many nations. Assuredly

²³ I.e., their agreement in revering kings.

the principle we here support must be said to have flowed from what is somehow the *law of nature*.

These considerations, besides, will even be strong enough to overthrow singlehanded the reasoning of the fanatics; who, seeing themselves met persistently by the objection that they could produce no written law permitting them to indict the king and sentence him to death, took refuge behind the proposition that where there is no written law, recourse must be taken to the law of nature. But if we show that the very law of nature before which they summon us is wholly against them, then precisely this it is whereby they can now, it would seem, be most effectually confuted.

Cook had heard the king at his trial ask repeatedly "by what law, what authority, you . . . proceed against me" (*King Charls his Tryal: or a Perfect Narrative*, pp. 11, 29, *et passim*; Muddiman, 90; also 81, 82, 83, etc.) and the king of course had never been satisfied by Bradshaw's repeated answer that the Court's lawful authority was that of "the Commons of England, assembled in Parliament, in behalf of the People of England" (Muddiman, 82, 90, 112, etc.). Cook, in his tract, now supposes the king's question *Quo jure?* to be repeated persistently by an imaginary but typical objector,²⁴ to satisfy whom he offers a dialogue in question-and-answer form. Cook's answers, in his habitual digressive, tangled, iterative, and parenthetical manner, are spread over some six pages—about one-seventh of the whole tract. Their extent, however, is warranted by their importance; for to the question *Quo jure?* they answer *Jure naturae*. Cook identifies or confuses the Law of Nature with the Law of Nations, the Law of God, and other "Laws" like the Law of Reason, the Law of Necessity, the Law of Self-Preservation, etc., and—finally and significantly—with the fundamental *unwritten law* (*lex non scripta*) or *Common Law* of England.²⁵ His passage is too long to quote in full; but here are

²⁴ The longevity of this typical objector, with his reiterated *Quo jure?* appears from an anecdote of William Warburton and James Quin the actor. "Quin was in the habit of meeting Warburton at Mr. Allen's, at Prior Park, near Bath. . . . On one occasion, after a conversation on the subject of the martyrdom of Charles the First, for the justice of which Quin contended, Warburton asked him 'by what law the King was condemned.' Quin, with his usual energy, exclaimed, 'By all the law which he had left in the land!' an answer which . . . at once put an end to the controversy." John Taylor, *Records of My Life* (New York, 1833), pp. 57-58. This conversation probably took place between 1741, when Warburton was introduced to Ralph Allen, and 1766, when Quin died.

²⁵ Such identifications or confusions date from far back in the history of political thought. For an interesting recent treatment of some of them, see M. A. Shepard, "The Political and Constitutional Theory of Sir John Fortescue" in *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard*

some of the points which gave Salmasius the motive for his fifth chapter, and Milton the corresponding inducement and motive for his.

Cook, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28:

*Q. But by what Law is the King condemned?*²⁶

R. By the Fundamental law of this Kingdom, by the general Law of all Nations, and the Unanimous consent of all Rational men in the world, written in every man's heart. . . .

*. . . and this Law needed not to be exprest, That if a King become a Tyrant, he shall dye for it, 'tis so naturally implied; we do not use to make Laws which are for the preservation of Nature . . . no kingdom ever made any Laws for it: And as we are to defend our selves naturally, without any written Law, from hunger and cold, so from outward violence; therefore if a king would destroy a people, 'tis absurd and ridiculous to ask by what Law he is to dye. And this Law of nature is the Law of God written in the fleshly tables of men's hearts. . . .*²⁷

Q. But why was there not a written Law to make it Treason for the King to destroy the people, as well as for a man to compass the King's death?

Resp. Because our ancestors did never imagine, that any King of England would have been so desperately mad, as to leavy a War

McIlwain (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), pp. 289-319 (especially pp. 289, 297-301, 317).

Cook, in supporting the opening proposition of his Charge—that the king is trusted with a limited power to govern by Law—names and paraphrases (p. 7) Fortescue on the English "Government Politique and mixt." He rests the condemnation of the king upon this older quasi-Platonic hypostasis of the Law as a "real" Idea, and not (as Bradshaw does) upon the sovereignty of the Commons.

²⁶ Throughout this dialogue the Questions and Objections are italicized in the original.

²⁷ Cook goes on (23-24) to derive from the general social compact ("For when many families agree, etc.") the special duty, contractual and fiduciary, of the king to preserve and not to destroy the people. Cf. Group F above, pp. 586-7. See also William Haller: *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution 1638-1647* (New York, 1934), Vol. I, chapter iii, "The Law of Nature," pp. 25, 26, n. 14, on the connection of the Law of Nature with the social compact in Henry Parker's *Observations* (1642) and Samuel Rutherford's *Lex, Rex* (1644). See also M. A. Judson, "Henry Parker and the Theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty," in *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain*, pp. 138-167.

The argument (Cook, 23) that if a general turn his cannon against his own soldiers, they are *ipso facto*, without written law or condition, entitled to disobey him and save themselves, occurs almost verbatim in an anonymous "printed paper" entitled *A Question Answered . . .*, of which the King complained to the House of Lords 25 April, 1642. *Parl. Hist.*, II. col. 1179 (date), 1184-1185 (text). The same argument appears in Parker's *Observations*, 2 July, 1642 (so dated by Thomason); Haller, II, 165; text, *ibid.*, 170. Could Cook, or could Parker, have been the author of *A Question Answered*?

against the Parliament and People: as in the Common instance of Paricide, the Romans made no Law against him that should kill his Father, thinking no childe would be so unnatural. . . . Nor was there any Law made against Parents that should kill their children; yet if any man was so *unnatural*, he had an exemplary punishment. . . .

. . . Obj. *But is there any president [i.e., precedent], that ever any man was put to death that did not offend against some written Law? For where there is no Law, there is no transgression.*

R. 'Tis very true, where there is neither *Law of God, nor Nature*, nor positive Law, there can be no transgression. . . .

The Law of England, [however,] is *Lex non Scripta* [italics original], and we have a direction in the Epistle to the 3 *Rep.* That *when our Law Books are silent, we must repair to the Law of Nature and Reason.* . . .

Group J does not, as far as I can see, positively clarify the contents of Milton's chapter on the Law of Nature. Rather it exemplifies a relation of a different kind among the disputants. As Cook's arguments frequently prescribe the contents of the *Defensio Regia*, so they *tend* to prescribe what Milton, if he is to make his answer effective, feels that he too must write about. The nexus here is not in the content of the passages—the transmission or the logical relations of argumentative matter whose earlier occurrences and implications clarify its later ones—but rather in the motives that induce the authors to write or not to write certain things at all. It could hardly have been a mere *façon de parler* for Milton to declare that he had not expected to deal with the Law of Nature, for he gives the reason which had made him plan to omit it, and then the reason which made him change his plan. The latter—his reason for introducing the subject after all—the reason which prevailed—he declares to be Salmasius's handling of the subject; and this is traceable straight to Cook.

III

At the beginning of this investigation (Group A) it was possible to establish the identity of Milton's "*advocatum nescio quem*." John Cook is unmistakably alluded to, and then actually named by Salmasius, who is refuting him, and whom in turn Milton is refuting. Thus one is led to Cook's tract, *King Charls His Case*, which, taken in conjunction with Salmasius's *Defensio Regia*, provides one with a key to several of Milton's difficult and important passages. Some of these passages in Milton owe their content, and others their line of argument, to the fact that Salmasius had dealt

with their matter in refuting Cook; still others are mere dark words and phrases, incomprehensible from the examination of Milton's text alone, stubbornly unclear even when Salmasius and Milton are examined together, and fully illumined only when all three—Cook, Salmasius, and Milton—have been taken into account. Accordingly, the nine triads or groups of passages examined above show how closely related are the three pieces of polemic, and how a reader should constantly take the three into successive consideration in order to elucidate Milton's frequent obscurities.

Thus the "extraordinary"-ness of Saul and David (Group B) alluded to by Milton becomes intelligible only after the student has carefully examined Salmasius's long discussion of this subject, and has in turn referred back to Cook's, which, though shorter and less systematic, provides the kernel of the argument. This "extraordinary"-ness of Saul and David as God's direct appointees leads at once to the problem of First Cause and second causes. Upon one's solution of this problem depend one's notions of kingship. Cook's "extraordinary" and ordinary kings, whom, respectively, God *makes* or *permits to be made*, are, according to Salmasius, all indiscriminately made by God (whether he acts as First Cause or through second causes), and are therefore under His protection. Milton, however, supporting Cook, refutes Salmasius in his own terms—if all things are of God, rebellion against tyrants is permitted as surely as is tyranny. From this "extraordinary"-ness of Saul and David, then, it is but a short step to the central problem of all three authors: have the people the right to judge and to kill their king (Groups B and C)? Much of the weight of Milton's argument in these passages is inevitably lost unless one also reads both Salmasius and Cook.

In Group G, Milton's references to the charge against Charles and the Duke of Buckingham go back to Salmasius and thence to Cook, while in Group H the references of both Milton and Salmasius to a "principle" that Englishmen forgive their enemies rather than their friends remain perfectly incomprehensible until one turns to Cook's passage on the failure of Charles to relieve La Rochelle, and discovers the remark of Diodati.

Again (Group D) Milton's discussion of the revolt against Rehoboam, of which God apparently approved, must be read in the light of Salmasius and of Cook. Milton finds in this story an opportunity to prove against Salmasius the legality of regicide, while Salmasius, in order to get around the implication that God gave approval of Jeroboam, a rebel against a king, had been forced to make a weak distinction (in which he contradicts his stand else-

where): God permitted, but did not approve the revolt. Yet Salmasius himself would never have had to bring in this story, and so would not have been driven into a corner by it, and felt himself compelled to interpret it favorably to his cause, had he himself not been refuting Cook. For Cook had been the first of these three to mention it—as illustrating rather the clemency of the English regicides. Again, Milton is illumined by his predecessors in the controversy.

So, too, Salmasius is trapped by Cook's single word *now* (Group E) into admitting popular sovereignty, and is shown up by Milton; while later (Group F), when Salmasius attempts to refute Cook's defence of popular sovereignty, by calling it a contradiction of Christ, and then reducing it *ad absurdum*, Milton in turn refutes him on both these grounds. Again it is Cook who provides the springboard for the controversy, as he does once more (Group J) when Milton feels himself obliged to deal, against his intentions, with the Law of Nature, because Salmasius had dealt with it in refuting Cook.

IV

These nine triads, then, may be regarded as specimens showing how closely connected are all three controversialists, and how reference to both of the earlier pair sheds new light on Milton. There are still other examples of these relationships.

One example, with which it has not here proved possible to deal, but which it is hoped will shortly receive separate treatment, arises in connection with the arguments concerning the royal coronation oath. On this subject there may be found another whole series of related passages in Cook, Salmasius, and Milton. If, for instance, a mutual obligation holds king and people, then out of this mutuality several interesting questions in political theory arise: How far is the coronation oath an express contract, by the terms of which the king owes protection and the subject allegiance, and thus what is its relation to the general unexpressed Social Contract, which implies these mutual duties? Is the king's power, which under these contracts is granted him by the people, held by him merely in trust, or is it irrevocable? Does the king's breach of the coronation oath release his people automatically or otherwise from their side of the contract, giving them the right to judge and to punish him? Naturally, one expects to find Cook and Milton answering these questions differently from Salmasius.

Then, too, there arise the historical problems involved in the vexed question of the clause [*leges et consuetudines*] *quas vulgus*

elegerit, traditionally included in the coronation oath, but omitted in the oath taken by Charles. Is this clause, although omitted, to be regarded as binding because it ought to have been included; and exactly what does *elegerit* mean in any case? How does the omission affect the general problem of the royal negative voice or veto, specifically in the famous case of the parliamentary "settlement of the militia"? And who was responsible for the omission of the clause from Charles' oath? The answers to all these questions are highly significant; upon them, quite naturally, we find our controversialists at odds. A full treatment of these problems will involve a discussion of the actual course of historical events and of the interpretation put upon them by the political theorists of the period.

V

What is the nature of Salmasius's and Milton's borrowings, and what processes do the passages undergo in moving from Cook to Milton?

To the larger structure of Cook's tract, which follows more or less clearly that of his Charge against the king, neither Salmasius nor Milton pays the slightest attention. What Salmasius, and Milton after him, picks up is Cook's detail from sentence to sentence, and this despite the confused manner in which Cook presents it. Cook's sentences are incoherent, full of afterthoughts and misplaced matters, set down, just as they occur to him, in postscripts and long and irritating parentheses. They touch a great variety of topics: Biblical texts upon the supposed right of kings (8, 9); the question who is sovereign—the king or the people (8, 24); legal authorities upon the powers and duties of the king of England, with special reference to the legal concept of a revocable or defeasible "power in trust" (6, 23-24); the nature of an English king's sovereignty (6, 7, 9); special questions relating to the king's coronation oath and its alleged alteration or "emasculcation" (7, 10); the king's "negative voice" or veto, especially as applied to Parliament's settlement of the militia in 1642 (6, 10, 17-18, 20, 21-22, 37); the charge that the Duke of Buckingham poisoned James I with the connivance of Charles (11-13); the Law of Nature, as identified or confused with the Law of Necessity, the Law of Self-Preservation, the Law of Reason, the unwritten or Common Law of England, the Law of Nations, and the Law of God (22-25, 27-28); the general Social Contract and the particular contract between king and subjects (23-24); the question whether a king can commit treason to his subjects (24, 26, 29); King Charles's alleged treachery in failing to relieve La Rochelle (31-35), and his alleged com-

plicity in the Irish massacre (28-31); etc., etc. *Obiter*, Cook lets fall much emotionally explosive matter: he exclaims (5) that if the king had ten thousand lives they could not satisfy justice for his myriad murders of innocent persons; he intimates (24) that the it, so that a short phrase dropped by Cook *obiter* and parenthetically appeals to God's judgment at Doomsday (3, 12-13, 40).

Cook's disorderly text Salmasius sometimes misunderstands, and he can hardly be blamed. Some of his other reactions to Cook are less excusable, though perfectly explicable. They are precisely what might be expected of a rhetorician who, though learned, possesses no very high order of intelligence, and who writes in haste. As a rhetorician, Salmasius systematizes and reconstructs some of Cook's confused text, but at the same time enormously over-amplifies it, so that a short phrase dropped by Cook *obiter* and parenthetically gets expanded by Salmasius into several passages of several folio pages each. What I have called Cook's explosive matter Salmasius treats emotionally rather than intelligently. He foams at the mouth in rhetorical indignation and invective, but again and again lets his emotional reaction against Cook betray him into arguments which count against his own side. His haste, too, prevents him from deleting his repetitions and correcting his accident. He commits numerous blunders in Latin, and runs to monstrous iteration. He simply cannot have done with Cook's dicta, for example, about the king's hypothetical ten thousand lives, and about the people as potter and the king as vessel: upon these he rings the changes without end.

What Salmasius expands, Milton again abridges. We have observed that Milton's references to Salmasius, and to Cook's matter as transmitted by Salmasius, are often so brief as to be obscure. Milton, however, has space enough to jeer at Salmasius's Latin and to complain bitterly of his tedious repetitions; and he seldom fails to score his opponent's fallacious arguments. As for Salmasius's sentimental diatribes upon matters of merely emotional relevancy, these Milton passes by in disdainful silence. *Non ragiona di lor, ma guarda e passa.*

In his choice of content, whether main-level argument or illustrative example, Milton was peculiarly influenced by his predecessors. Indeed, he had to be; the very nature of the document he was writing required it. He was refuting Salmasius, and we now know Salmasius to have been in large measure refuting Cook. Naturally, Milton is to be found agreeing on the whole with Cook, restating Cook's arguments with greater force and in better order, often going beyond Cook to strengthen his point, and forced by the very exigencies of his task—the refutation of Salmasius—to deal once

more with the material with which, for the purposes of this controversy, Cook had been the first to deal.

Here the present study rests. When Milton's arguments or, more generally, his ideas or philosophy, are similar to Cook's, it does not undertake to exclude other possible sources or influences, or the possibility that Milton thought of such arguments independently of Cook. The ideas may have been "in the air"—in the traditional or current theodicies, or in contemporary Royalist-Puritan polemic writings, or in other possible sources of Milton's politico-religious philosophy; they may even appear in some earlier work of Milton himself. Indeed, this paper presents evidence of other sources and influences, and cites or quotes similar matter in other works of Milton. It claims no completeness in dealing with them. Its main object is to furnish Milton's *First Defence* with a series of elucidative annotations which may add to its interest, clarify its meaning, and perhaps suggest a change in recent estimates of its importance.

Columbia University

BOSWELL AND ANDREW LUMISDEN

By ROBERT WARNOCK

From Rome in May, 1765, Boswell wrote mysteriously to Sir Alexander Dick in Scotland: "I have the pleasure of being acquainted with a cousin of yours who resides at Rome as secretary to a Scots gentleman of very ancient family. Your cousin and I have past many a good hour together, and I do assure you that I have not met with a more worthy accomplished gentleman. I have learnt much from him and shall ever retain a real esteem of his character."¹ This gesture of discretion was light concealment for his friendship with Andrew Lumisden, secretary to the Old Pretender, but the romantic youth in Boswell often attached serious import to quite innocent proceedings in his life. A little later he was to feed the *London Chronicle* with anonymous notes of his Italian travels, suggesting veiled political consequence in his whole Grand Tour. The dénouement revealed a plan to place Prince Charles Edward on the throne of Corsica, but it was clearly a fiction, or at best a wild scheme, of young Boswell's. His association with Lumisden was purely friendly, as his journal shows,² and "bonnie Prince Charlie" was fast sinking into such decay that he was little able to govern even his own servants.

Yet Boswell's secrecy had another and more sensible basis. Especially at this time he felt extremely reluctant to become identified with any single political group. This policy was dictated not so much by a fear of blight on his later career in politics as by a sincere and justifiable pride in his liberalism. A chief impression gathered from his journal notes from Italy must be of the easy impartiality with which he could appreciate men of all classes and persuasions. Proudly and devotedly a Scot, he had nevertheless no ill-feeling toward English fellow travellers or their stupid contempt for his countrymen. Lumisden remarked of him that "superior to the prejudices so common at present in our country," he "has no difficulty to converse with and cultivate the friendship of his countrymen, whose honest but out-of-fashioned principles prevent them from living at home."³ In no active way a Jacobite him-

¹ *Letters of James Boswell*, edited by Chauncey B. Tinker (Oxford, 1924), I, 80.

² The firsthand material of this article is taken from Boswell's unpublished notes for a journal of his Italian tour, now in the Isham collection. The complete journal, if it ever existed, has been lost.

³ J. Dennistoun, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Strange and Andrew Lumisden* (London, 1855), I, 205.

self, he could live, nevertheless, in frankest intimacy with the followers of King James.

There is a familiar story to the effect that Boswell as a child of five "wore a white cockade and prayed for King James, till one of his uncles (General Cochran) gave him a shilling on condition that he should pray for King George, which he accordingly did."⁴ It illustrates after a fashion the rather noncommittal attitude that he continued to hold toward Jacobitism. In his mature life it ceased to be an issue that demanded violent opinions, but as a Scotsman and Tory apostle of divine right, he must always have felt a certain sympathy for the exiled leaders and their cause. He was proudly fond of such sentimental attachments, especially when Doctor Johnson shared them.

In 1764 Boswell had travelled with Lord Marischal, a Jacobite leader who had fought with the chevalier in 1715. Andrew Lumisden was a veteran of Culloden, attached to the chevalier's son. There were nowhere now two more distinguished representatives of the Jacobite cause than these his intimate associates.

Lumisden was twenty years older than Boswell, a lawyer by training, though he had forsaken his profession in 1745 to become secretary to Prince Charles in Edinburgh. After Culloden he was made a fugitive by the Act of Attainder and escaped to France in disguise by way of London. Reaching Rome in 1757, he was appointed under-secretary to the Old Pretender at a salary of 120 crowns, later raised to 200. On this pittance of forty pounds "and an irregularly paid French pension of 600 livres, with an occasional remittance of slender amount from Scotland, he managed to maintain the appearance of a gentleman."⁵ In 1762 he was made full secretary and held that position until his master's death on December 10, 1765. "His melancholy duties chiefly consisted in answering appeals from the ruined adherents of the Stuart cause, who were starving and scheming in the various continental cities. Some wanted peerages, others Garters and Thistles, many more asked for bread; and his business was prudently to dole out the alms which the narrow fortunes of his master enabled him to dispense, or courteously to refuse what could not be granted."

His life was even more distressing when he became secretary to the Young Pretender in 1766. Charles Edward had an income of three thousand pounds and lived with a depleted band of followers at the Palazzo Muti or in his villa at Albano. Lumisden found him-

⁴ *Boswell's Life of Johnson*, edited by George Birkbeck Hill and L. F. Powell (Oxford, 1934-), I, 431.

⁵ Sir William Stirling-Maxwell, *Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses* (London, 1891), p. 162.

self little more than a valet and factotum to his new master and longed for release from these arduous, unpleasant duties. Four years after Boswell's visit with him in Rome, escape came at last. Prince Charles had taken to very heavy drinking and grown morose and ill-tempered. One night in a drunken fit of obstinacy he decided to go out to an oratorio, and when Lumisden and two other attendants refused to accompany him, he grew furious and dismissed them.⁶ Later he invited them to return, but on the advice of his brother, Cardinal York, they declined. Lumisden was subsequently pardoned at home and returned to Scotland, where he died in 1801. During his stay in Rome he had made a study of the antiquities of the region and published an account of them in 1797. Except for his letters, it is the only record remaining of an active mind devoted to the service of others.

As secretary of State to King James,⁷ Lumisden was nominally the leader of the forlorn, dwindling band of Jacobites who still clustered around their sovereign in Rome. Boswell never saw the Old Pretender. James was failing rapidly, "and none but those who were immediately necessary were admitted to see him."⁸ The Young Pretender was at this time in Switzerland, soon to undertake his trip south too late to see his father. The only member of the family of whom Boswell had a glimpse was Cardinal York, the younger son, who had given the final blow to Jacobite hopes in accepting his post in the Church.⁹ But in Lumisden, Boswell had the closest possible contact with the royal family and its affairs.

Their first meeting was under appropriate conditions. On March 26, after Boswell had decided to commission a picture about Scottish history from Gavin Hamilton, a well-known Scottish painter resident in Rome, he was seeking a text for it in Robertson's *History of Scotland*. Either not having a copy of the work or not being able to make up his mind about the subject, he called in his Jacobite friend, Morrison, who in turn proposed visiting Lumisden. With a feeling of awe Boswell approached the palace and walked solemnly up the staircase to the second floor. Lumisden was overjoyed to see them and made them comfortable. They talked pleasantly for a time, but not about politics, and Boswell's first impression of Lumisden was to last. "He is a true, worthy Scotsman," he thought, "and a genteel man, too." Lumisden, on his side, imme-

⁶ Henry Paton, *The Lyon in Mourning* (Edinburgh, 1895-6), III, 223, 232.

⁷ *Jacobite Peerage*, compiled by the Marquis of Ruvigny and Raineval (London, 1904), p. 215.

⁸ Sir Horace Mann to the Secretary of State, March 9, 1765. Earl Stanhope, *The Decline of the Last Stuarts* (London, 1843), p. 21.

⁹ Boswell's Journal Notes, May 27, 1765.

diately grew fond of the enthusiastic young Scot, and returned the call next day, when there was "much talk of Scots People and Antiquities." To William Drummond of Strathallan he described Boswell as "a young gentleman of great talents and merit," and to Robert Strange he said: "I have a particular esteem for him; he is beloved by all his acquaintances."¹⁰

Lumisden offered to provide Boswell and Hamilton with a miniature of Mary, Queen of Scots, as guide in painting the larger picture. It was not immediately available, however, and the matter offered Boswell pretext for repeated calls. He sometimes found Lumisden in his study, reading English and French gazettes and looking "quite the Secretary of State."¹¹ He seemed "a learned, pretty, Honourable man," seated there among his books "good and chosen," and to Boswell he was always "worthy Lumisden," "honest Lumisden." When Boswell received the miniature, he was pleased to find it a "quite royal" representation of Queen Mary. Lumisden supplemented it with some prints from the collection of the palace, which he explained with remarks "neat, accurate, classical, and genteel."

Their intimacy quickly bred deep confidence between them, and Boswell came to look to the older man for guidance and advice, even in money matters. It was well to "have Mr. Lumisden to consult," and he resolved to "see Lumisden much" and "correspond with him sensibly for life." The worthy secretary gave advice without prejudice. He could urge Boswell to accompany Lord Mountstuart, the son of Lord Bute, George III's minister, and even himself meet the young lord on polite terms. Boswell marvelled and "saw him allways a man."

In Lumisden's presence Boswell usually talked much, "but well and with grave force." About only one subject, Jacobitism, he felt conscious restraint, and resolved to "be calm and make Lumisden speak," for he was anxious to learn of the Jacobite point of view at first hand without involving himself. "Be reticent and learn as much as you can," he told himself. "Be prudent, as you know not yet your principles. You may be Minister." But Lumisden took his sympathy with the Jacobites for granted, and talked freely of their history and plans. "You're true blue," he told Boswell one day, "or I would not have spoke so. I'd not give a man on tother side so much satisfaction." Boswell remained noncommittal.

Meeting Lumisden at dinner or for walks through the streets of Rome, he invariably steered the conversation to the older man's

¹⁰ Dennistoun, *op. cit.*, I, 214; II, 33.

¹¹ Twenty references from the April and May Journal Notes are synthesized in this and the next two paragraphs.

favorite subject and marked his sentiments or remembered his anecdotes of the old days. Once Lumisden talked of Culloden and told how he had been so near the fighting as to be "spattered by the cannon." He explained that they had been forced to retreat after they took Derby because there was no succor there from the expected uprising of the English or reinforcements from France. Then for some time after the defeat, all was uneasy, and things were concealed from old James. Bitterness crept into Lumisden's memory as he recalled the near meeting of Cardinal York with George III's scapegrace brother, Edward, Duke of York, who was travelling through Italy incognito in 1764.¹² The opportunism of the Italians made them quick traitors to the Stuarts and they entertained Edward lavishly. "Two days after Edward, Duke of York, was at Florence," said Lumisden cynically, "the Cardinal was conducted by the same people." Sometimes he expressed bitterness for his own case, now that his Jacobite identification denied him free intercourse with whatever friends he might choose. "This is hard," he said, "but so it is with those who prefer their duty to their interest." Lumisden's talk was not always of the Jacobite cause; it was sometimes of literature "fine and classical," of Epicurus, or of Lord Orrery's letters. Occasionally he even passed a jest. "Boswell had a travelling box in which he carried his hats and his papers. He was saying one day, 'What connection now have they together?' Replied Mr. Lumisden, 'They have both a connection with your head.'"¹³

It was with Lumisden that Boswell took his "Horace Jaunt" to Tivoli on May 24. The young Scot contemplated this pilgrimage to the shrines of Horace with appropriate awe, and gave his feelings elaborate instructions before setting out. "You leave Rome with Mr. Lumisden," he wrote, "manly and worthy to think of, years hence. Sleep some in chaise; ask to do so. At Villa, be in enthusiasm. Recall Mr. Dun and Auchinleck. Swear firm tone, Devotion, Ambition, every noble and manly Pursuit." The prescription of sleep was well needed, for he had slept only an hour the night before, and for the first part of the trip he was "grievous." But he dozed for a time and reached the Sibyl's Temple in fine spirits. This impressive ruin, with its colonnade of ten fluted Corinthian pillars, filled Boswell "with rapture," and he recovered completely. At Vicovaro they took horses and a guide and rode up to Rocca Gio-

¹² Alice Shield, *Henry Stuart, Cardinal of York, and His Times* (London, 1908), p. 183; Dennistoun, *op. cit.*, I, 213-17. Boswell had been intimate with the Duke of York in 1760.

¹³ Rev. Charles Rogers, *Boswelliana*, p. 240, after Journal Notes, April 30.

vane, a tiny village perched on a precipitous rock. The "sad, mountainous roads" seemed to Boswell like the Auchinleck turnpike. But when they came to Horace's "fons idoneus," with the mountain of "Lucretilis"¹⁴ in the background and ruins sacred to Horace on every side, he "fell on his knees and uttered some enthusiastic words." He felt himself a pilgrim at a shrine, and in a classical humor worshiped devoutly.

They took the road down to "Digentia" and mounted again to Licenza, an airy little village on a steep mountain-spur with a pleasant old inn. The landlord was a hearty Sabine, who sat down with Lumisden and Boswell while they ate. All the other people in the vicinity did the same, "nor bashfull nor forward," and after a time some dogs and a sow waddled in. The tired travellers washed down their bread and cheese with three bottles of wine at two pauls a bottle, and soon the whole company was contented and cheerful. It was pleasant respite in a day of strenuous devotion to antiquities, and Boswell left this homely scene much refreshed. In the afternoon they saw more ruins, and at one spot he stopped to write to his friend, John Johnston of Grange, in the inspiration of his surroundings, while Lumisden no doubt took notes for his book on Rome's antiquities. Their Sabine guide rejoiced and sang a song, which lightened the rough way back to "Digentia"; and Boswell felt quite renewed when he at last reached home. Lumisden stayed to supper and talked intimately of the habits of the Old Pretender and Cardinal York, how the one never had money in his pocket and the other always said: "God bless you!" when he called at his father's palace. Boswell listened to these stories with great satisfaction, and retired content with the day.

He saw Lumisden frequently during his months in Rome, often several times in one day, and he was quite frank about his affection for this kindly friend. Only his growing intimacy with Lord Mountstuart reduced their meetings toward the end of his stay. When he left Rome, he took with him Lumisden's highest esteem and a promise of frequent correspondence. Boswell wrote from Florence on August 20 and from Lucca sent a frank account of his affair with Porzia Sansedoni on September 30. Lumisden responded on October 12 with a letter of good advice which is the only survival of their correspondence.¹⁵ When they met again, in Scotland ten years later, Boswell recalled their days together with a new happiness. It was on October 26, 1775, and he wrote: "Walked out with Mr. Lumisden to Dr. Boswell's, and breakfasted. We were most

¹⁴ *Epist.*, I, 16, 12; *Carm.*, I, 17, 1.

¹⁵ Dennistoun, *op. cit.*, I, 206-7.

comfortable, and it was most agreeable to me to recollect my being at Rome with Mr. Lumisden and talking of the good Doctor when there was no prospect of our all meeting in this world, and then to have the immediate perception of our society this morning."¹⁶ Their association had been stimulating and in every way fortunate, supplementing as it did the intimacy with Lord Mountstuart. To the lonely Jacobite it offered welcome companionship; to young Boswell it gave much-sought guidance and such a first-hand acquaintance with a dying cause of old Scotland as could fill his patriotic heart with pride.

University of Connecticut

¹⁶ Boswell Papers, I, 248.

A TASSO QUOTATION IN SHELLEY

By CHANDLER B. BEALL

In his *Defence of Poetry*, Shelley, after enumerating some of the attributes of poetry, adds: "It justifies the bold and true word of Tasso: *Non merita nome di creatore, se non Iddio ed il Poeta*."¹ None of the various editors gives the source of this quotation; they are content merely to translate it or to point out that Shelley had used it, in a slightly different form, in a letter to Peacock written from Bagni di Lucca on August 16, 1818: "This proud, though sublime, expression of Tasso: *Non c'è in mondo chi merita nome di creatore, che Dio ed il Poeta*." Lucas Verkoren in his study of the *Defence*,² cites still another form of the Italian aphorism used by Shelley in his *Essay on Life* (1840 ed., I, 224): "*Non merita nome di creatore, sennon Iddio ed il Poeta*." Verkoren states that "evidently in all three cases Shelley quoted from memory," but he, too, fails to give the source that Shelley had in mind. Mario Praz, reviewing Hans Thüme's *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Geniebegriffs in England for English Studies* (X, 26 sq.), remarks that neither Thüme nor Spingarn had attempted to check Shelley's reference and adds: "I wonder if somebody will try to do it sometime: once in a rather hasty survey of Tasso's works I was unable to find the exact expression, but only similar ones. . . ."³

As a matter of fact, the quotation probably cannot be found in Tasso's works at all. Shelley was more interested in Tasso the man than in his works, and in 1818 he was reading Tasso's biography with a view to composing a play on the poet's misfortunes. Mary noted in her *Journal* on April 11 that "Shelley has finished the Life of Tasso and reads Dante," and again on May 4, "Shelley reads Manso's Life of Tasso." Corrado Zacchetti annotates the entry of April 11: "Quella scritta dal Manso,"⁴ evidently using the May notation as his authority. But it seems more probable that Shelley had finished in April another, and better, work on Tasso by Serassi, *Vita di Torquato Tasso* (Bergamo, 1785), of which a second edition was issued in 1790. This was the standard biography of the poet up to the end of the nineteenth century. It is not listed by

¹ Page 56 of the Brett-Smith edition (1921).

² *A Study of Shelley's "Defence of Poetry," Its Origin, Textual History, Sources, and Significance* (Amsterdam Diss., 1937), p. 102.

³ I am indebted to Miss Mary Kessi for this reference.

⁴ *Shelley e Dante* (Milan: Sandron, 1922), p. 125.

Droop⁵ among Shelley's readings; but it is in fact the source of the Tasso quotation in the *Defence*. Serassi published (II, 261-2 of 1790 edition) for the first time a letter written by Monsig. Pietro de Nores to Gio. Vincenzi Pinelli, describing a conversation with Tasso wherein the poet is reported to have said, in the course of a discussion on Dante,

che non toccava a lui pronunciare in simili materie; che il Poeta era cosa divina, e i Greci il chiamano con un attributo, che si dà a Dio, quasi volendo inferire che nel mondo non ci è chi meriti il nome di creatore, che Dio e il Poeta. . . .

It is interesting to note that Tasso's remark is quoted in Italian and paraphrased in English by Hobhouse in his *Historical Illustrations of the Fourth Canto of Childe Harold* (1818, p. 26): "Such was the condition of him, who thought that, besides God, to the poet alone belonged the name of creator, and who was also persuaded, that he himself was the first Italian of that divine race." This sentence was copied by "W" in the *New Monthly Magazine* for September 1, 1818 (X, 131).⁶ It is probable that many cultivated readers of Shelley's day could have quickly traced down the original of his quotation. It was inevitable that modern students of the *Defence*, referring only to Tasso's works or to more up-to-date biographies of the Italian poet, should have failed to find Shelley's source.

University of Oregon

⁵ *Die Belesenheit P. B. Shelleys nach den direkten Zeugnissen und den bisherigen Forschungen* (Weimar: Wagner, 1906).

⁶ See note 3 *supra*. In 1810 John Black had translated the same remark in his *Life of Tasso* (II, 326).

WURZELN DER ROMANTIK BEI HERDER

Von AUGUST CLOSS

Herder erschloß seiner Zeit und der Nachwelt einen literarischen Universalismus, dessen Ausmaß und Vermächtnis an die Sprache des Gefühls und der Phantasie nach Klopstock kaum völlig erschöpft wurden. Er war nicht nur einer der mächtigsten Wegbereiter Goethes und der deutschen Romantik, sondern war eins mit Hamann in der Auffassung von der Poesie als der Blüte des menschlichen Geistes und der Lyrik als dem Kern aller Kunst auf Erden. Wohl sah der Ethiker Herder in der Dichtung die vornehme Dienerin der Humanität, aber er hatte zu gleicher Zeit ein empfängliches Organ für die Stimmen der Vergangenheit und des Traumlebens sowie für Gegenwartsforderungen seiner Umwelt. L'art pour l'art Dichtungen waren ihm kunstwidrig. Gegen die einseitige Überschätzung des Griechenideals setzte er den Plural "Schönheiten"; auch suchte er neue Empfindungen oder Deutungen dem Kreis antiker und orientalischer Mythologie zu unterschieben. Vor allem aber ward ihm das Wort zum Symbol, zur Offenbarung Gottes im Menschen und der landschaftlich und zeitlich begrenzten Züge. Wie treffend er diese erfassen konnte, bezeugt unter seinen quellenreichen Übertragungen die Entdeckung des deutschen Neulateiners Jakob Balde, dessen Naturidyllen und pathetische Hochgebirgsschilderung den eigenen Landsleuten durch das fremde Sprachgewand verhüllt geblieben waren. Sicherlich rührte hier Herder an Geist von eigenem Geist, obschon er dessen rednerischer Übersteigerung, die bei Herder durch Klopstocks Schwung einst wesentliche Anstöße von barocker Wucht erhalten hatte, bereits entwachsen war.

Herder war nicht nur ein einführender Künstler; sein Einfluß erstreckte sich auf die ausgedehntesten Geistesgebiete seiner Zeit. Als Genetiker bekämpfte er Lessing und Kant, doch erkannte er nicht klar genug, daß Kant in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (1781), die im Todesjahre Lessings erschien, den Materialismus sowie den Dogmatismus in den Naturwissenschaften ablehnte. Herder sah darin vielmehr eine aufklärerische Rationalisierung des Irrationalen! Er kämpfte gegen den Intellekt und für Originalität, Organismus und Urtümlichkeit. Ein neues Natur- und Weltgefühl war durch ihn geweckt worden, das in Goethe zu seelischen Bildern von einheitlich äußerer und innerer Bewegung

gestaltet wurde und das den deutschen Geist in die Romantik und noch tiefer hinein bis ins zwanzigste Jahrhundert wandeln mußte. Wie kräftig die Wurzeln der Romantik in Herders Schaffen keimen, soll aus folgenden Einzelzügen ersichtbar werden.

Als Verfasser der "Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit" (1784-91) und als schlichter Kanzelredner hatte sich Herder über Weimar hinaus einen hohen Ruf geschaffen. Um diese Zeit schienen die Wogen seiner inneren Unruhe geglättet zu sein. Die Reise nach Italien im Jahre 1788-89 ließ ihn wenigstens anfangs frei aufleben. Er reiste akademisch unvoreingenommen, d.h. nicht als Gelehrter. Selbst Goethe rühmte es, wieviel "menschlicher" Herder der Antike gegenübergetreten sei. Kunst war diesem nur eine Schule der Humanität. Folgerichtig sah er in Laokoon die Darstellung des edlen Märtyrertums und in Niobe die Tragödie des Familienlebens. Die griechischen Bildwerke sprachen zu ihm als vergottete Menschheit. Das historisch belastete Rom konnte den religiös gestimmten Ethiker nicht befriedigen, der für Plastik von Jugend auf keinen Sinn hatte, war er doch kein Mensch des räumlichen Gestaltens, ganz abgesehen davon, daß er als Moralist in der antiken Sinnlichkeit die Sittlichkeit vermißte. Aber bei all diesen wesentlichen Gegensätzen zwischen ihm und Goethe hätte sich in den Jahren der französischen Revolution, der Veröffentlichung des "Tasso" und in der Zeit von Schillers Tätigkeit in Jena ein engeres literarisches Zusammenwirken zwischen beiden entfalten können. Trotzdem trat um 1793 eine merkliche Erkältung ein, die durch politische, moralische und ästhetische Gründe bedingt war. Der allzuoft überbetönte persönliche Neid oder die Verbitterung wegen des nur zum Teil eingelösten herzoglichen Versprechens der Erziehungsfürsorge für Herders Kinder spielten selbstredend mit. Doch ging es diesem um tiefere Ursachen, die in die Romantik vorauswiesen, wie aus dem fünften Bande der "Zerstreuten Blätter" zu erschließen ist. Darin bekennt sich der Verfasser zu einem freien Christentum, zu einer Religion ohne Dogmen als dem Kern des Christentums. Dieses ist ihm wie später einem Novalis die Religion innerhalb des Reiches reinsten Humanität und eine Pfingststoffenbarung über die Pfähle der Einzelvölker hinaus für alle Zeiten und Nationen. Hier wird Herder zur literarischen Brücke zwischen Lessing und dem eigentlichen Theologen der Romantiker, Schleiermacher.

Goethe widersprach nicht; ihn entfernten Optik und Botanik u.a. immer mehr vom Weimarer Konsistorialpräsidenten. Es blieb zwischen beiden die unüberwindliche Schranke zwischen Künftertum und ethischer Weltanschauung. Wo beide feinfühlig dem dichter-

ischen Wesen nachgespürt hatten, konnten sie einst zusammengehen, aber nun nicht mehr, seitdem Goethe zwar nicht unmoralisch aber morallos—wie die Romantik des Schlegelkreises—geworden war.

Hier scheiden sich nicht nur Herder und Goethe, sondern auch zwei Jahrhunderte. Der "Wilhelm Meister" ist dafür Prüfstein. Schiller, für den der ästhetisch gebildete Mensch zugleich der moralische sein mußte, sah in diesem Roman den Weg zur natürlichen "Freiheit durch Schönheit," wodurch das Sinnliche gereinigt werde. Herder war dagegen u.a. über Philine ungehalten. Solche Starre des Ethikers mußte auch die Romantiker persönlich von Herder verschrecken, von dem sie doch entscheidendste Anregungen erhalten hatten, hatte er ja wie jene die Poesie in den Mittelpunkt alles Schöpfungstums gerückt und in ihr das Poetische, Schöne überhaupt gepriesen, völlig abgelöst vom Material der einzelnen Gattungen. Auch stand ihm damals der dritte im Weimarer Triumvirat, Schiller, in der geschichtlichen Betrachtung über die Vielseitigkeit der Poesie gegenüber den anderen Kunstformen innerlich nahe, wenn nicht geistig verschuldet, wie dessen Jenaer "Antrittsrede"—"Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte" (1789)—erscheint läßt; aber der Gegensatz zwischen beiden verschärfte sich, als Schiller gegenüber Herders "Iduna" einseitig dem Griechenideal verschworen blieb und sich zu der Zeit grundsätzlich alles Zeitcharakters entschlagen zu müssen glaubte, was zum offenen Zerwürfnis zwischen ihm und Herder führte, der wie die Romantiker, ohne in Parteipolitik zu verfallen, in der Poesie einen Hauch und Nachklang verschollener Tage spürte und den antiken Stil als "Stil an sich" verwarf. Doch blieb dieser für Herder ein Höchstwert und vor allem strebten beide Dichter aus der individuellen Begrenztheit zu einem idealen Menschentum. Nur ging der Weg beider in entgegengesetzter Richtung. Schiller wurde von der im "Apfel der Verjüngung" angebotenen nordischen Mythologie abgestoßen. Er glaubte eine neue Überfremdung abriegeln zu müssen und blendete so seinen Blick vor einer mythologischen Vergleichskunst (Tau = Schweiß der Rosse; Weltenbaumwurzeln = Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, Zukunft u.a.), deren Schatz erst die Romantiker wieder hoben. Herder war unterdessen aus dem Gefühl der Opposition und des Alters aus dem Dreibund ausgeschieden.

Als Mittel zur Bildung der Menschheit hatte Herder schon in den "Ideen" (1784-91) die Sprache gerühmt, die Geschlechter und Gesetze schaffen kann. "Ein Volk hat keine Idee, zu der es kein Wort hat"—ein goldenes Wort, das mit Stefan Georges markigem

Spruch: "Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht" in unsere Gegenwart leuchtet. Herders Sprachauffassung darf eine direkte Vorahnung der romantischen Sprachphilosophie und der Tieckschen Sinnessynästhesie genannt werden. In die "Ideen," die den griechischen wie jeden Nationalgenius durch den Strom der stammesgeschichtlichen Begebenheiten, der Umstände in bestimmter Zeit- und Ortslage nach Naturgesetzen erklären, die zugleich dem Fortschrittsgedanken unterliegen, ist jene Sprachtheorie als grundromantische Keimzelle eingebettet. Herders und Hamanns Lehre von der Sprache als Offenbarung des Geistes greift Jakob Grimms Auffassung vom Naturwunder des Sprachwachstums voraus. Schon vor Tiecks "Liebe denkt in süßen Tönen" zaubert Herder vor unsere Seele die Bilder des Auges und des Ohres: Ein Hauch unseres Mundes wird zum Gemälde der Welt, zum Gedanken oder zum Gefühl im anderen Menschen. "Vom Hauch unseres Mundes hängt ab, was wir dachten, wollten, taten und tun werden"—ja die ganze Menschheitsgeschichte, Tradition und Kultur, wurzeln in diesem göttlichen Rätsel. Von der Form aller Form, dem "Ohr des Auges" und dem "Auge des Ohres" handelt später die "Terpsichore" (1795-96), in der Herder aus der Lyrik den Kern des Poetischen entfaltet und vor allem auf die Sprache als Musik hinweist.

Sein Sammelwerk "Zerstreute Blätter" (1785 ff.) wendet sich u.a. der Übersetzungskunst zu. Herder erstrebt in griechischer Anthologie keine wörtliche Übertragung, sondern dichterische Aneignung und Hebung aller Schätze. Daher die Kürzungen, Erweiterungen, Spaltung und Zusammenziehung, wodurch er die griechische Epigrammkunst erst den Deutschen eroberte. Jene gab jedoch den Romantikern keine wesentliche Anregung. Wir suchen vergebens nach bewußter Epigrammpflege bei Brentano oder Tieck. Die "Paramythien" suchen hingegen wie die Romantik die Welt poetisch zu verklären und eine neue Mythologie zu schaffen. Doch mangelt Herders Bildhaftigkeit, abgesehen von "Echo," dem "Sterbenden Schwan," und besonders dem "Sphinx," die plastische Klarheit. Aber wir verzeichnen hier den Anhub einer neuen Mythologie, die sich die Romantiker durch Tiecks "Oktavian" u.a. in Gestalten wie Venus—Eremit, Liebe—Glaube Romanze schuf. Die "Blätter der Vorzeit" und "Jüdische Parabeln" aus der dritten Sammlung der "Zerstreuten Blätter" greifen weit in die orientalische Anschauungswelt: Wir lauschen den "Gesängen der Nacht," in der Sterne und Himmel in Harmonie zusammengestimmt sind. Traum und Weltenmusik klin-

gen durch die Nacht als Motive, die später in der romantischen mondbeglänzten Zaubernacht geheimnisvoll aufleben.

Herder erschließt hier der Romantik auch andere Wunder des Morgenlandes: Nachbildungen aus den Epigrammen des Persers Sadi oder aus indischen Sprüchen, wodurch er der Verbreitung der Indologie durch Fr. Schlegel, Rückert u.a. willkommene Wege eröffnete. Er weist auch auf den Tempel- und Chorgesang hin. Mitten in diese universal auszweigenden Anregungen ertönt der vaterländische Ruhm eines "Ulrich von Hutten." In den "Legenden" sucht er ferner ausdrücklich nach dem Poetischen, wie in der griechischen, persischen, hebräischen, indischen und arabischen Dichtung, also nicht eine moderne Legendenaszetik. Ähnlich hob später die Romantik aus altem Märchen- und Legendenschatz das rein Poetische heraus. Doch nicht nur Tiecks "Genoveva" oder später Gottfried Kellers "Sieben Legenden," sondern auch Schillers Balladen ("Kampf mit dem Drachen," "Gang nach dem Eisenhammer"), sein "Jungfrau von Orleans" und Goethes "Legende vom Hufeisen" konnten bei Herder Anregung finden, wenn auch Schiller bei diesem den einfachen Erzählton vermißte. W. Schlegels Beeinflussung durch Herders "Bild der Andacht" bedarf keiner Begründung mehr. Ludwig Theobul Kosegarten kann ebenfalls als Schüler Herders gelten. Dieser hatte in schroffem Gegensatz zu Kant die Lehre vom nutzlosen Schönen, von der formalen Schönheit, als Unding und als nationale Gefahr abgelehnt.

Wir erwähnten die "Terpsichore" (nach Herder die Muse der lyrischen Dichtkunst, nicht des Tanzes), in der die Lyrik als der dichterische Quell im Sinne der Romantik verherrlicht wird. Wohl sind die drei Bände hauptsächlich Jakob Balde gewidmet, dessen Dichtung Herder aus dem Geist des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts verjüngt hatte, ohne dem bayrischen Jesuiten aus dem Barockzeitalter eine glitzernde Maske anzulegen und ohne ihm durch sklavische Übersetzungstreue alles Abgeschmackte anhängen zu lassen. Herders Auffassung "Von der Natur und Wirkung der lyrischen Dichtkunst" und "Von zwei Hauptgattungen der lyrischen Dichtkunst" berührt sich mit seiner hier angedeuteten Sprachphilosophie. Sprachlaute sind ihm Naturlaute, Gegenstände, Bilder und Gesinnungen. Als Blüte menschlicher Sprache wird echt herderisch und in Vorahnung romantischer Dichtung die Lyrik gepriesen, als der "vollendete Ausdruck einer Empfindung oder Anschauung im höchsten Wohlklange der Sprache." Wie "sinnliche" Völker sich eine sinnliche Sprache schaffen, so die geistigen eine geistige. Jede Sprache hat ihre eigenartigen Laute und Bilder. Sie gibt die Eindrücke der Sinne, der

Phantasie und auch der kalten Abstraktion. Wohl spricht Herder in der "Terpsichore" in allgemeinen Zügen vom Poetischen, ohne sich in eine einzelne Einzelanalyse zu verlieren, doch ist auch diese Schrift von bahnbrechender Bedeutung. Seine feine Scheidung zwischen "kühnaufragend" und "zart-besänftigend" ist ein vielfach völlig übersehener Vorläufer der Nietzschen Antithese von "dionysisch" und "appolonisch" oder den schon abgegriffenen Begriffpaaren: musikalisch-plastisch, romantisch-klassisch, interessant-objektiv (Fr. Schlegel), faustisch-griechisch u.a.

In der literarischen Überschau, die uns Herder in den "Briefen zur Beförderung der Humanität" gibt, sucht er den Genius der Völker in deren Dichtungen und Formen zu erlauschen. "Humanität" ist ihm Menschlichkeit, Menschenpflicht und -liebe, Menschenwürde und -recht. Den Inhalt der mittelalterlichen Poesie bezeichnet er als Liebe, Tapferkeit und *Andacht*, also mit den drei Schlagwörtern, die für Tiecks Auffassung vom Mittelalter (siehe Stoffwahl und Ausführung der "Genoveva") bedeutsam wurden. Auch hören wir hier bei Herder "romantische" Worte über den Roman als die Poesie aller Gattungen und den umfassenden Anreger von Herz und Verstand — Worte, die später an die Universalpoesie im "Athenäum" gemahnen. Herder preist ferner in romantischem Sinne die Literaturgeschichte als Seelengeschichte der Völker und weist ihr die Naturmethode zu, die die Erscheinungen nach Ort und Zeit von der Wurzel bis zur Krone betrachtet; daneben gilt selbstredend als zweiter Maßstab der moralische, an dessen Stelle aber die Romantiker des "Athenäums" den ästhetischen Wertmesser einsetzten.

Herders Anhängerschaft war unterdessen auf Gleim, Wieland und Jean Paul beschränkt worden. Mit beiden letztgenannten verband ihn sein Vorurteil gegen Kant in der "Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (1799). Der unversöhnliche Gegensatz gegen den Philosophen von Königsberg wie auch gegen Lessing und Schiller lag, wie schon angedeutet, in Herders genetischer Lebensauffassung. Im folgenden Jahre nahm er in der "Kalligone" gegen Schelling und Fichte die Fehde auf, wiederum aus dem Gegensatz gegen Kants "interesseloses Wohlgefallen," doch vermag er es gegen die überwältigende Systematik der philosophischen Schulung mit Erfolg nicht aufzunehmen.

In der "*Adrastea*" gibt uns Herder das letzte, bedeutende theoretische Vermächtnis seines Universalgeistes. Er schreibt nicht nur über Optik, Astronomie, sondern auch über Oratorien, Händel und Cäcilia, und andere Gebiete der Kunst und Wissenschaft. So wird er zum großen Vereiner, dessen Universalismus sich an die

Romantik forterben konnte und der vom "Sturm und Drang" zum "Athenäum-Kreis" nicht nur die Brücke baute, sondern für beide das gemeinsame Erdreich bot.

Wie in den oben erwähnten Schriften werden in der "Adrastea" historisch-moralisch-ästhetische Fragen aufgeworfen; mit diesen erschienen auch Herders Dramen, die seiner lyrisch-rednerischen Grundeinstellung halber statt gestaltender Charakteristik in musikalische Effekte oder Satire verflossen. Im Kampf gegen die herrschende Zerstreuung, die läppische Augenweide auf der Bühne und gegen Goethes klassisches Theater bevorzugte er den Opernstil. Seine melodramatischen Stücke sind unmittelbarste Vorläufer der romantischen Verquickung von Musik und Theater und den Einzeltatungen (Lyrik, Roman, Drama) und deuten auf Richard Wagners Gesamtkunstwerk. Allein Herder war kein Dramatiker. Sein Wetteifer mit den Weimarnern war rührend und von vornherein hoffnungslos. Die "Ariadne libera" und "Der entfesselte Prometheus" sind kaum bühnenfähige, vielmehr in Szenen aufgespielte, melodramatische Betrachtungen bzw. Paramythien. Das Drama "Admetus Haus," das den bereits bei Wieland beliebten Alkestestoff behandelt, streut wie die romantischen Dramen lyrisch-musikalische Einlagen in die einzelnen Auftritte. Chöre sprechen sich über den im Sterben liegenden Herrscher aus. Der Olymp wendet das Leid zur Wonne: Alkestes kehrt aus dem Schattenreich zurück. Chor, Volksfreude, Opfer und Tanz schließen den "Tausch des Schicksals," der von einem Prolog und Epilog umrahmt ist. Die Stimmung dieser Schicksalsfabel ist noch nicht zum Musikdrama geformt, sondern bleibt dekorativ und repräsentativ.

Die Verdeutschung von zweiundzwanzig Romanzen des "Cid" schließt Herders dichterisches Testament in der "Adrastea" ab. Die epische Mischung von spanisch-französisch-deutsch Altertümelndem mit persönlicher Gegenwartsschau sagte den Romantikern zu. Brentanos Rosenkranzzyklus erhielt vom "Cid" dichterischen Anstoß. Doch hatte Herder die Nachwirkung nicht mehr erlebt. Der Tod befreite einen einsam Verdrossenen und Verkannten, dessen Leben sich kühn über weiteste Horizonte gespannt hatte. Herder starb im Todesjahre Klopstocks, als Schillers "Braut von Messina" und Goethes "Natürliche Tochter" und als Peter Hebels "Alemannische Gedichte" erschienen und ein Jahr nach Novalis' "Heinrich von Ofterdingen." Wie für diesen war für Herder der Traum zum Ideal aller Romane und Märchen geworden. Dichtung und Theorie fanden sich in beiden auf dem Boden einer

höheren, romantischen Wirklichkeit als dem Abbild unserer greifbaren Erscheinungswelt, der sie jedoch die Anerkennung nicht versagten.

University of Bristol, England

THE DEAD-HAND MOTIVE AS A PHASE OF GERHART HAUPTMANN'S ROMANTICISM

By FREDERICK A. KLEMM

The term "dead hand" or its equivalent "mortmain" is used here not in the customary legal sense of posthumous and impersonal ownership or control, but rather in its more literal inference of the dead exercising a general influence on the living. The dead-hand motive in itself is by no means unusual, since it is perfectly normal for the friends and relatives of a dead person to think of him and perhaps act in accordance with some of his wishes. In the writings of Gerhart Hauptmann, however, the influence of the dead upon the living is abnormally emphasized, both in the number of occurrences and in their intensity. The theme crops up in more than a score of his works and forms a major problem in at least five. It is the purpose of this paper to interpret the origin and meaning of these occurrences.

Hauptmann's first literary use of the dead-hand theme is found in the Novelle, *Bahnwärter Thiel*. Thiel, already showing mild indications of the disturbed mind which eventually caused him to go berserk, is pictured as holding frequent communion with his dead wife. Influenced by his pietistic religion, Thiel actually worships at a primitive shrine in her honor:

Hatte er Tagdienst, so beschränkte sich sein geistiger Verkehr mit der Verstorbenen auf eine Menge lieber Erinnerungen aus der Zeit seines Zusammenlebens mit ihr. Im Dunkel jedoch, wenn der Schneesturm durch die Kiefern und über die Strecke raste, in tiefer Mitternacht beim Scheine seiner Laterne, da wurde das Wärterhäuschen zur Kapelle. Eine verblichene Photographie der Verstorbenen vor sich auf dem Tisch, Gesangbuch und Bibel aufgeschlagen, las und sang er abwechselnd die lange Nacht hindurch, nur von den in Zwischenräumen vorbeitobenden Bahnzügen unterbrochen, und geriet hierbei in eine Ekstase, die sich zu Gesichtern steigerte, in denen er die Tote leibhaftig vor sich sah. (*Das epische Werk*, III, 15)

A second very pronounced use of the same theme is found in *Fuhrmann Henschel*, where the deceased wife again provides the motivation. The stolid drayman, partially unbalanced by pricks of conscience, gradually succumbs to a series of misfortunes, many of which are connected with the imagined presence of the first Frau Henschel. When the question of his marriage to the servant girl Hanne arises—a step which he promised his wife on her death—

bed he would never take—he goes with due reverence to Frau Henschel's grave and asks her advice on the matter:

Mutter, sagt ich in mein'n Gedanken, gib mir a Zeichen! Ja oder nee? So wie's ausfällt, soll mir's recht sein. An' halbe Stunde hab ich gestanden—Ich hab auch gebet't und hab er ooch alles vorgestellt, aso bei mir selber, meen ich natierlich:—aber s' hat mer kee' Zeichen gegeben. (*Das dramatische Werk*, II, 404)

Later he relates how she has haunted him for breaking the sacred promise:

Se kann keene Ruhe finden im Grabe. Sie kommt und geht und hat keene Ruhe.—Ich strieggle de Ferde, da steht sie da.—Ich nehm' mer a Sieb vom Futterkasten, da seh ich sie hinter der Tiere sitzen.—Ich will ins Bett gehn, in de Kammer, da liegt se drinne und sieht mich an.—Se hat mer a Seeger umgehungen, se kloppt an de Wand, se kratzt an de Scheiben.—Sie legt mer a Finger uf de Brust, da will ich ersticken, da muß ich nach Luft schnappen. (*Ibid.*, p. 442)

Thus, literally, the dead hand drives Henschel to suicide.

Gabriel Schillings *Flucht* continues the problem of the relationship between the living and the dead, although the usage is more to create a foreboding air of impending death rather than to stress the motive independently. The figurehead of a wrecked Danish brig stands as a lasting reminder of the sailors who were drowned in the disaster and who lie buried in a near-by churchyard.¹ Furthermore, Lucie Heil expresses the feeling that she occasionally stands in contact with her dead mother.² Bettina Clausen in *Vor Sonnenuntergang* possesses similar beliefs.³

The Komtess Juliane in *Die goldene Harfe* worships the spirit of her brother, Heinz-Herbert, who was killed in the War of Liberation. She has made it a custom to visit his grave every Tuesday and place on it freshly cut oak branches or some other remembrance. According to her father, "Juliane treibt einen Kult mit dem Andenken ihres Bruders."⁴ The twins, Alexis and Günther, also adorn the grave of their dead comrade, and Günther says: "Irgendwie bestand ein Kontakt zwischen mir und der Gruft, die mich frösteln machte."⁵ In another passage of the same drama there are three candles, two long ones representing Alexis and Günther, and the third one, a burned-down stump, representing

¹ *Das dramatische Werk* (S. Fischer Verlag: Berlin, 1932), IV, 81.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 92, 115.

³ *D.d.W.*, VI, 302, 306.

⁴ *Die goldene Harfe* (S. Fischer Verlag: Berlin, 1933), p. 22.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

the dead Heinz-Herbert. Alexis says: "Wir waren drei und der eine von uns hat ausgebrannt." Günther replies: "Nein, wie du siehst: es geht noch immer ein bläuliches Leuchten," thereby denoting the spiritual presence of their deceased friend.⁶

The Novelle, *Das Meerwunder*, again uses the deceased wife as the wielder of the dead hand. Cardenio has married a nymphomaniac who was especially partial to sailors. When the couple moved to a lonely island, she was given to brooding, and one day her dead body was found along the shore. Soon afterward Cardenio discovers his wife's strange influence:

Als ich mein Weib beerdigt hatte, habe ich, wie ich beschwöre, weit draußen auf dem Wasser ein markdurchdringendes höhnisches Lachen gehört, was mir die gewollt ungewollte Überzeugung aufdrängte, daß ich von einem dämonischen Wesen gefoppt worden war. Ich wußte nun, glaubte zu wissen, die Seekatze oder Chimäre sei nicht tot, sondern habe nur eben den Weg in ihr Element zurückgefunden. (*D.e.W.*, V, 286)

Still under her spell, Cardenio carved her features into a figurehead for an ill-fated ship. Having rescued his handiwork from an ensuing shipwreck, he continues to preserve this "Kultbild," as he calls it, and suffers constantly from his mysterious powers. Only after splitting the figurehead with an axe and hurling the fragments into the fire is he released from the spell. Death takes him immediately thereafter.

As other more general examples of a relationship between the living and the dead, one can mention Hannele's desire to unite herself with "der liebe Herr Jesus," who is calling to her from the depths of the Dorfsee, and to join her dead mother.⁷ The same idea is also contained in Hannele's forerunner, Bergliese, the Mondbraut, in *Das bunte Buch*. Another occurrence is bellfounder Heinrich's wife, Frau Magda, signaling with the sunken bell out of the depths of the lake.⁸ The effect that Elsalil produces upon Sir Archie in *Winterballade* is the result of the Scotchman's belief that he is seeing the murdered Berghild.⁹ In *Die blaue Blume* and *Mary* the poet meets his dead wife in the land beyond. A slight variation of the motive is found in the cases of those characters who feel intuitively that death is present. Dortka in *Elga* says: "Mich grauset's . . . ich weiß nicht warum," even though she has no knowledge that the throttled Oginski is near by.¹⁰ Similarly, Rosa Sacchi in

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁷ *D.d.W.*, II, 32.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

⁹ *D.d.W.*, V, 242.

¹⁰ *D.d.W.*, II, 249.

Die schwarze Maske, although she is not aware of the presence of the corpse, is terrified as soon as she enters the room where Jedidja Potter's body is laying: "Mich friert es bis ins innerste Mark, mich graust es vor dem, was außer uns noch im Zimmer ist."¹¹ A number of similar instances could be cited.

Let us now turn from the enumeration of the occurrences of the dead-hand motive to an investigation of its possible origin. Recent years have brought forth a veritable flood of autobiographical and critical material which shows more than ever how deeply Hauptmann has drawn upon personal experiences in the creation of his literary works. This autobiographical element is especially strong in respect to our particular problem.

When Hauptmann was in his fifteenth year there occurred an event which had far-reaching effects on the poet's spiritual development. His thirteen-year-old cousin, Georg Schubert, passed away several hours after a violent attack of meningitis. This episode is narrated at length in *Das Abenteuer meiner Jugend* and also forms an integral part of *Anna*, where Georg is called Erwin. Georg, the only child of Hauptmann's maternal aunt and uncle, had been renowned in family circles for his kind and pious nature and was dearly loved by all who knew him. Hauptmann, who felt particularly close to him, was stunned by the sudden tragedy. Hurrying home from boarding school in Breslau, he participated in the lengthy and exaggerated funeral service.

The circumstances surrounding Georg's death, however, would soon have passed from young Hauptmann's immediate thoughts, had he not become in effect his cousin's successor. In the spring of 1878 Gerhart was taken from the Breslau boarding school and sent to the home of the bereaved Onkel Gustav and Tante Julie Schubert, who were overseers of the estate Lohnig and also had their own little farm in near-by Lederose, not far from Striegau. The purpose of Gerhart's change of residence was fourfold, namely, to replace in a sense the dead cousin Georg, to develop a practical occupation, to strengthen a weak physique, and finally to save money.

The lad looked forward with pleasure to the thought of living in the home where he had enjoyed so many pleasant hours playing with his cousin in previous years. But his presence did not console the parents; indeed, he often felt that he was continually being compared unfavorably with the departed playmate. Furthermore, the Schubert home breathed the air of Herrnhuter pietism. The members of the household, each in his own quiet way, moved about

¹¹ *D.d.W.*, VI, 252.

in close communion with God. The sorrow resulting from Georg's death, although kept below the surface, existed to such a degree that Onkel Gustav, Tante Julie, and the latter's deformed sister, Tante Auguste, practised a veritable cult of death. Onkel Gustav seemed to thank God for each successive day, since each one brought him closer to a reunion with his departed son. Tante Julie would go daily to the near-by Dromsdorf churchyard and worship silently at little Georg's grave. The departed child's picture, with the words "Dein Herr Jesu" embroidered beneath it, rested on the organ in the living room of the Schubert home—"Hier war Juliens Altar"—where she would pray and sing chorals. Before being set up in the cemetery the tombstone, a granite cross, was actually placed for a time in the same living room, "wo es lag, den Hausraum belastend mit Grufthauch."¹² It seemed as if the Schuberts found peculiar joy in re-opening and perpetuating the wound caused by their bereavement.

Such extraordinary acts and mystical teachings found fertile soil in the mind of Hauptmann, who was passing through the sensitive period of adolescence. "In diese dem Tode zu-, dem Leben abgewandte Gemütsverfassung wurde ich, ohne es zu merken, mehr und mehr eingelullt," he says.¹³ Gradually he began to accompany his aunt silently to Georg's grave, and soon he started going there alone, finding a peculiar peace of mind among the tombstones. Philosophizing in these surroundings, he came to the conclusion that death was merely a state of mind, a hallucination. Consequently, like Jesus Himself, he tried to call little Georg back to life.

Matters gradually grew worse in the sepulchral atmosphere in Lederose. "Heut habe ich den Eindruck, daß damals der religiöse Wahnsinn an meine Tür klopfte," he writes.¹⁴ At another time, stirred by the fanaticism of some wandering preachers, he developed a savior complex and actually set out for home in order to deliver his parents from eternal damnation. Because of the continuous mental strain imposed by these pathological manifestations, he became subject to fits of imagined blindness, which would disappear, however, after a long sleep. Fortunately, his parents recalled him from the neurotic atmosphere in Lederose and sent him to the Art Academy in Breslau, where his attention was directed to more normal pursuits. Nevertheless the Lederose period remained indelibly impressed on Hauptmann's mind. That this extreme rev-

¹² *Das epische Werk* (S. Fischer Verlag: Berlin, 1932), III, 334.

¹³ *Das Abenteuer meiner Jugend* (S. Fischer Verlag: Berlin, 1937), I, 425.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

erence for the dead became a part of the poet's nature is demonstrated by an excerpt from a speech in commemoration of what would have been the seventieth birthday of his brother Carl, on May 11, 1928: "Kein Kultus der Lebendigen ohne einen Kultus der Toten: der Totenkultus über dem Grabe meines Bruders ist ein Teil meines Wesens geworden."¹⁵

It now remains for us to determine what importance should be attached to the repeated occurrence of this theme. To the average reader, Hauptmann and Naturalism are still synonymous. Even scholars have often failed to see Hauptmann's truly diversified nature.¹⁶ Only within recent years has attention been drawn to the strong inclination toward Romanticism in his life as well as in many of his writings. The frequent recurrence of such an irrational phenomenon as the dead-hand motive offers further evidence of the deep-seated character and omnipresence of Hauptmann's romanticism. Let it be noted that the first occurrence of this theme is in *Bahnwärter Thiel*, Hauptmann's initial attempt at naturalistic writing. Likewise *Fuhrmann Henschel*, appearing a decade later, is generally regarded as a good example of Naturalism. Subsequent usages of the dead hand theme—in *Gabriel Schillings Flucht*, *Die goldene Harfe*, and *Das Meerwunder*, for example—are perhaps not so striking, simply because the sharp contrast with Naturalism is no longer present. However, the fact that the poet possessed marked romantic tendencies even while entering upon and riding the crest of Naturalism strongly supports the thesis that Gerhart Hauptmann is basically a Romanticist, and that he wrote naturalistic works not because the theories of Naturalism were entirely congenial to him but because Naturalism was the reigning literary trend when he became of literary age.

University of Pennsylvania

¹⁵ *Um Volk und Geist* (Berlin, 1932), p. 126.

¹⁶ Jethro Bithell, in his new volume *Modern German Literature 1880-1939* (London, 1939), lists all the dramatic works of Hauptmann under the section headed "The Dramatists of Naturalism."

THE FLOWER SYMBOLISM IN *MARDI*

By MERRELL R. DAVIS

I

In a letter to his father-in-law shortly after the publication in America (April, 1849) of his novel, *Mardi*, Herman Melville answered the attacks of the reviewers who had failed to observe the merits of his latest work:

"There's nothing in it!" cried the dunce when he threw down the 47th problem of the 1st Book of Euclid—"There's nothing in it!"—Thus with the posed critic. But time, which is the solver of all riddles, will solve *Mardi*.¹

Herman Melville was expressing a belief that the "riddle" of the book would be solved. He was looking to the future and challenging the later critics of *Mardi*. It is true that considered attempts to solve the novel's symbolism have thrown some light on the allegorical search of the hero, and have served to enhance the appreciation of the novel, but it is also true that the symbolism of the novel has not yet been satisfactorily demonstrated. This paper proposes to present evidence that Melville used contemporary "flower books" in creating the characters of Yillah and Hautia, and in constructing the framework which "carries the interest and the ultimate meaning of the 'romance.'"²

II

As a type of "gift book" popular during the middle years of the nineteenth century, "flower books" merited a significantly prominent place. At least fifty such volumes were published in America during the years from 1825 to 1865,³ and several of these volumes went through numerous editions.⁴ These flower books were appropriately named: *The Language of Flowers*; *Flora's Dictionary*; *The Flower Vase*; *Flora's Lexicon*; *The Flowers Personified*; or *The*

¹ Letter to Justice Lemuel Shaw, April 23, 1849, in Raymond M. Weaver, *Herman Melville, Mariner and Mystic* (New York, 1921), p. 274.

² Frederic I. Carpenter, "Puritans Preferred Blondes. The Heroines of Melville and Hawthorne," *New England Quarterly*, IX (June, 1936), 255. This contains a suggestive analysis of the "quest" in *Mardi* that approximates most nearly the interpretation presented here, although it has not benefited from the identifications of the flower symbolism.

³ Ralph Thomson, *American Literary Annuals and Gift Books, 1825-1865* (New York, 1936), p. 17.

⁴ *Flora's Interpreter*, by Sarah J. Hale, had gone through fourteen editions or reissues by 1847, and *The Lady's Book of Flowers* by Lucy Hooper was reissued at least five times in the years from 1842 to 1848.

Poetry of Flowers. Some of them aimed to assist the housewife in the cultivation of flowers, or to inform her of the various classifications set forth by Linnaeus. The flower books which are important to this study, however, are those that describe the flowers by attaching certain meanings or sentiments to each one, that illustrate these sentiments with poems or stories, and that list in a "dictionary" each flower and its appropriate meaning.

Among the dozen or so flower books that have been examined, *The Poetry of Flowers and Flowers of Poetry*, edited by Frances S. Osgood, is both representative of the others and peculiarly appropriate in its "flower language" for the identification of the flower symbolism in *Mardi*.⁵ Mrs. Osgood has presented "poetical sentiments, original and selected" to illustrate the symbolism of each flower, and has included a "Copious Floral Dictionary," divided for the convenience and quick reference of the reader into two sections, one alphabetically listing the flowers opposite their appropriate meanings, the other alphabetically listing the meanings which identify the flowers. In discussing the "language" of the flowers she says:

The interpreters of our sweetest sentiments, flowers lend their charms even to love—to that pure and chaste affection, which, as Plato observes, is an inspiration from the gods. The expression of this divine passion ought to be divine also, and it was to illustrate this that flowers were ingeniously made emblematical of our most delicate sentiments; they do, in fact, utter in "silent eloquence" a language better than writing; they are the delicate symbols of the illusions of a tender heart and of a lively and brilliant imagination. . . . [Its] language is as old as the world, but its characters are renewed in each succeeding spring. . . .

⁵ *The Poetry of Flowers and Flowers of Poetry: to which are added, A Simple Treatise on Botany, with familiar examples, and a Copious Floral Dictionary*, edited by Frances S. Osgood, New York, J. C. Riker, 1841. Arranged chronologically, the other flower books that have been examined are: Mrs. Sarah J. Hale, *Flora's Interpreter* (Boston, 1832); Louis Armé Martin, *The Language of Flowers* (London, 1835, 3rd ed., revised); Mrs. Elizabeth W. Wirt, *Flora's Dictionary* (Baltimore, 1835); Mrs. Sarah C. Mayo, *The Flower Vase* (Lowell and Boston, 1844); Louis Armé Martin, *The Language of Flowers* (Philadelphia, 1846, 7th American from the 9th London edition); Jeane I. I. Grandville, *Les Fleurs Animées* (Paris, 1847, 2 vols.); N. Cleaveland, *The Flowers Personified*, being a translation of *Les Fleurs Animées* (New York, 1847); Lucy Hooper, *The Lady's Book of Flowers and Poetry* (New York, 1848; 1841); Mrs. Jane Loudon, *The Ladies' Flower-Garden* (London, 2nd edition, Preface signed: October 1, 1849); Mrs. Catherine H. Esling, *Flora's Lexicon* (Philadelphia, 1852; 1839); Lucy Hooper, *The Lady's Book of Flowers and Poetry* (Philadelphia, 1864 [a reissue]); Anon., *The Language and Poetry of Flowers* (London, 1876). The editions that appeared after the publication of *Mardi* have only been useful in establishing Mrs. Osgood's book as a "norm" for the "sentiments" which the flowers represent.

This eloquent language gives a charm to the sweet intercourse of friendship, and to filial and maternal love; it adds to the delight of youthful affections, and affords an excellent mode of recognition. The unfortunate may even find a faithful messenger in a flower.⁶

Mrs. Osgood's explanation is not unique; it is typical of all the explanations that occur in the introductions to these flower books. Furthermore, whereas the sentiments which Mrs. Osgood attaches to each flower agree in general with the identifications found in the other books, she presents a more extensive list of flowers, useful in identifying those which Melville employs. Almost without exception the meanings correspond to the interpretations given by the poet, Yoomy, of the flower messages from *Hautia*, and sometimes the actual phrasing is reproduced. In addition the information Mrs. Osgood presents in discussing the flowers is echoed frequently in Melville's descriptions. The *Circaea* flower, which Mrs. Osgood describes as "rose-coloured and veined with purple," and as commonly growing "in damp and shady places,"⁷ finds a parallel in Melville's "three rose-hued purple veined *circaea* flowers, the dew still clinging to them."⁸ The description of the columbine as the "emblem of folly . . . on account of the shape of its nectary, which turns in a similar manner to the caps of the ancient jesters"⁹ is echoed in the description of *Hautia*'s heralds as "garlanded with columbines, their nectaries nodding like jesters' bells."¹⁰ Finally one need only compare the description of the "night-blowing *cereus*" in *Mardi* with that of Mrs. Osgood to observe the resemblance in detail. Mrs. Osgood writes:

The inside of the calyx is a splendid yellow or bright sulphur colour; the petals of the purest white; but viewing it in front, whence issue its long trembling stamina, baffles all description; for in one shade, it is of an aurora colour; viewed in another, it resembles the blaze of burning nitre; and as the eye plays over it, we think we see, at times, a brilliant purple.—"This grand flower opens its beautiful corol, and diffuses a most fragrant odour for a few hours in the night, then closes to expand no more."¹¹

In the description in *Mardi*, we find that the sirens of *Hautia*

. . . bore a large and stately urn-like flower, white as alabaster, and glowing, as if lit up within. From its calyx, flame-like, trembled forked and crimson stamens, burning with intensest odours.

⁶ Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁸ *Mardi*, in Constable edition of Melville's *Works*, III, 218. All citations of Melville's works are to this edition.

⁹ Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

¹⁰ *Works*, IV, 388.

¹¹ Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

The phantoms nearer came; their flower, as an urn of burning nitre. Then it changed, and glowed like Persian dawns; or passive, was shot over by palest lightnings;—so variable its tints.

"The night-blowing cereus!" said Yoomy, shuddering, "that never blows in sun-light; that blows but once; and blows but for an hour. . . ." ¹²

One may certainly assume that Mrs. Osgood's flower "language," as representative of other flower identifications, is a trustworthy guide to the symbolism which Melville presents, and, with no more than internal evidence available,¹³ that her *Poetry of Flowers* is a credible source for the flower symbolism of *Mardi*.

III

Yillah and Hautia

"Unsophisticated as a wild flower in the germ," the "mystical Yillah" has the natural and "wild beauty" of innocence and purity, appropriate to her flower origin as she explains it to Taji. She was "more than mortal, a maiden from Oroolia, the Island of Delights." Born in Amma, as an infant she was spirited away to Oroolia, where the waters of the island "washed white her olive skin, and tinged her hair with gold." Then one day, while

. . . strolling in the woodlands, she was snared in the tendrils of a vine. Drawing her into its bowers, it gently transformed her into one of its blossoms, leaving her conscious soul folded up in the transparent petals.¹⁴

Imprisoned as a blossom, she hung in a trance, until "her spirit was about to burst forth in the opening flower." But before her spirit could bloom,

. . . the blossom was snapped from its stem; and borne by a soft wind to the sea; where it fell into the opening valve of a shell.¹⁵

This "pearly casket" Aleema opened by a spell and took out the

. . . bud, which now showed signs of opening in the reviving air, and bore faint shadowy revealings, as of the dawn behind crimson

¹² *Works*, IV, 383.

¹³ I have been unable to discover whether or not Melville actually used this volume. Mrs. Eleanor Melville Metcalf has informed me that no flower books are among the volumes of Melville's library that have come to her and her sisters. Mr. Charles J. Olson has also been kind enough to check his file of all the books of Melville's library which have survived, but he has been unable to find Mrs. Osgood's book, or any other flower books among them.

¹⁴ *Works*, III, 160.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

clouds. Suddenly expanding, the blossom exhaled away in perfumes; floating a rosy mist in the air. Condensing at last, there emerged from this mist the same radiant Yillah as before; her locks all moist, and a rose-coloured pearl on her bosom.¹⁶

After Yillah's soul, "folded up in" the petals of this bud, had blossomed forth, she was enshrined as a goddess in the "verdant glen of Ardair, far in the silent interior of Amma, shut in by hoar old cliffs." In this "Valley of Ardair," Yillah lived in solitude and innocence, secluded from the world.

In addition to the obvious flower characteristics of Yillah's origin, there are in the nature of her origin and of her dwelling place in the "Valley of Ardair," similarities to the explanations of the "lily" and of the "lily of the valley," in the flower books. Mrs. Osgood writes of the lily, whose flowers are "so beautiful that even the females are named from them,"¹⁷ that "all nations agree in considering it the symbol of purity and modesty."¹⁸ She also suggests that the "heathen nations consecrated it to Juno, contending by their fable that it sprang from the milk of that goddess." Wanting to raise Hercules to a divine rank, Jupiter gave Juno a cup of nectar to produce a deep sleep, and then placed Hercules at her breast,

. . . that the divine milk might enter his frame and thus work immortality. The infant was not able to swallow so rapidly as he drew milk from her celestial breast, some drops of which falling on the earth, this flower sprang up from it.¹⁹

Other versions of this same story indicate that the lily was originally "of the colour of crocus,"²⁰ or sometimes "orange-coloured,"²¹ but that the drops of milk changed it to white. In thus being washed white the lily's origin bears some resemblance to that of Yillah.

The habitat of the lily of the valley conveys also some suggestion of the dwelling place of Yillah. Mrs. Osgood emphasizes the love of this flower for the "shelter of the hollow valleys, the shade of oaks, or the cool banks of streams," and she includes three lines of poetry to illustrate this love of shade and solitude:

That shy plant, the lily of the vale,
That loves the ground, and from the sun
withholds,

¹⁶ *Works*, III, 160.

¹⁷ Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

²⁰ Mrs. Elizabeth W. Wirt, *Flora's Dictionary* (Baltimore, 1835), in "notes," under alphabetical listing of "lily."

²¹ Louis Armé Martin, *The Language of Flowers* (London, 1835, 3rd ed., revised), p. 141.

Her pensive beauty, from the breeze her
sweets.²²

In addition various other poetical selections characterize the flower as the "bright emblem o' innocence," and the "fairest o' Flora's bright train." One two-line verse suggests:

The lily, whose sweet beauties seem
As if they must be sought.²³

These similarities of origin and habitat are of course only vaguely suggestive, but the real justification for interpreting Yillah as a flower is clearly demonstrated in Melville's use of flower symbolism in the quest, and in his actual identification of Hautia as a flower, for it is improbable that Melville could make use of the flower symbolism in Taji's search for Yillah or could consider Hautia as a flower and as the direct antithesis of Yillah without imaginatively holding in mind some flower meaning or some flower which she would represent. Furthermore there is direct evidence in the quest that Melville did have in mind a lily of the valley, signifying the "Return of Happiness," though perhaps associated with the lily and its qualities of "Purity and Modesty."

On his quest through "Mardi," Taji is accompanied by a king, a philosopher, an historian, and a poet, but only the poet is able to interpret the flower messages which are received from the "three hooded damsels" of Hautia. Yoomy is the poet, and he alone consents to be "Flora's flute, and Hautia's dragoman," the floral interpreter for Taji.²⁴ On the fourth appearance of Hautia's heralds,²⁵ the first offers "Iris mixed with nettles," interpreted by Yoomy (in accordance with the proper flower language) as: "A cruel message!" Then the second "siren" presents "glossy green wax-myrtle berries, those that burn like tapers,"²⁶ and the third extends "a lily of the valley, crushed in its own broad leaf." Yoomy, "after much pondering," interprets the message to mean: "I speak for Hautia; who by these berries says, I will enlighten you." Taji is exultant: "Oh give me then the light! say, where is Yillah?" At this the heralds

²² Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

²⁴ *Works*, III, 250.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 359. The heralds of Hautia actually appear on nine separate occasions (*Works*, III, 218-219; 250-251; 311-312; 359; and IV, 50-51; 118-119; 150; 290; 383-384), and they are said to have appeared on four other occasions (*Works*, III, 227; and IV, 381).

²⁶ In her description of the wax-myrtle ("I will enlighten you"), Mrs. Osgood notes the custom of boiling the green berries and moulding them into candles, "which give a remarkably clear and brilliant light" (Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 115).

seem "offended" and look "reproachfully" at Yoomy, but they nod in approval when the young poet corrects himself:

"Then I am wrong," said Yoomy. "It is thus:—Taji, you have been enlightened, but the lily you seek is crushed."²⁷

In this flower message, properly interpreted by Yoomy to accord with the intention of Hautia's messengers, is the identification of Yillah with the lily of the valley. And furthermore, Taji has been enlightened, for the three avengers, sons of the murdered Aleema, have just given their version of Yillah's history. She was the daughter of "beings, white, like . . . Taji," they said, and still but an "infant in her mother's arms; a bud, nestling close to a flower, full-blown," she had come in a "mighty canoe" to their island of Amma. All were killed by the people of Amma in revenge for the slaying of their own countrymen, but Yillah was saved. "The bud was torn from the flower," and carried by Aleema to the "Valley of Ardair."²⁸ With this enlightenment the mysteries of Yillah's past history have been "unriddled" for Taji:

Now, all was made plain: no secret remaining, but the subsequent event of her disappearance. Yes Hautia! enlightened I had been—but where was Yillah?²⁹

In addition to this direct identification of Yillah with the lily of the valley in the flower message of Hautia, there is further justification for considering Yillah as a flower symbol in the clear identification of Hautia as a flower and in the opposition of Hautia to Yillah. Hautia is at once the "temptress" of Taji and the "enchantress" of Yillah. Before Yillah has been lost to Taji, Hautia appears before him as a "mysterious" incognito, "enveloped in a dark robe of tappa," so shielding her that only a "solitary eye" is exposed. This eye she fixes upon Yillah "with a sinister glance," but upon Taji, "with a different expression."³⁰ The next day appear her "Three black-eyed damsels, deep brunettes, habited in long variegated robes, and with gay blossoms on their heads." The gifts of flowers they bring from "Queen Hautia" are not understood by Taji, nor are they explained for him, although King Media does smile and throw out "queer hints of Hautia." But had the flowers been interpreted for him, the role of Hautia as temptress and as

²⁷ *Works*, III, 359.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 357-358.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 362.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 217-218.

enchantress would have been made clear, for the meaning would have been:

I have a message for you. Some witchcraft is weaving. Youthful charms I give you. Fly to me.⁸¹

In this flower message is the explanation for the "different" expressions of Hautia's "solitary eye," and the suggestion of her hostility to Yillah and desire for Taji.

Subsequent gifts of flowers, with their symbolical portent for Taji, continue Hautia in her accepted role. She attempts to lure Taji with *Circæa* flowers (fascination; witchcraft), jonquils (desire), *Venus-cars* (fly with me), moss-roses (pleasure without alloy), verbenas (sensibility), a wreath of strawberries (perfect excellence), vines (intoxication), and grapes (charity), but Taji does not yield. At the same time her flower messages suggest that Yillah has come under her power and is lost to Taji. On separate occasions she sends: "a pallid blossom, buried in hemlock leaves" (I have wrought a death), "the lily of the valley crushed in its own broad leaf" (return of happiness crushed), daffodils (deceitful hopes), and a half-closed *Convolvulus* (extinguished hopes). But Taji is "fixed as fate" and does not turn aside.

Hautia's final message, however, is a glorious "night-blowing *Cereus*" (transient beauty). Taji submits and is lured to "Flozell-a-Nina, or The-Last-Verse-of-the-Song,"⁸² for the flower has suggested that the time is short and that through Hautia his "Yillah may be found." Having succumbed to this "last and victorious temptation," Taji speculates:

But how connected were Hautia and Yillah? Something I hoped; yet more I feared. Dire presentiments, like poisoned arrows, shot through me. Had they pierced me before, straight to Flozella would I have voyaged; not waiting for Hautia to woo me by that last and victorious temptation. But unchanged remained my feelings of hatred for Hautia; yet vague those feelings, as the language of her flowers. Nevertheless, in some mysterious way seemed Hautia and Yillah connected. But Yillah was all beauty, and innocence; my crown of felicity; my heaven below;—and Hautia, my whole heart abhorred. Yillah I sought; Hautia sought me. One, openly beckoned me here; the other dimly allured me there. Yet now was I

⁸¹ *Works*, III, 218 (*Iris*—Message; *Circæa*—Fascination, Witchcraft; Moss-rose bud—Youthful Charms; *Venus-car*—Fly with me).

⁸² Here a theological element is added to Hautia's character, for a queen of this island was an ancestor of Hautia, and had been the first to stir up the Mardians against the "winged beings, of purer minds," because of their "superior goodness" (*Works*, IV, 385-386).

wildly dreaming to find them together. But so distracted my soul, I knew not what it was, that I thought.³³

Taji himself begins to fear that his temptress is also an enchantress of Yillah, and confesses that had he been "pierced" with that thought before, he would have gone straight to Hautia's isle of Flozella. Had he suspected that the "return of happiness," his "crown of felicity," would be found in the flowery bower of Hautia, "straight" would he have searched there, although his feeling of hatred toward Hautia remained.

A suggestion of Hautia's opposition to Yillah and desire for Taji has been gained from the symbolism of her flower messages, yet our knowledge of her is still as vague as Taji's feeling of hatred for her: "yet vague those feelings, as the language of her flowers." To clarify Hautia's status, the most suggestive and significant passage is the description of her in "flowery Flozella." The "glorious morn in spring" when Taji and his companions set out is passed, and autumn has arrived. The travellers approach the isle from the sea, pass by many "fragments of wrecks" that have been "dashed to pieces against that flowery land." Sweet incense flows to them from the "gardens of Hautia." On the beach they are met by the "three dark-eyed maidens," who are "garlanded with columbines" (folly). Following these guides, they pass along a "winding vale" where violets (modesty) grow by the brooks. On one side of them are mountains with white daisies (I will think of it) and orange blossoms (chastity) that fall like snow. These they pass by, enter an orchard which is the "frontlet of the isle," and move on into a "lengthening plain," that lies "thick . . . with flowery gems:—turquoise-hyacinths [grief], ruby-roses [beauty], lily pearls³⁴ [purity and modesty]." Within this flowery region is the "bower" of Hautia, and the flower symbols that follow suggest its character, and identify its queenly occupant:

Here roved the vagrant *vines* [intoxication]; their flaxen ringlets curling over arbours, which laughed and shook their golden locks. From bower to bower flew the wee bird, that ever hovering, seldom lights; and flights of gay canaries passed, like *jonquils* [desire], winged.

But now, from out half-hidden bowers of *clematis* [artifice], there issued swarms of wasps, which, flying wide, settled on all the buds.

And, fifty nymphs preceding, who now follows from these bowers, with gliding, artful steps:—the very snares of love!—

³³ *Works*, IV, 386.

³⁴ The "lily pearls" is interesting as suggestive of Yillah's "rose-coloured pearl" and its possible association with the lily.

Hautia. A gorgeous *amaryllis* [haughtiness; pride] in her hand; *Circaea flowers* [fascination] in her ears; her girdle tied with *ver-vain* [enchantment].

She came by *privet* [prohibition] hedges, drooping; downcast *honeysuckles* [bonds of love]; she trod on *pinks* [lively and pure affection] and *pansies* [think of me], and *lilies* [purity and modesty]. She glided on: her crescent brow calm as the moon, when most it works its evil influences.

Her eye was fathomless.

But the same mysterious, evil-boding gaze was there, which long before had haunted me in Odo, ere Yillah fled.—Queen Hautia the incognito! Then two wild currents met, and dashed me into foam.

"Yillah! Yillah!—tell me, queen!" But she stood motionless; radiant, and scentless: a *dahlia* [heartless beauty; instability] on its stalk.

"Where? Where?"

"Is not thy voyage now ended?—Take flowers! Damsels, give him wine to drink. After his weary hunt, be the wanderer happy."

I dashed aside their cups and flowers; still rang the vale with Yillah!³⁵

Here, then, is the "mysterious" Hautia: a "dahlia on its stalk," a "heartless beauty," marked by "instability," whose portrait is completed by the accompanying symbols of "haughtiness," "fascination," and "enchantment." Mrs. Osgood's identification of the dahlia includes a suggestive description:

The gorgeous flowers of the dahlia allure only to disappoint us, for they are without fragrance.

The light, the grace, the brilliant bloom,
Of Beauty, unendowed with heart,
Resemble flowers without perfume,
And just as little joy impart.³⁶

This "Heartless Beauty" has lured Taji to her bower by suggesting that Yillah may be found, but Taji is disappointed with the "scentless" Queen, escapes from her blandishments and her arbor of

³⁵ *Works*, IV, 389-390. The italics are mine and the flower meanings from Mrs. Osgood.

³⁶ Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 106. Mrs. Osgood's identification of the *amaryllis* as "Haughtiness" is interesting, for it suggests that Melville's "Queen Hautia" is another verbal coinage. J. H. Birss (*op. cit.*, p. 404) has suggested that Hautia may be traced to a "princely personage" who was minister to Queen Pomare of Tahiti described in Tyerman and Bennett, *Journal of Voyages and Travels*, I, 145. But the flower identification is even more likely.

Clematis, and madly dashes forth on his endless search for the "Return of Happiness."

"Ah! Yillah! Yillah—the currents sweep thee oceanward; nor will I tarry behind.—Mardi, farewell!—Give me the helm, old man!"²⁷

IV

The flower symbolism which Melville found so very useful in constructing his "romance" is essential material for any accurate identification of the characters of Yillah and Hautia, and for any precise interpretation of the quest in *Mardi*, as Melville, the literary artist, conceived it. The flower "language" observed in Mrs. Frances S. Osgood's *Poetry of Flowers* and *Flowers of Poetry* affords a credible basis for identifying the characters of Yillah and Hautia, and presents significant evidence that the quest of Taji is directed toward the "Return of Happiness" (Yillah), which has succumbed to the "Heartless Beauty" (Hautia), at once the temptress of Taji and the enchantress of Yillah.

Mrs. Osgood's book may also have contained useful information for Melville in her presentation of the "far-famed dial of flowers constructed by Linnæus," particularly when we note that the quest of Taji began in the early spring and ended in the late autumn. In celebrating this dial, Mrs. Osgood includes a poem by Mrs. Hemans which contains at least two very suggestive stanzas. The complete poem praises the custom of marking the hours and months by the opening and closing, or the blooming and fading of flowers.

Thus had each moment its own rich hue,
And its graceful cup and bell,
In whose coloured vase might sleep the dew,
Like a pearl in an ocean-shell.²⁸

This stanza contains a suggestion of the shell used in describing Yillah's origin and the pearly ornament which she wore on her bosom. A later stanza contains a reference to the "isles of delight" (the home of Yillah in *Mardi*), and to the vain quest for them.

So in those isles of delight, that rest
Far off in a breezeless main,
Which many a bark, with a weary quest,
Has sought, but still in vain.²⁹

²⁷ *Works*, IV, 399.

²⁸ Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

In a long passage following this poem, Mrs. Osgood moralizes on the lesson taught by the dial of flowers, and presents the hopelessness of man's quest for such havens of "felicity." The whole passage bears quoting as it allusively relates to the quest of Taji.

We might fancy ourselves luxuriating in a garden of roses, where "every flower that blows" would add to our felicity; where the most agreeable and delightful companions were assembled to pass the hours in heedless pleasures — where no care — no sorrow — no unpleasant recollections of past disappointments — of hopes destroyed — or the overthrow of anticipated happiness — are allowed to interrupt our joy, and mar the beauty of the enchanted scene. Alas! these are but day-dreams, scattered by a breath. The rude realities of life — the continual frustration of long-cherished designs — and the constant blighting, if not extinction of our fondest hopes — all prove how utterly fallacious are the projects on which unassisted *man* attempts to construct a durable felicity.⁴⁰

Thus Mrs. Osgood's book not only furnished Melville the flower symbolism for the identification of his characters, but may also have suggested the quest as a basis for the story of *Mardi*.

APPENDIX

A "Floral Dictionary" for *Mardi*.

<i>Flowers*</i>	<i>Sentiments*</i>	<i>Mardi</i> , in <i>Works</i>
Amaranth.....	Immortality.....	IV, 361, 380
Amaryllis.....	Haughtiness; Pride.....	IV, 50 (leaf "arrow-shaped"), 389, 395
Anemone.....	Your frown I defy; Forsaken; Sickness.....	IV, 393
Bilberry.....	Treachery.....	III, 359
Birdsfoot Trefoil.....	Revenge.....	IV, 50 (leaf "trifoiled")
Black Thorn.....	Difficulty.....	IV, 118
Bluebells.....	Constancy.....	IV, 389
Cactus (Serpentine).....	Horror.....	IV, 150
Circaea, or Enchanter's Nightshade.....	Fascination; Witchcraft.....	III, 218, 250; IV, 118, 389
Clematis, or Virgin's Bower.....	Artifice.....	IV, 389, 397
Columbine.....	Folly.....	IV, 388
Convolvulus (Major)...	Extinguished Hopes.....	IV, 290
Crocus.....	Smiles; Cheerfulness.....	III, 359

⁴⁰ Osgood, pp. 16-17.

* NOTE: The flowers and their sentiments are from the *Poetry of Flowers and Flowers of Poetry*, by Frances S. Osgood, only those used symbolically in *Mardi* having been selected.

Daffodil.....	Deceitful Hope.....	IV, 50
Dahlia.....	Heartless Beauty; Instability.....	IV, 389
Daisy.....	Innocence.....	IV, 388
Daisy (White).....	I will think of it.....	IV, 388
Dead leaves.....	Sadness.....	III, 359
Fennel.....	Strength.....	IV, 397
Grape.....	Charity.....	IV, 150, 290
Heath.....	Solitude.....	IV, 389
Hemlock.....	You will cause my death....	III, 311; IV, 290
Honeysuckle.....	Bonds of Love.....	IV, 389
Hyacinth.....	Grief.....	III, 221; IV, 389
Iris.....	Message.....	III, 218, 227, 250, 311, 359; IV, 118, 290, 383
Jonquil.....	Desire.....	III, 250; IV, 52, 389
Juniper.....	Asylum; Protection.....	IV, 394
Linden.....	Conjugal Love.....	IV, 392
Lily (white).....	Purity and Modesty.....	IV, 389
Lily of the Valley.....	Return of Happiness.....	III, 359
Lotus-flower.....	Silence.....	IV, 396
Midnight Tremmella....	Resolve the Riddle.....	IV, 290
Moss Rose.....	Pleasure without Alloy.....	III, 311
Moss-rose Bud.....	Youthful Charms.....	III, 218
Moss.....	Ennui.....	III, 221
Myrtle.....	Love.....	IV, 361, 380
Nettle.....	Cruelty.....	III, 359; IV, 150
Night-blowing Cereus...	Transient Beauty; or, Fancy's Fire.....	IV, 383
Nightshade (Bitter- sweet).....	Truth.....	IV, 389
Oleander.....	Beware.....	III, 250, 359
Orange Flower.....	Chastity.....	IV, 388
Palm.....	Victory.....	IV, 361
Pansy.....	Prohibition.....	IV, 389
Pink.....	Think of me.....	IV, 389
Poppy.....	Lively and Pure Affection..	IV, 131
Privet.....	Consolation of Sleep.....	IV, 389
Reed.....	Music.....	IV, 150
Rose.....	Beauty.....	III, 312; IV, 390
Rose-balm.....	Beauty-cure.....	IV, 118
Sardony.....	Irony.....	IV, 118
Strawberry.....	Perfect Excellence.....	IV, 118
Sumach.....	Splendour.....	IV, 150
Tiger-flower.....	For once may Pride befriend me.....	IV, 150

Venus-car.....	Fly with me.....	III, 218, 311; IV, 118
Verbena.....	Sensibility.....	III, 311-312
Vervain.....	Enchantment.....	IV, 389
Vine.....	Intoxication.....	IV, 150, 389
Violet.....	Modesty.....	IV, 388
Wax Myrtle.....	I will enlighten you.....	III, 389
Witch-hazel.....	A spell.....	III, 218
Wormwood.....	Absence.....	III, 250

Northwestern University

REVIEWS

Louis-Bertrand Castel, Anti-Newtonian Scientist. By DONALD S. Schier. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1941. Pp. x + 229.

Diderot called Father Castel "moitié sensé, moitié fou." Voltaire wrote to Helvétius in comment on Castel's *Optique des couleurs*: "Je crois qu'il était aux petites-maisons quand il fit cet ouvrage." Rousseau also attacked Castel's famous sound-color analogy. Yet Montesquieu was his friend, and Diderot was not uninterested in his theories. Castel tried to help Rousseau at the beginning of his career in Paris, before attacking later his famous *Discours sur l'inégalité*, though hardly without ever having read it, as Mr. Schier suggests. In his lifetime, he was in fact known as "le célèbre Père Castel."

Vaguely Castel forecasts modern radio and television with "his machine for sending messages one hundred leagues and getting an answer in two hours, without any kind of physical contact between the sender and the receiver; a lens for *making oneself visible* at a great distance." His "ocular harpsichord" particularly aroused the interest of the public of his day. He appears indeed as a kind of unconscious ancestor of Rimbaud, of the Disney-Stokowski *Fantasia*, of the color fountains and the color organs of our own time. In short, somewhat like his contemporary, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, noteworthy for his beneficent chimeras, Father Castel was one of those near-great men in a continual effervescence of ideas, unchecked by humdrum considerations of what is actually workable.

Thus Father Castel "explained away difficulties on theoretical grounds, instead of grappling with them on practical ones." Hostile to Newton, Castel held curiously that the "sky . . . holds the earth together by compression." Without batting an eye, he would calmly set up in his mind a logical connection between entirely unrelated ideas. His reasoning is *a priori* rather than experimental and scientific. His mind lived in a kind of dream world of what he thought ought to be rather than of what is.

Yet Castel is interesting to us still, partly of course as an intellectual curiosity resurrected from the past, partly because of his minor contacts with the really great men of the period, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot, partly as an indication of "the daily concerns of the reading public of the day."

Mr. Schier has presented Father Castel to us objectively, with no effort to make him appear of greater stature than he was. His book is thoroughly documented. It helps further to round out our knowledge of the eighteenth century by this picture of one of the *anti-philosophes*, so much more typical of average opinion than the leading figures of the century whom we sometimes tend to think of al-

most as though they had lived alone in a rarefied atmosphere of intelligence and distinction, remote from anything which ever existed in life, past or present. No doubt many another secondary figure of the century awaits a biographer as careful and sane as Mr. Schier proves himself to be.

GEORGE R. HAVENS

Ohio State University

Bibliography of Italian Linguistics. By ROBERT A. HALL, JR. Special Publications of the Linguistic Society of America, 1941. Pp. 543.

This voluminous work, which is not at all a *μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν*, represents a serious and critical effort to catalogue whatever of importance has been done since 1860 in the field of Italian linguistics. Sincere tribute must be paid to the abnegation, patience, and skill with which Mr. Hall has condensed, in his 543 pages and 3921 items, not only accurate information about the multifarious publications which are listed (many of them dealing with subjects far off the beaten track), but also references to the echoes which these have found in reviews, as well as suggestions of the cross-connections traceable between items in different chapters; all of this material is brought up to date: the work apparently covers the year 1940. Mr. Hall's compilation can be particularly helpful as an indication of the direction which the course of research into Italian linguistics should take in the future—and this by means of the comparative length of the various chapters: when we see that he has had to give 186 pages (pp. 219-405) to the history and description of Italian dialects, and 166 pages (pp. 53-218) to standard Italian, we cannot fail to sense the disproportion involved, and must think of encouraging more work on the standard language. When the items for the four centuries of Italian from the fifteenth through the eighteenth cover only two pages, while six pages are devoted to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, we can see how much of Italian linguistic history is still virgin territory. When, in the dialectological section, 24 pages are allotted to Sicily, 10 to Tuscany, 6 to Rome itself, it is clear where the gaps in our knowledge of his realm lie. The fact, borne out by the proportions in this work, that the field of Italian syntax has been less thoroughly worked than that of phonology (12 as against 29 pages is the evidence of the book) was, however, known before.

It was an excellent idea of Mr. Hall to list the dialect vocabulary under the headings of the maps of the AIS (insofar as these have been published) so that further contributors might be able to see just which lexicological elements have been the least studied up to date. And I wonder if it had not been better likewise to list the

vocabulary of standard Italian under the headings of the REW; for the three subdivisions which he introduces in pp. 141-95 (1. "words from a given etymon [including Italian dialects]"; 2. "articles on two or more words [Italian or dialectal]"; 3. "articles on the etymology of one word"), even when taken together with other lexicological sections (Vulgar Latin; dialectology), represent at best an incomplete replica of the references to Italian etymologies which may be found in Meyer-Lübke's dictionary. Many of the articles already referred to in this dictionary fail to be represented here—not to speak of important word studies which have appeared since the last revision of the REW; thus the book fails to give us a full picture of the state of our knowledge up to date concerning a given word. For example, under No. 1040 the word *baleno* occurs in connection with a reference to Count Nigra, but the article of Schuchardt, listed in REW s.v. *ballena*, is not mentioned—as is also true of the remarks of Rohlf's (*Sprache und Kultur*, 1928, p. 28) and of M. L. Wagner (*Volkstum und Kultur der Romanen*, VI, 171) which deal with the same word; under No. 204, in regard to Latin *basilica* "aedes sacra" there is cited an article by one Ferrus, but the rest of the writers who have treated this problem, men such as Kretschmer, Rheinfelder, and Jud, receive no mention. In the case of *bravo* (Nos. 996, 1281) we are informed of the studies by Storm and Cornu, but Menéndez Pidal's suggestion is ignored; this may be because he published his remarks in a book not primarily concerned with Italian. Under No. 1505 s.v. *quitaré* we are told of Suchier but not of Lerch; under No. 1540 s.v. *tartaruga* we find, not the final etymology *ταρταρονχος*,* which Gamillscheg has brought to the knowledge of Romance etymologists, but instead the explanation attempted by Riegler.

The fact that it is necessary, in a bibliography, to list comprehensive treatises dealing with manifold phenomena without specification of contents, while the sundry *spigolature*, *articoletti*, and *noterelle* of a Salvioni or a Nigra can receive specific analysis—this makes complete information on a given problem impossible (for, practically speaking, it would be impossible to present a collection of complete indices of all the books published on Italian).¹ Thus,

* The author requested a circumflex over the *upsilon*, but the linotype character was not available.—EDITOR.

¹ The reviewer must confess to an engrained aversion to bibliographies in general which originate from and help maintain the belief in the progress of science by means of technical devices, and which, under the cover of helping other scholars do creative work, testify to the lack of personal creativity on the part of the compiler as revealed in his mechanical manner of listing items. Perhaps the aim in which bibliographies have hitherto been conceived is at fault: the ideal has been that of objectivity and completeness—even though the achievement of "completeness" is physically impossible and, in itself, of highly questionable value. I would propose, on the contrary, "subjective" bibliographies, which would make no pretense to completeness: i.e., collections of bibliographical items that have been chosen by *great scholars* of Romance philology, and which might range in number from five, as set down by Gillieron, to several hundred, as listed by Schuchardt. Such collections would show us what the masters themselves have deemed

for example, it is in the part devoted to phonology (Nos. 300-7; 339-42) that theories of diphthongization are mentioned; who would ever suspect that the articles of Schuchardt² and Von Wartburg, listed in the chapter "Classification of the Romance Languages," contain the most important contributions so far offered to the problem of diphthongization? Again, under Nos. 622-3, in a discussion of adverbs of the type *carponi*, reference to my study on Romance *-one* is omitted—only to appear in a division limited to the discussion of the adjectival *-one* (*-one* as augmentative and diminutive, No. 615). In these cases, as in many others, the scholar must supplement the printed bibliography with the bibliography which he carries in his own head.

The decision of the author to limit himself to the works produced after 1860 would seem eminently reasonable: with the exception of the work of Diez (who, incidentally, is included by Mr. Hall in spite of the limits set) contributions of Romance philologists in the first part of the nineteenth century are negligible. But the same does not hold true for creative writers—of whatever century—who have dealt with their own language: Manzoni, Bembo, Dante who wrote *De vulgari eloquentia*. These are everlasting authorities on the *questione della lingua*; but, because of (quite understandable) practical considerations, they must be passed over in silence, while space is given to whoever would write an article about them. Yet any Romance linguist concerned with the problem of a *κοινή* should begin, not with Caix, Vivaldi, D'Ovidio, but with Dante himself, the greatest shaper of language who ever existed in Romania, and one of the greatest philosophers of language the world has known.

This volume, containing so many titles in foreign languages, is accurately printed. One could perhaps have desired a more generous use of space between subdivisions. The indexes are carefully and comprehensively devised.

Finally, I regret to note in Mr. Hall's work occasional departures from objectivity in reporting on criticism: in general he analyzes reviews as either "favorable" or "unfavorable"; in a few cases where scholars have attacked his own work we find such

essential contributions; while many items offered by the objective bibliographies would be perforce excluded from such lists of elect titles, these lists, on the other hand, would exceed the limits of Romance philology—and even of philology itself. For the masters may have been influenced by "outsiders"; can anyone doubt, for example, that Diez was more greatly influenced by Jakob Grimm than by the Romance philologist Raynouard? And the same is possible for any scholar; in my own case it has happened that my *Italianische Umgangssprache* owes its birth to the Germanist Wunderlich, my study on the suffix *-one* to the Slavist Belić, my article on the etymology of *trouver* to the (literary) study of E. Auerbach on *figura*.

² The Schuchardt study *Über die Klassifikation* is no longer available in print as a single work; it should be cited according to the new edition in the *Schuchardt-Brevier*. This collection is not mentioned in Mr. Hall's work; since it contains the complete bibliography of Schuchardt's writings it is to be added to the chapter, "Bibliography of Individual Scholars."

judgments expressed as "petty criticisms," "personal reprisal"—expressions which detract from a book conceived in a highly co-operative spirit.

LEO SPITZER

The Johns Hopkins University

The Italian Language. By MARIO A. PEI. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 272. \$3.00.

Professor Pei's introductory chapter, entitled "Language and History," and consisting of 27 pages, is excellent. It gives much needed material which is lacking in other books on the subject. The relation of Latin to Greek, Celtic, Germanic, and other Indo-European languages is clearly brought out, especially by the diagram on page 9, which students will find to be very handy. The significance of the social revolution in the Roman Empire brought about by the advent of Christianity is made clear without being overemphasized.

On page 22, § 30, Professor Pei mentions the fall of *n* before *s* and the fall of final *-m* as "probably connected with the stress-accent." This may be so because even during the Classic Latin period, stress was probably not entirely lacking even though metrics were based on quantity and pitch, but there are many lines of Virgil that cannot be scanned if one pronounces final *-m*. It would have been safer for Professor Pei to have said "perhaps connected with the stress-accent." On page 23, in the second part of § 31, the statement is made: "It must be stressed that within this period [fifth to eighth century] the changes referred to were not peculiar to one section of Romania, but appeared universally and in substantially the same measure in all the future Romance countries." Here it might have been safer to insert after the word "measure" (*at least in the documents which have come down to us*). On page 24, § 32, the changes of Classic Latin short *i* and short *u* to close *e* and close *o*, respectively, are mentioned; and, very properly, the changes of Classic Latin long *e* and long *o* to *i* and *u* are omitted from the body of the text, as they are of comparatively little importance in the development of the language. A footnote, however, might not have been out of place.

On page 41, § 66, *inimicu* becoming *nemico* is given as an example of vowel dissimilation. Since the pretonic *i* in this word is short while the tonic *i* is long, *nemico* is the normal development. On page 99, § 134, *sonui* and *lavi* becoming *sonai* and *lavai* are given as examples of regularization in conjugation. One might add *domui* and some others. It is to be noted that these are first conjugation verbs which developed irregular perfect forms during the Old Latin period, and it is possible that the regular forms **sonavi*,

lavavi,¹ **domavi* existed in the spoken language all through the Classic period just as *seperare* (regularly developed in Old Latin) must have existed alongside of *separare*,² although it is not attested in literature. In § 109 (last line) *alacer* is given as the etymon of *allegro* without any mention of **alicer* which would be the regular phonetic development in Latin and may have been the vulgar word.

In § 135, since all Italian irregular verbs (except *essere*, *dare*, and *stare*) have second person singular and first and second persons plural of the preterite corresponding to the forms of the imperfect, the theory may be advanced that these forms (little used in comparison to the first singular and first and third plurals) are analogical with the imperfect.

The chapter on Dialectology has two very good maps, but the treatment of the Modern dialects is too condensed. Fifty pages of sample texts are interesting and the comments on the texts are well made. The section "Special Bibliographies and Practice Material" is a useful addition to the book. It stimulates the desire of the student to broaden his knowledge of general linguistics. The latest editions of Kent, *The Sounds of Latin*, and Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin*, should be cited (pp. 214 and 221). The question of *ablaut* (p. 236) might have been raised in the section where Kent is cited (p. 221), as Kent gives the clearest definition of the phenomenon.

Professor Pei has given us an excellent textbook for the teaching of Italian linguistics and we should be very thankful to him for it.

HERBERT H. VAUGHAN

University of California

Goldoni in Spain. By PAUL PATRICK ROGERS. Oberlin, Ohio: The Academy Press, 1941.

Dr. P. P. Rogers in his thesis has studied Goldoni's fortune in Spain. In so doing, he has illuminated, though not at great length, various aspects of eighteenth-century Spanish culture: the growth of opera, famous actresses and dramatic centers, the rôle that Italian influence played through the translation of Goldoni's works and through the compositions of such musicians as Fischietti, Corradini, Anfossi, and Galuppi. He has also briefly sketched the political reasons that were the immediate causes for the Italian vogue: the marriage of Philip V to Maria Louisa of Savoy, his second marriage to Isabel Farnese, and the presence in Madrid of the diplomat, Annibale Scotti. As to Goldoni's fortune, Dr. Rogers has enumerated

¹ *Lavavi* is attested.

² Cf. Fr. *sevrer*.

the musical plays (pages 3-25) and the comedies (pages 26-42) that were performed in Spain either in the Italian original or in Spanish translations. He calls to our attention the fact that Goldoni's vogue had its height in the years following 1752 and up through the first twenty years of the nineteenth century; that his vogue was even greater than Alfieri's, and that indeed it was greater than that of any other foreign author. Dr. Rogers has identified Goldoni as the author of twenty-nine plays. Cotarelo y Mori, the chief source used by Dr. Rogers, had either failed to mention the author of these plays or he had wrongly attributed them to someone else. This is the positive side of the balance sheet.

Unfortunately, Dr. Rogers has not been able to go to Spain and conduct his research directly on primary sources, the existence of which he definitely knows and mentions in his thesis. Hindered by the tragedy of the Spanish civil war, he has had to limit himself to the perusal of secondary sources (Cotarelo y Mori, Coe, Carmena y Millán, Paz y Melia, Virella y Cassañes) with the result that, on the whole, he presents facts already unearthed by former investigators. This is rather regrettable because Dr. Rogers' labor leaves the problem of Goldoni's fortune in Spain fringed with an indefiniteness that should not exist at the completion of a thesis in which a problem of a limited scope is investigated, and that deals with factual material. As an example, concerning the *Incógnita*, already mentioned by Cotarelo, Dr. Rogers comments: "[It] may well have been a musical version of Goldoni's play *La incógnita perseguitada*, a comedy that seems to have been known in Spain by this time" (p. 20). These are factual elements which, if not scientifically ascertained, leave the problem precisely where Cotarelo left it. The short introduction to the valuable appendices is bristling with such expressions as "possibly, it seems, it is likely, it may have been, it may be," which definitely weaken the scientific character of a work of this kind.

We are also disinclined to agree with Dr. Rogers as to his characterization of both Metastasio ("unhappy poet of genius," p. 9) and of Goldoni ("occasionally, but only occasionally . . . did his brush move with universal sweep across his canvas," p. 1). The word *genius* should not be wasted on a poet like Metastasio, an author literally dead today. As to Goldoni, there is much more in his dramatic art than the picturesque naturalism usually attributed to him. Had Dr. Rogers not relied so much on Chatfield-Taylor, he would have acquired a clearer idea of the cultural potentialities involved in Goldoni's vogue in Spain.

This realization might have led him to add a new section to his thesis: the influence of Goldoni on the realistic comedy of Spain, and especially on Moratín. After all, the essential point in the study of cultural influences is the consideration of their effect. Moratín knew Goldoni personally, and in his works there is the same spirit of wholesome realism and of constructive satire that characterizes

Goldoni's plays. The café that serves as a background to *La comedia nueva* reminds one of the celebrated comedy by Goldoni, *La Bottega del caffè*. Both the *Teatro Comico* of Goldoni and *La Comedia nueva* of Moratín are defenses of the dramatic ideals of their respective authors. Goldoni's Lelio and Moratín's D. Eleuterio bear many a trait in common. If Moratín fought against Comella, Goldoni waged bitter struggles against Chiari and Gozzi. Likewise, the hero of Moratín's *El barón* reminds one of the false count that appears in Goldoni's *Il Raggiratore*. The criticism of the education of young girls and of marriages of convenience voiced by Moratín is heard also in Goldoni's *Donna di garbo*, *Dama prudente*, *Putta onorata*, and *La villeggiatura*.

Instead of stressing this aspect of Goldoni's influence, Dr. Rogers seems reluctant to admit the very existence of Goldoni's vogue in Spain. The reader finds it hard to agree with him when he writes, "If Alfieri enjoyed a vogue in Spain, the same can hardly be said for Goldoni." A glance at the appendices that form the central part of Dr. Rogers' thesis shows to what an extent the Spanish public and Spanish translators favored Goldoni. If Goldoni's plays did not respond to the emotional wave of nationalism that accounted for Alfieri's vogue, another cause must have made Goldoni accessible to the Spanish public. It was the duty of the literary historian to find it. Goldoni was a man of rare intellectual honesty and balance, who stood against both the license of the populace and the decadence of the pleasure-loving courtiers of his day. As such, he was attracted into the current of Spanish realism by the well-balanced and constructive mentality of the middle class, which was reflected in Moratín through his admiration for classical realism. If after the Congress of Vienna, "official literature" identified itself with the historical drama, it did not and could not destroy the realistic current that moved quietly under Romanticism only to reaffirm itself in the second half of the century. It is a well-known fact that Spanish Romanticism, more than any other, marked a return to the spirit of realism that animated the literature of the Golden Age.

In spite of these shortcomings, Dr. Rogers' thesis fills a gap in the cultural history of eighteenth-century Spain, and it reveals in its author a man who is bibliographically well-posted and who expresses attractively his critical ideas.

D. VITTORINI

University of Pennsylvania

The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and St. Thomas More.
By C. R. THOMPSON. Privately printed, Ithaca, N. Y., 1940.
Pp. 52.

The translations of Lucian into Latin by Erasmus and More have received little attention from students of the Renaissance. This is particularly true of More's biographers: neither Bridgett nor Chambers grants the volume produced by so notable a collaboration more than bare mention. Yet that volume (*Luciani opuscula ab Erasmo et Thoma moro interpretibus* [Badius, 1506]) was reprinted more frequently than any other of More's works, including even the *Utopia*, and it contains his first published prose writing. Dr. Thompson is concerned chiefly with describing the contents of *Luciani opuscula*. He also studies Lucian's influence upon the work of the translators, and the general question of Lucian's popularity during the Renaissance. The last point is probably treated in fuller detail in Thompson's unpublished Princeton University doctoral dissertation, *Lucian and Lucianism in the English Renaissance* (1937), of a part of which the present essay is a revision.

The most valuable contribution of the book is its emphasis upon the interest of More and Erasmus in oratory and rhetorical composition. In an epistle prefatory to *Luciani opuscula*, Erasmus expresses the hope that the translations will stimulate study of the neglected discipline of oratory. He classifies them among those of his works *quae spectant ad institutionem literarum*. Although More, in his dedication to Ruthall, professes admiration for the morality and critical temper of Lucian, it is evident that he also, like Erasmus, found Lucian an excellent textbook in rhetoric. At More's suggestion, the collaborators added to their volume original Latin responses to Lucian's declamation, *Tyrannicida*. If a man kills a tyrant's son and the tyrant thereupon commits suicide, is the assassin entitled to the reward legally granted to tyrannicides? Lucian argues the affirmative; More and Erasmus the negative. That the humanists should have chosen so esoteric a point for debate is evidence that it was rhetoric, perhaps more than content, that attracted them to Lucian. Thompson's discussion of these seldom-read declamations will prove of value to those who wish to study the impact of Greek literature upon Renaissance minds.

In so brief a book as this under review, it is difficult to justify the inclusion of summaries of the Lucianic pieces translated by More and Erasmus. Lucian is readily available, both in Greek and in English, and the content of his writings is not the creation of his translators. One may also take exception to a few of Thompson's statements. Certainly, the great textual critics of the Renaissance—Valla, Grocyn, and Erasmus, among others—would protest the assertion that they were "less perturbed by questions of disputed authorship than we are" (p. 4). And it is strange that Erasmus "found

little Greek in England when he first visited the country in 1499" (p. 6). He found Linacre and Grocyn there, and he praised their learning highly. Two pages on, Thompson says, "Thomas More had better luck than Erasmus with teachers. He learned Greek from two celebrated humanists, Thomas Linacre and . . . William Grocyn."

WILLIAM NELSON

New York City Schools

Repetition in Shakespeare's Plays. By PAUL V. KREIDER. Princeton University Press, for University of Cincinnati, 1941. Pp. viii + 306. \$3.50.

To apply the word "repetition" to what the author describes in this work seems to me to be somewhat misleading. In a carefully drawn analytical appendix he outlines the areas in which the "repetition" occurs. The outline includes sports, social organization (including all personal and family relations), beliefs, literary customs, natural and supernatural contingencies of life, banishment, bereavement and grief, atrocities, death, civil war, love and lovers, low or clownish characters, villains and villainy. If it had added foreign wars, kingship, politics, government, and a few other subjects, it would have afforded a complete outline of Renaissance life. The author charges that Shakespeare makes so much use of imitation and repetition within his own plots and characters that, so far as the purely mechanical aspects of construction are concerned, his inventive faculty is relatively small. Shakespeare, he says, attempts to compensate for the triteness of his work by verse which differs (I take it on some occasions only) from the ordinary only in its extravagance, as if mere commotion could conceal paucity of invention. This seems to me to misunderstand the matter, and, frankly, it does injustice to the book in hand. What is aimed at is the fact that Shakespeare illustrates the ancient definition of art as an imitation of nature (or life). What could Shakespeare write about except life, and, if his scope is as ample as is represented, was it not necessary that he should treat the same subjects, situations, and characters over and over again? The question is as to the quality of his treatment, and we have here the old issue as to the nature of originality. It was also inevitable that he should follow the patterns of Renaissance thought and expression. He had nothing else to follow. Literature always does something of this sort, whether we recognize it or not, and a full outline of current American life and thought, together with the patterns of modern thinking, could be derived from current American literature. It would be found to be repetitious in this sense and, I fear, in a worse one.

Mr. Kreider's book is composed in two parts. The first is a study of Shakespeare's villains, the second is made up of essays on certain aspects of *Macbeth*, *King Lear*, and *As You Like It*. The second part is not very closely related to the first, although it illustrates some of the same principles. In the first part is a very good chapter on "The Mechanics of Disguise" which I shall omit from consideration. In the remaining chapters of the first part Shakespeare's villains are taken up from six different points of view. In order to demonstrate the repetitive quality of Shakespeare's work it was necessary for the author to introduce a great deal of commonplace material and to prove the obvious, and, although he is a good writer and has marked literary skill, it must be confessed that in these chapters there is a good deal of real repetition. The evidences presented in chapter III as to the character of the villain indicate a marvelously true conception on Shakespeare's part of what constitutes a villain. We are told that villains have a complete disregard for generally accepted virtues, that to many of them feminine purity is altogether ridiculous, that they attach no importance to the relation of host and guest, that, if they find innocent persons standing in their way, they do not hesitate to kill or ruin them, that they are egregious liars, that they sometimes have poetical powers, and sometimes a conscience. Among their motives we find envy, desire for vengeance, lust, and gratuitous hate. This is not without interest in the current international situation. One suspects, however, that a larger study of evil passions in ethical writers would show inter-relations among these evil qualities and that they could be subsumed under larger heads.

The book is so closely confined within the borders of Shakespeare that it may be said to lack background. So many Renaissance commonplaces crop up in the study that making Shakespeare stand alone rather narrows the picture. One would not of course imply that the author is ignorant of these matters, but one feels the lack of a wider view. For example, in the two essays which bear the title "Macbeth and Sleep" the author makes a collection of all passages in the play on sleep and presents them with a careful and effective interpretation of *Macbeth*. Sleep is a very common subject in literature, both ancient and modern. The author shows no consciousness of this, and we are left to infer that it was Shakespeare's fancy to say what he did about sleep. This is true even of old classical commonplaces like "sleep is the brother of death" and "Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown." There is, on the other hand, a brilliant use of the idea of the extreme brutality and godlessness attached in the age to the slaying of a man in his sleep.

Another essay closely connected with those on *Macbeth* is the one entitled "Gloucester's Eyes." The author there advances the thesis that the scene of the blinding of Gloucester so impressed Shakespeare that it determined passages and figures of speech in the play, a thing which may be true, but hardly to the extent which

the author claims. Sight is the main human reliance for ideas, and one can hardly "see" in all recurrences of the words, "see," "look," "seem," "show," "perceive," and the like anything more than ordinary and inevitable references to seeing. Indeed, ideas can hardly be expressed without the recurrence of such words. This method of finding general tone color in the frequent use of certain words and images reminds one of the work of G. Wilson Knight and Miss Caroline F. E. Spurgeon. It is an illuminating and interesting method of study, but, after all, it usually means only that Shakespeare, writing about a particular subject, used forcibly the only words and figures he could use to express his idea.

The best parts of Mr. Kreider's book are his clear and interesting expositions. He knows Shakespeare, understands him, and writes about him usually well and sometimes eloquently.

HARDIN CRAIG

Stanford University

John Dryden: Some Biographical Facts and Problems. By JAMES M. OSBORN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. xvi + 295. \$3.50.

Mr. Osborn characterizes his volume as "an attempt to do a little of the preliminary digging" for Dryden's next biographer, who "will have to be," as he remarks, "a handy man with the spade." He divides his book into two sections. The first is a critical examination of the biographies of Birch, Derrick, Johnson, Malone, and Scott, and of the biographical work of the last hundred years; this section is concluded with an appendix containing additions Malone collected for a revision of his biography, and notes on the work of Scott and Christie. The second section of Mr. Osborn's book contains his own "Collateral Investigations"; these are nine essays and eight notes on a variety of topics like "Dryden's Absences from London," "Dryden and Langbaine," and "The Dryden Letters at Knole." In keeping with his utilitarian purpose, Mr. Osborn provides a serviceable index.

Superficially the present status of Dryden biography appears much better than that of Spenser biography; about Dryden there is much more information generally available, but because of the controversies among which the career of Charles's laureate takes its course, this material demands the most careful scrutiny. Although four men of some literary eminence wrote lives of Dryden, of these perhaps only Malone approached the subject with a real appreciation of its requirements; Johnson certainly labored under difficulties, but Malone's criticism of his work is not unjustified. Scott is generally indebted to Malone, and Saintsbury too frequently

to his own ingenuity; they contributed next to nothing in the way of new facts, and they did not adequately check the information they were passing on: the value of their work derives from their own peculiar literary talents, and from the broad understanding they brought to such problems as, for instance, Dryden's conversion. But even Saintsbury's cogent handling of this problem was insufficient to convince Christie and no doubt others after him until Professor Bredvold made his painstaking study.

Mr. Osborn's exposition of the status of Dryden biography is clear and detailed. His chapter on Malone naturally is most interesting and valuable, for here he is dealing with the only biographer of Dryden who was assiduous and systematic in his search for facts; and from the Malone papers, something of a record of his search and of his use of the material which he found can be reconstructed. Here, as with other works dwarfed by Malone's production, Mr. Osborn contrives to give a well-documented, perspicacious, and rounded estimation of the writer's contribution to Dryden biography. Fulfilling his purpose in the investigation of these earlier biographies, "to sift out the facts about Dryden that have good pedigrees and to set them off from the fictions that clutter up much that has been written about him," Mr. Osborn has the advantage of utilizing modern scholarship. He is better able not only to weigh the information which earlier biographers brought to light, but to evaluate the treatment they accorded the character of Dryden.

Mr. Osborn's inquiry into the history of Dryden biography is a welcome and a useful piece of work to which he has brought the care that, as his study has made him aware, the subject demands. His chapters hold the implication of a general outline which will be useful for charting the course of future investigation. About the general practices of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century biographers his study is very informative. Taken together, his own specific contributions to Dryden biography in the second section of his book give some idea of the variety and multiplicity of the topics on which information is deficient or altogether lacking. One essay, "Dryden Family Traditions in 1799," is an outgrowth of his work on the Malone papers; others assemble or advance definite and tentative information about certain phases of Dryden's life. This "preliminary digging" has stirred considerable earth.

RICHARD H. PERKINSON

Fordham University

Hester Lynch Piozzi (Mrs. Thrale). By JAMES L. CLIFFORD. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1941. Pp. xix + 492.

Mr. Clifford has written a long book and a melancholy book, but a good one.

The story of Mrs. Piozzi's life is necessarily a long one, for she was an active woman in every sense, always reading, always writing, always interested in the world about her, dancing defiantly at the ball she planned in honor of her eightieth birthday. The pages of this book, text and notes, are closely packed with the records of all this activity to produce a long and exciting book; but the reader may find himself wishing that she had written a little less, or that less had been preserved. More especially, I find myself wishing that after her second marriage in 1784 she could have been contented to live a quieter and less documented life, for in that case the second half of the book might have been compressed to a brief concluding chapter. Yet it is obviously not Mr. Clifford's fault that Mrs. Piozzi declined to be quiescent during these later years.

No thoughtful reader can study these pages without some sense of the sadness of life. Many of her troubles Mrs. Piozzi brought on herself, no doubt; she had, however, many intervals of gaiety and happiness. But her trials were never at an end: as a girl, she saw the constant financial worries of her family; as the handsome wife of an unfaithful and unloving husband, she bore twelve children in rapid succession, and buried eight almost as rapidly; as a widow, she alienated all her friends, as well as her daughters, to marry for love; and throughout her long life her judgment was repeatedly at fault in family, financial, and literary problems. Always wanting affection, she constantly drove her daughters away from her; always hoping for financial security, she repeatedly found herself in financial difficulties; and her attempts to gain literary fame never brought her much beyond literary notoriety.

This melancholy tone, however, is not a defect in the book. Mr. Clifford has done his work well, extremely well. Despite some perhaps unavoidable repetition and an occasional paragraph that seems a little awkward, the great mass of material, collected from hundreds of scattered sources, is so carefully arranged and digested that each anecdote and each quotation falls into its appointed place and each performs its appointed task in illuminating the heroine's career. The style seems to me good: without ostentation it tells the story clearly and accurately—a happy result of the author's enthusiastic interest in his work as well as a proof of careful revision. Except for one pardonable outburst of romantic sensibility, in the description of Mrs. Piozzi's death, the whole exciting story is told with sober judgment and with thoughtful interpretation of the evidence. Even the footnotes partake of the general excellence: they serve their several functions of amplification, authentication,

or illustration of the text, and they are good (if distracting) reading in themselves. One note, on p. 101, is worth quoting: "Fanny Rice was married at fifteen, in quick succession gave birth to thirteen children, and a few weeks after the last, she died at the early age of thirty-two." With only two interpreting words, "quick" and "early," Mr. Clifford has recalled in one sentence not only the tragedy of Mrs. Thrale's life at Streatham but the scandal of a society that neglected the mother's rights to insist on "marital rights."

Mrs. Piozzi wrote nothing of literary value, despite many attempts. She felt deeply, but she thought too quickly to be profound. Mr. Clifford speaks in his Introduction of "her facile mind," and recognizes that her mind was too fatally facile to be sound. That Johnson made the same distinction is likely: he praised her "Ode to a Robin" as a very pretty effort (p. 51), but this does not mean he thought it good poetry. In fact, Johnson seems to have felt about female authors, including Mrs. Lennox and Fanny Burney, much as he felt about a woman's preaching and about a dog's walking on its hind legs: he was surprised to find that they could do it at all. In other words, he never expected her judgment to be accurate by genuine critical standards, but he admired her mind for what it was, a woman's mind. Mr. Clifford himself recognizes this attitude implicitly on p. 37: "The characterization is more sure than one would have expected from a young lady of twenty-one."

Although the book is called in the Introduction "the history of the Thrales," it remains in many ways a biography of Dr. Johnson, and the central two hundred pages are for that reason the most interesting. Johnsonians will find much here, including (let us hope) a final refutation of the hints of Johnson's early sexual irregularities: the dreadful secret that so frightened Hawkins and has so attracted the psychologists, Mr. Clifford shows, was Johnson's fear of insanity—not an irrational fear for a man whose intellectual life was his whole life. But that is only one point; this book presents a charming picture of Johnson at home with his dear Master and Mistress. It is indeed a biography of Johnson from the pleasantest side, and this picture is no less lifelike than the other picture drawn in Boswell's greater book. Perhaps, as Mr. Clifford believes, Boswell was unwilling to portray this domestic side of Johnson; at any rate he did not, and I think he could not.

It may be allowable to question one point: Mr. Clifford does not like Queeney, and I wonder whether he has not therefore been unduly harsh in his judgment of her. (Very subjective judgments of Queeney are scattered through the book, notably on pp. 297, 389, 434.) That she was a little stiff and proud must be admitted, but perhaps her mother's actions hurt Queeney about as much as Queeney's reserve hurt her impulsive and affectionate mother. A fair distribution of the blame is obviously difficult for us, but I am inclined

to shift some of it away from Queeney; this is after all merely a difference of emphasis, but I have enough sympathy with the difficulty of Queeney's position to be unwilling to condemn her.

A. T. HAZEN

Yale University

Mark Twain in Eruption. Edited and with an Introduction by BERNARD DE VOTO. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940. Pp. xxviii + 402. \$3.75.

Ever since Mark Twain's *Autobiography* was published in 1924 there has been much surmise and rumor about the contents of the unpublished portions. Of the unpublished sections Bernard De Voto has selected, rearranged, and edited about one-half. Mr. De Voto assures us that he has left out nothing that seemed to him interesting, that fantastic or injurious remarks have been excluded and the material rearranged in the interest of coherence. The editor adds that he is willing to assume responsibility for his decisions; since we have no means of checking, we must be content to let him take up his burden.

These new portions of the autobiography add nothing of vital importance to the data already known. Mark Twain in the light of this newly published material remains essentially unchanged. There is new evidence of Mark Twain's inability to understand what was happening in his country—particularly in the first hundred pages, which are mainly devoted to his fulminations against Theodore Roosevelt, Andrew Carnegie, and Jay Gould. The dislike is entirely personal, because Mark Twain is equally indiscriminating in his praise of Mr. John D. Rockefeller while at the same time entertaining doubts about the future of American democracy because of the rising power of a new plutocracy. Mark Twain's judgments, always highly personal, always colored by his fluctuating moods, are not the stuff that make for an understanding of self, of other personalities, or of historical forces.

Likewise there are anecdotes about the Hannibal days, additional circumstances about the writing of various minor works, experiences with contemporary writers such as Bret Harte and Thomas Bailey Aldrich, and some reminiscences about his last visit in England. Most of the material must be labeled trivia, but even trivia about such a colorful personality are interesting. The climax as a typical Twain anecdote is the interview with Elinor Glyn, which was, as Mark Twain said, "one of the damnest conversations I ever had with a beautiful stranger of her sex. . . ."

Mr. De Voto's editing makes the material more understandable for the general reader but makes no pretensions to thoroughness.

E. H. EBY

University of Washington

American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman. By F. O. MATTHIESSEN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. xxiv + 678. \$5.00.

Mr. Matthiessen makes the focus of his study the major writings of Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and Whitman during the five-year period from 1850 to 1855. His purpose is to make an intensive analysis and evaluation of the literary theories and practice of these five American authors. The work is a notable achievement in its field.

Although the scope of the study is limited, the treatment is not narrow. The *American Renaissance* creates a picture of an era, the high tide of American romanticism, more vividly and more thoroughly than most of the attempts to survey a wider territory or to investigate that broad area of activities generally covered in what is called a cultural or social history.

One reason for this success is the cumulative amount of scholarly research accomplished in the American field during the last decade, of which Mr. Matthiessen has made full use. Enough spade work has been done, particularly around these five major writers, to make possible such a full-bodied but intensive work. A second reason for Mr. Matthiessen's success resides in his ability to see that the issues belonging to literary theory and practice involve much more than the narrow considerations of literary technique. The penetrating discussion of the issues relevant to these writers' conceptions of the role of the individual in society and of the nature of good and evil gets to the heart of the period.

The detailed study of the interrelationships between Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and Whitman gives the major unity to the book and at the same time constitutes its most unique contribution, since all five were in their fashion experts whose judgments of one another cannot escape being revealing. The new material, made available through a study of the underlinings and marginal notations in the books that Herman Melville owned, helps to clarify that writer's intentions and show him to be one of the keenest thinkers of the age.

Mr. Matthiessen cannot resist the invitation to wander down some interesting by-paths. In treating the subject of functionalism in art the author takes an excursion into the writings of Horatio Greenough and later he takes some time off to write about Millet and Eakins—interesting digressions, it is true, and partially relevant, but inadequate both in respect to these artists and to the broader subject of the interrelationships between the graphic arts and the five American writers. The same weakness is evident in the treatment of the importance placed on optics in its relationship to romantic theory, particularly with regard to the discoveries in photography. Least unified of all is the excursion into the problems of folk

language, exemplified by George Washington Harris, because it is not tied into the main stream of Matthiessen's work. Just as important, perhaps more so, are the relationships between music and these romantics, or the natural sciences and literary theory, or at least Agassiz, Emerson, and Thoreau; but on these suggested topics Mr. Matthiessen apparently was not tempted.

These neglected side diversions have been mentioned purposely in order to show that some contemporary enthusiasms are the reason for these weak spots. It can be boiled down to an over-enthusiastic acceptance of the issues raised by T. S. Eliot. It is not a question of Eliot's significance; it is simply that Eliot's special interests should not be allowed to overbalance the scales used in measuring a past era. For another illustration take the section called "The Need for a Mythology," which discusses mythology in terms currently used by such writers as Eliot, Thomas Mann, and James Joyce. Back of this current verbiage is the simple fact that a writer has to establish close relationships with his audience and this in turn requires the acceptance of a common scale of values with mutually understood terms to convey it. In this sense the problems of expression which troubled all five romantics become clear, but in the usage of Eliot and the other contemporaries the whole problem becomes a mysterious search for some folk hero, some Sut Lovingood or Paul Bunyan, plus a struggle to coin some new language that at times seems to be a cross between a hill-billy dialect and the vaporings of Greenwich Village. Similarly, one suspects that the reason for Matthiessen's richly detailed analysis of the seventeenth-century English influences and in comparison the rather limited treatment of the nineteenth-century influences upon these men is the result of the same special contemporary interests.

These are minor shortcomings, however, in a work that may very well mark a period in American scholarship, because the *American Renaissance* is a mature work, a stimulus to similar investigations of other American writers, and a work that suggests new possibilities for research.

E. H. EBY

University of Washington

The Redentin Easter Play. By A. E. ZUCKER. Translated from the Low German of the Fifteenth Century with Introduction and Notes. Records of Civilization Sources and Studies, No. XXXII. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. x + 134, front. \$2.00.

The translation into English of the *Redentiner Osterspiel*, a document generally rated by critics as one of the very best of its kind, must be considered a very welcome publication to all students of mediaeval drama and culture. This is especially so, because it

makes available to the English reader a very valuable literary monument from the Middle Low German, a field which for the most part has been very sadly neglected. The *Redentin Easter Play* revealing, as it does, not only a fervent spirit of religion, but also an excellence of character portrayal, sincerity of purpose, and a popular and sturdy humor, is another literary gem characteristic of the fifteenth century, which will help to give us a clearer understanding and conception of the mediaeval mind.

Professor Zucker's work includes a survey of the development of the Easter Plays in general, the staging of the play, a problem to which he has already devoted much attention, short chapters on the sources and the characters of the play followed by the translation itself, notes, and a most complete bibliography of text editions, translations into Modern German (High and Low), and critical literature.

The rimed couplets of the original have been translated into prose. A very careful examination of the translation with the original Low German shows remarkable accuracy. It is easy to suggest better readings in any translation. For example, I might suggest *Tap Licker* instead of *Pot Licker* for *Lykkeitappe*, the name of one of the devils. This would be the literal translation and at the same time might bring out the idea of the parasite somewhat better. In line 324 I would translate *Also dat wesen scholde* with *As that was to be* rather than with *Therefore it had to be*. In four places (lines 895, 1428, 1510, 1614) the expression *Hebbe ik de breve rechte lesen* has been literally translated *If I've read the letters correctly*. This really means simply *If I have understood correctly*, as Zucker himself mentions in the notes. However, it would be quite remarkable if any individual would accept any translation as the best possible one. Such "improvements" must necessarily remain subjective and arbitrary and the translator usually has his own reasons for interpreting as he does. Much more significant is the fact that Zucker has a faithful translation and at the same time has lost none of the spirit of the original. This is no small accomplishment, if we realize that there are still many disputed passages in the play. In such cases the translator has made judicious use of the information garnered from the Low German editors (Krogmann, Schröder, Freybe, Froning). There are many humorous sections, especially in the second part, which border on the crass and vulgar, but in the translation they have lost none of their effect, although at times Zucker has made use of the notes to explain certain passages in more detail. The notes themselves are compact and to the point in all cases.

There are only a few minor errors in the print. The word *Hell* is sometimes capitalized and sometimes written small without any apparent reason. I would also suggest the spelling of *Poel* instead of *Pole* for the name of the island outside of Wismar.

CARL F. BAYERSCHMIDT

Columbia University

Lessings Stellung in der Entfaltung des Individualismus. By FRIEDRICH JOSEF SCHMITZ. University of California Publications in Modern Philology, XXIII, 1941. Pp. 152.

Recalling the days of his youth, Rudolf Binding (*Erlebtes Leben*, p. 57) deploras "jene bedenkliche Essenz des Zeitalters, die es so stark und tödlich durchdrang: die Essenz des Tuns-als-ob"; and Wilhelm Windelband (*Die Philosophie im deutschen Geistesleben des XIX. Jahrhunderts*, 1909, p. 114) testifies out of his experience of the same period:

So erleben wir eine Nivellierung der historischen Unterschiede und eine Uniformität des Daseins, wie sie kein früheres Zeitalter der menschlichen Geschichte auch nur geahnt hat. Daraus aber entspringt nun die große Gefahr, daß wir damit das Höchste einbüßen, was eigentlich erst Kultur und Geschichte ausmacht und zu allen Zeiten ausgemacht hat: Persönlichkeitsleben. Das Gefühl dieser Gefahr geht in der Tiefe durch das ganze geistige Leben der letzten Jahrzehnte hindurch und bricht von Zeit zu Zeit mit leidenschaftlicher Energie hervor. Neben jener glänzend nach außen sich entfaltenden materiellen Kultur entwickelt sich ein heißes Bedürfnis nach innerem Eigenleben, und neben jenem demokratisierenden und sozialisierenden Massendasein erwächst eine heftige Opposition der Individuen, ihr Aufstreben gegen die Erdrückung durch die Masse, ihr urwüchsiger Trieb zur Entladung des eigenen Wesens.

Dr. Schmitz has undertaken to define the position of Lessing in the development of individualism—this not, perhaps, so dynamic a phenomenon as the one above observed, but still an individualism which he properly calls modern, and of which he finds Lessing, despite all differences of circumstance between the age of Frederick the Great and our own, a valiant champion. Eighteenth-century rationalism and orthodoxy were not averse to an "Uniformität des Daseins," and even before the ebullient "storm and stress" there were seekers for a more abundant "Persönlichkeitsleben." How Lessing stood with reference to rationalism, empiricism, sensualism, pietism, "enlightenment" in its narrower sense, and "storm and stress"—likewise his relation to Leibniz, Thomasius, Wolff, Gottsched, Klopstock, Wieland, and others—being succinctly exhibited, the monograph proceeds to show how Lessing first got his bearings and then ever more redoubtably activated his "urwüchsigen Trieb" to set his own course for reasonable service to his day and generation.

The method is expository rather than argumentative. Excerpts from Lessing's writings, corroborated by pertinent citations from a host of critics and historians of literature, are woven into an orderly, coherent, dispassionate presentation of a well-founded view. Nor does the presentation have the air of special pleading. Dr. Schmitz has chosen a special subject and, like Matthew Arnold—indeed like Lessing himself—he is content, in this paper, to treat only one aspect of a many-sided figure. Accordingly, in the dis-

cussion, e.g., of *Emilia Galotti*, attention is directed not to the "dramatic algebra," the inviolable time-table, the dubious eventuation into a "bürgerliche Virginia"—not to fate, tragic guilt, "moral," or katharsis, but—on the one hand—to the particular individual endowments that make the persons' *characters* fit to arouse sympathy, as distinguished from types—not to say lay figures; and, on the other hand, to the essentially revolutionary quality of a conflict in which human beings with senses and instincts as well as reason are unable to be themselves and guide themselves in this "best of all possible worlds." For them, plainly, it could not be affirmed that "whatever is, is right."

Here we draw near to the heart of the matter. Lessing was an "Aufklärer"—no doubt about that! He used his reason—acutely; he could lay down the law with precision and vigor; he insisted upon fundamentals and delighted in distinctions; he had a right to inculcate a doctrine, for he knew its sanctions; he had little patience with unintelligent self-expansiveness. But, an unremitting inquirer, a believer in objective reality, organic growth, personal capacity and responsibility, he was aware that a human creator can sometimes build better than he knows; that nations as well as persons have their individuality; that times change; and that artistic genius stirs the more deeply, the more genuine the life that it presents or represents. What though he was no dreamer, no musician, no sensitive respondent to lyrical appeal, "weder Schauspieler noch Dichter"—what though to him line was more significant than color, action than revery? Allusion might have been made to that irascibility which Gotthold Ephraim confesses to have inherited from his father. Not that the son could not control his temper. He could and did—and equally his intellect, lest this should usurp the functions of insight, of faith, or of will.

It is, in sum, a man of insight, of good faith, and of good will whom Dr. Schmitz invites us to contemplate: "der mannhafteste Charakter der deutschen Literaturgeschichte."

WILLIAM GUILD HOWARD

Harvard University

Lessing's "Laokoon." By FRED O. NOLTE. Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press, Inc., 1940. Pp. 174. \$2.00.

Perhaps all students of Lessing will find Mr. Nolte's criticism interesting. They may even go so far in their adulation of Lessing as to agree with the author, when he writes, "It is criticism and criticism alone that has taught us to walk upright. Whereas art is born of passion and fed by prejudice, criticism is born of discrimination and bred by tolerance." There is more of the same nature in this study which may be interesting, but it is more personal and

aesthetic than critical. It attempts an evaluation of Lessing's contribution, but instead it succeeds only in giving the reader a unique but rather unscholarly, and uncritical personal discourse.

None of the recent valuable studies of Lessing seems to have attracted the author's notice. He would certainly have profited by reading Mary Colum's penetrating study, and he might have been inspired by it to a more judicious analysis.

The author did not see fit to add either a selected bibliography or an index.

SOPHUS KEITH WINTHER

University of Washington

Some Studies of Medieval Literature and History (University of Colorado Studies, Series B, Studies in the Humanities, Vol. 1, No. 3). Boulder, Colo., February, 1941. Pp. 223-308. \$1.00.

Under the general title, *Some Studies of Medieval Literature and History*, this number of the University of Colorado Studies contains eight articles which offer a well-chosen combination of appraisal, suggestion, and new material.

(1) "The First Biography of an English Poet," by Irene McKeehan. This is an appreciative consideration of portions from the life of St. Godric written by Reginald of Durham in the latter part of the twelfth century. Facts about Godric's life are discussed, and particular emphasis is placed upon the matter of his visions, about which there is said to be a vividness, an originality, that distinguishes them from the usual visions in hagiography. Reginald's *Vita* was summarized by Zupitza in *Englische Studien*, XI, but so little is known of English poets and poetry of the twelfth century that the remarks in the present article are especially welcome.

(2) "Germanic Influence on Old French Syntax," by Paul-Louis Faye. The points of evidence for Germanic influence are sketched, and several are discussed in some detail. The use of *fut* interchangeably with *esteit* is attributed to the possibility that the writer was thinking in terms of *was*. It is suggested that the use of *cil* for *li* is traceable to writers and speakers for whom the Germanic article and demonstrative *der* might have been the means of expression for the three Old French forms *cil*, *cist*, *li*. A bibliography of the subject accompanies the article.

(3) "An Unnoticed Abridgment of the *Historia de Preliis* (Redaction I²-I³)," by S. Harrison Thomson. This abridgment is edited from MS Mum A 4. 102 in the Chetham Library at Manchester, described as a paper codex, the work of several fifteenth-century scribes. In the MS the work occupies folios 98^r-113^r, *Gesta*

Alexandri Magni, written circa 1430 by an ignorant scribe; it makes about fifteen closely printed pages. Of the main reworkings of the *Historia de Preliis*, those known as I¹, I², and I³, this version has some characteristics of I² and some of I³. The edition of the text makes available what may prove to be fruitful material for further study not only by those interested in the relationship of the redactions of the *Historia* but also by students of the English vernacular versions.

(4) "A Noteworthy Contribution to the Study of Bede," by Jack D. A. Ogilvy. Primarily in praise of the recent (1939) edition of Bede's *Expositio in Actuum Apostolorum* and *Retractatio* by Laistner, the article also considers the importance of the study of Bede not only as an historian but also as an exegete. It is noted that from the commentaries of Bede one may better examine his scholarly methods than from his history, because the former are more extensive and because in them Bede was working with material which has come down to us. It is also noted that in the *Expositio* and *Retractatio* Bede shows interest in the difference between Latin and Greek versions, a concern which might be investigated in regard to the knowledge of Greek in the Anglo-Saxon period.

(5) "George Poděbrady and Bohemia to the Pacification of Silesia—1459," by Otakar Odložilík. The main political and religious movements in Bohemia in the first half of the fifteenth century are considered in detail, with particular emphasis upon the political activities of George of Poděbrady until the end of the rebellion in Silesia. In a thorough study he is set forth as one who, faced with many problems of state, showed himself capable of skilful negotiations. The author proposes to add elsewhere a treatment of the last nine years of George's reign as king.

(6) "The Leadership of the English Delegation at Constance," by Allen duPont Breck. As a contribution to the understanding of the part which England played in the reform of the church in the fifteenth century by participation in the Conciliar Movement, this article deals with a group of English men at one particular Council and considers their policies and the results obtained. As probably little is generally known of the fifteenth-century English reformers, one is glad to find something told about each of the ten men in the group.

(7) "Emperor Charles IV and Pope Innocent VI," by Edwin J. Westermann. With the intent of correcting a view that Charles was in general subservient to the papacy, the article examines in some detail a particular period of Charles' reign—that preceding and immediately following his coronation. It is pointed out that in some crucial matters Charles pursued a quite independent course.

(8) "AOI: Another Suggestion," by Paul-Louis Faye. To the numerous proposed interpretations of the *aoi* which occurs in the Oxford MS of the *Chanson de Roland*, this brief note adds still an-

other of considerable interest. It is suggested that in the *aoi* are to be found the initials of a formula, such perhaps as Alpha Omega Jesus. Since no wholly acceptable solution for *aoi* has been found, the suggestion is of value in putting scholars on the alert for possible corroborating evidence.

HERBERT MERITT

Stanford University

The Imaginary Voyage in Prose Fiction: A History of Its Criticism and a Guide for Its Study, with an Annotated Check List of 215 Imaginary Voyages from 1700 to 1800. By PHILIP BABCOCK GOVE. (Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature, no. 152.) Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xiii + 445. \$3.50.

Since earliest times men have found, or pretended to find, curious and marvelous things in their travels; hence the fabulous tales of fabulous lands which came to be part of the great stories of antiquity and got themselves recorded in geographies, encyclopedias, and natural histories—and later in travel books. Not only did the marvelous from faraway places come early into the written records, but so did the purely fictitious travel story, involving frequently the description of a utopian land. The appeal of such fictions has always been great, but perhaps at no time greater than in the eighteenth century. Hence it is with the eighteenth century, when one might well expect the fictional voyage to get itself regularized, that Mr. Gove has chiefly concerned himself.

His book is divided into two parts, the first of which he calls a history of the criticism of the imaginary voyage, and the second, a check list of such voyages written in the eighteenth century. Part I deals with the widespread, indefinite use of the term *imaginary voyage*; the earliest use of the term; the antiquity of the genre; the history of critical discussion of the genre; the Robinsonade; and the relation of the type to other kinds of prose fiction. In this part, as the writer suggests in his preface, the major concern is really definition. Having examined many, if not all, definitions of the imaginary voyage, the author rejects them all, but refuses to propose one himself—quite rightly:

. . . no final *inclusive and exclusive* definition of the imaginary voyage is possible. It has been a living, shifting, and combining form, analogous, for example, to the essay, which is definable only with respect to a few main characteristics; . . . (p. 175)

He goes on to say that, instead of trying to break down the imaginary voyage into its various types and subtypes, he has thought

of it as itself a subdivision of the larger category of "geographical fiction." Such point of view would seem to be wise. For, after all, *voyage* is used both in its broad French sense and also in its restricted English sense; and *imaginary* may very well be applied to parts of almost all travel accounts, including such famous ones as Raleigh's *Guiana*. Indeed, the imaginary voyage, if we regard it as a part of "geographical fiction," harks back on the one hand to Homer and on the other to Plato, to Herodotus and Strabo, to Pliny and Campanella, to Mandeville and More; and, though it became in the eighteenth century almost a special kind of fiction, it was never closely restricted either as to content or form, culminating, as it did, in such ill-sorted masterpieces as *Robinson Crusoe*, *Gulliver's Travels*, and *Candide*.

Mr. Gove's valuable survey of the critical material, mostly from the French and German, is concerned too much, perhaps, with matters of definition and classification. Surely more attention could be given to what has been said about the quality of imagination displayed by writers of the imaginary voyage, about their style, and about their social and philosophic ideas. Such attention, indeed, might very well help one to understand better what the general type is like. Moreover, the section on the antiquity of the genre might have been enriched by some consideration of the place of the ancient Irish voyages in the history of the type.

Though one might quarrel with the somewhat arbitrary restrictions (for instance, the author discards all voyages that have to do with the Mediterranean), one finds the "Check List" of Part II a veritable mine of bibliographical information. Arranged chronologically, this list includes not only titles, dates, known editions, translations, and the libraries in which they may be found, but also extended bibliographical notes and a list of critical and historical references. The material is vast, if not exhaustive, and makes the book indispensable to anyone interested in the subject; the notes, moreover, really make clear the complex problems of bibliography and criticism. It is interesting merely to go through the list and see how many Robinsonades there were, or how many trips to the moon, or how many imitations of Gulliver. In spite of the wealth of information, however, one could wish for more. For instance, the author (partly, no doubt, from lack of space) limits his review of the critical materials of *Robinson Crusoe* to those dealing primarily with the novel as an imaginary voyage.

The "Short Title Index," the selected bibliography, and the excellent general index contribute greatly to the usefulness of the book. The style is generally sufficient to the subject, though an occasional awkwardness might, with more care, have been avoided. (For instance, p. 183: "Eighteenth-century fiction has a much closer interlingual relationship than is always realized.")

Mr. Gove's book belongs to the general type of study, now appearing with increasing frequency, which reviews what has been done in a certain field and then lays the groundwork for additional investigation. (Such, for instance, is James M. Osborn's recent study, published also by the Columbia University Press, *John Dryden: Some Facts and Problems*, 1940.*) This type of research enables the serious student to find out at once what has been done in a field and what needs doing. Mr. Gove's work makes it clear, for instance, that a history of all kinds of voyages and travel accounts before 1700 should be written, and that only now can the story of the imaginary voyage of the eighteenth century be told.

THOMAS B. STROUP

University of Florida

La Littérature française entre deux guerres, 1919-1939. By FERNAND BALDENSBERGER. Los Angeles: Lymanhouse (1941). 207 pp.

The first query which comes to one's mind in reading this volume is, how did the author gather his never-failing information? A great amount of it must be traced of course to his stupendous memory, but how could the works still necessary become available today in America? Professor Baldensperger discloses part of his secret when he says that he made use largely of periodicals; these are often more available than books, and this is indeed a valuable hint to many of us who do not think of this resource.

Another cause for astonishment and praise is the compactness of these pages. At the same time, it must be admitted that this very quality might constitute a serious handicap for some readers. One has often the impression that Professor Baldensperger imagined himself lecturing (he says that the book is composed, partly at least, of lectures delivered on the Pacific Coast) before his audience at the Sorbonne. Our personal experience tells us that many names which are familiar enough in France awaken only very feeble echoes in an American audience: names such as Alain or Guéhénno, and even specific and famous works like Dorgelès' *Saint Magloire*, of 1922.

The attitude is, as was expected, that of a professor more prone to observe than to judge. Yet here and there one will come across a personal reaction: Francis Jammes "si peu artiste," and Claudel, "tellement artiste"; or again: "l'œuvre magnifique de Jules Romains," capped with the opinion that posterity will offer to the *Hommes de bonne volonté* "un rang dans le voisinage des *Misérables*, et à quelque distance de *Guerre et paix*" (p. 163).

* See review on page 650.

Professor Baldensperger has always evinced a philosophical turn of mind; he never was a mere collector of facts. There is a well defined plan and purpose in the volume, although perhaps not so clearly discernible in the opening chapters as in the later ones.

The first chapter is devoted to works dealing with the fate of the young men just coming of age in 1918, who were left stranded by the effects of the long war. They constituted the pathetic "adolescence inquiète." A long list of novels is given, such as Louis Chardonnet's *L'Inquiète adolescence* (1920), Radiguet's *Le Diable au corps* (1923), Marcel Arland's *L'Ordre* (1924). Sometimes they were simply cases of "poudroïement de l'adolescence"; but more often these youths were presented as inclined to adopt the most radical philosophies of life, such as humanity had most determinedly rejected: since things had gone so wrong with previous bourgeois standards, why not simply ignore these? And thus, the cynicism of Baudelaire was opposed to the suggestion of saner reformers; the marquis de Sade was put above Diderot; Beckford's *Vathek* and Lewis' *Monk* were preferred to "l'admirable cohorte des romanciers britanniques." Obviously the task of writers after 1918 would have been to take a hand in guiding the French people in a work of reconstruction after the great tragedy. This they generally did not do. There are, it is true, extenuating circumstances which one must not forget. If they were slow to find ways, the even greater tragedy is that, just as they were finding these ways and moving up-hill again, the second world war interrupted the process. As a matter of fact, according to Professor Baldensperger, instead of grappling with the problem of reconstruction, most of them, at first, seemed rather to evade it.

In Chapter II, "L'Émerveillement de l'Irrationnel"—this "manie de certains littérateurs qui ne peuvent voir un objet sans penser aussitôt à un autre" (A. Gide)—Professor Baldensperger denounces another deceptive mirage. It is analyzed in connection chiefly with Proust and his "épopée de l'irrationnel"; but scores of other writers are mentioned, including Julien Green, Giraudoux, even Maurois (in *Climats*); not to speak of James Joyce, who counted many admirers in France.

As to those who simply and frankly gave up, maintaining that no philosophy can exist for our crazy world, they are dealt with in "Grandeur et Décadence de Dada et Cie" (Chapter III). Their activity goes back, of course, to 1916 and 1917, but Tristan Tzara, the initiator of Dadaism, continued as late as 1924 and 1925. Marinetti then followed. And finally, the Surrealists came along, endeavoring to save something, not of human reason indeed, but of what they considered human wisdom: "la pensée en l'absence de tout contrôle exercé par la raison, en dehors de toute préoccupation ethnique ou morale" (Aragon).

Exoticism has become "exodism" since the World War ("La Découverte de la Terre," Chapter IV). Here, of course, the motif

of *evasion* is obvious: "Toujours cette envie d'être ailleurs," says Morand. It was expressed in two ways, this escape from the world of realities: (1) "en profondeur," as by Giono's *Lyrisme cosmique*: to be everywhere and nowhere; (2) "en largeur," for instance by Malraux, with his novels of the Far East.

Chapter V, "Sous l'Oppression de l'Inconscient," exposes the worst forms of these evasions. Professor Baldensperger could not help taking them into account; but we are immersed here in the world of the abnormal, with the unsavory themes of incest, homosexuality, and what not: Proust and Gide, Deberly and R. Faucher, and so forth. The abundance of this kind of literature, as recorded by the author, makes one realize how irresistible was the longing for an escape from a hopelessly monotonous, meaningless *Weltanschauung*, by men who were certainly sincere and unhappy; others would not have to be taken into consideration.

Professor Baldensperger being a poet himself, one is not surprised that the next chapter, "Des Incertitudes du Parnasse à la Poésie de la Lucidité," should be rich in quotations and direct references. "Lucidité" is irony; in fact, modern poetry is turning away from "lucid" poets, like Vigny and Hugo, preferring either a poetry that need have no meaning ("la poésie pure, cette beauté abstraite qu'on voulait émouvante"); or a poetry feeding on a cryptic association of the ethereal and of the technical—for instance, Patrice de la Tour du Pin, who seems to "apparenter sa *Quête de joie* à la plus abstruse recherche scientifique." The foremost case here is, of course, Valéry. Are such attitudes really very new? E.g., does not the beautiful *Madrigal panthéiste*, *Affinités secrètes*, by Théophile Gautier, contain the very essence of so-called ultra-modern verse?

The chapter on the stage, "L'Équilibre Incertain de la Scène," is perhaps the least satisfactory of the volume. The reproach made to the playwrights—Géraldy, Lenormand, and Giraudoux evidently not excepted—is that they did not treat of fundamental themes. Two plays are singled out as of real value, Raynal's *Tombeau sous l'Arc de triomphe*, and, a little surprisingly, Pagnol's *Topaze*. This seems scant appreciation of a number of remarkable stage successes.

Chapter VIII, "Débordement et Balisage des Romans-fleuves," will probably prove the most interesting to the many who are familiar with at least some of these. The trouble is that none of all these "romans" gives the impression of having helped poor humanity: Jacques Chardonne, Duhamel, Roger Martin-du-Gard, Montherlant, and even Jules Romains himself, at least so far, have offered nothing but mere men, not men "de bonne volonté": "Il est triste de constater que c'est au fond la bataille des Flandres, non le redressement sur la Marne et la défense de Verdun, qui semblait préparer les déclivités de ce roman fleuve . . ." (p. 125). There was a danger in what is aptly called "la nonchalance fluviale." The author would suggest "romans dignes": short and focusing on some definite aspect of life. (E.g., Jean de la Varende.) Thus Professor

Baldensperger, all in all, feels more sympathetic towards the novels treated in the next chapter, where he sees promise of some constructive material: "Pour faire parler Caliban." An attempt was made in the school which called itself "naturisme." Eugène Montfort is quoted as saying that it was necessary to "réagir contre une certaine littérature proustienne, giraudouillette, morandiste et gidarde"; and what the "naturistes" (Thérive, Dabit, Léon Lemonnier) want is to draw attention to all the plain people of France, those who are neither eccentric, monstrous (Proust), nor abuliac (Duhamel); even more, they want to be sympathetic, as Péguy put it, with the "éminente dignité du pauvre." Hamp's exaltation of "le travail," and anarchistic philosophies like Barbusse's, Malraux's, and Céline's, distinctly lack the benevolent note of the *naturistes*.

What of religious literature? (Chapter X, "L'Âpre Exigence Religieuse: *Fervents* ou *Bien Pensants*?") It is difficult to challenge the author's statements that this literature, while quite abundant, seems more concerned with theological discussions between unbelievers and catholic or protestant dogmatists, than with actual religious life. One of the consistently Catholic writers, Bernanos, is certainly stirring in his prose, but he is not catholic in the etymological sense of "universal." As to the "renouveau catholique," it appears somewhat hazy to the layman, e.g., in A. de Chateaubriant's *La Réponse du Seigneur*, or in Daniel Rops's *L'Âme obscure*. At times it is difficult to know, as in Mauriac's novels, whether "l'accent si rauque et déchiré qu'exhale à l'ordinaire cette foi brûlante témoigne d'un doute intérieur, ou au contraire d'une ardente charité, anxieuse de faire partager à ses lecteurs, fraternellement, la certitude."

As we approach the concluding pages, we remember that Professor Baldensperger started his career in the world of letters by his eloquent studies of Goethe. Here once more he praises Goethe's magnificent humanism, as it is echoed a hundred years later in another great humanist, Gottfried Keller, the author of *Der grüne Heinrich*. The reader is treated here to a sort of "profession de foi" in which "humanism" is taken not in the somewhat scrimped connotation given to it among recent American philosophers, but in a very lofty acception: "Aux commodités de la vie courante ne faut-il pas proposer un peu d'héroïsme, de dévouement—au sens religieux du mot—et peut-être de scrupule?" In other words, it would mean a return to "la grande tradition que l'humanité n'abandonnerait que pour trahir son destin."

The last word is for Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, whose lofty figure hovers over us: "Or, par une réalité poignante qui est un juste retour des choses, la jonction de l'héroïsme avec la littérature se démontrait en sillages éblouissants, dont ne pouvait tirer parti aucun 'genre' apparent, mais qui laissaient leur trace dans des réactions conscientes—donc dans la matière propre à réflexion et à poésie de demain."

Such is this stern, conscientious, penetrating, and, the writer would be willing to add, moving book, a book which "does not read like a novel," but which does great honor to the man who signed it. If more personal comments have not been offered by the reviewer, it is because it seemed difficult not to agree with the fundamental ideas. To dwell on small divergences of opinion would have been to neglect absurdly the excellent content of the volume.

ALBERT SCHINZ

Philadelphia, Pa.

BOOKS RECEIVED

AMERICAN

- Aly, Bower. *The Rhetoric of Alexander Hamilton*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. x + 226. \$2.50.
- Bennett, Whitman. *Whittier. Bard of Freedom*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 359. \$3.50.
- Byrd, William. *The Secret Diary of William Byrd of Westover, 1709-1712*. [Edited by Louis B. Wright and Marion Tinling.] Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, 1941. Pp. v + 622. \$5.00.
- Cameron, Kenneth Walter. *Ralph Waldo Emerson's Reading*. A guide to the volumes which he withdrew from libraries, together with some unpublished letters and a list of [withdrawals from the Boston Athenæum by] Emerson's contemporaries (1827-1850) . . . and an introduction describing bibliographical resources in New England. Raleigh, N. C.: The Thistle Press, 1941. Pp. 144. \$3.50.
- Coan, Otis W., and Lillard, Richard G. *America in Fiction*. Stanford University Press, 1941. Pp. iii + 180. \$1.50.
- Hart, James D. *The Oxford Companion to American Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. v + 888. \$5.00.
- Hawthorne, Nathaniel. *The English Notebooks*. Based upon the original manuscripts in the Pierpont Morgan Library. [Edited by Randall Stewart.] New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1941. Pp. xlv + 668. \$6.00.
- James, Henry. *Representative Selections*. [Edited with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes, by Lyon N. Richardson.] Cincinnati: American Book Co., 1941. Pp. v + 490. \$1.25.
- Warfel, Harry R., and Orians, G. Harrison. *American Local-Color Stories*. Cincinnati: American Book Co., 1941. Pp. v + 846. \$3.50.

ENGLISH

- Addison, Joseph. *The Letters of*. [Edited by Walter Graham.] New York: Oxford University Press; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1941. Pp. v + 527. \$8.00.
- Berwick, Donald M. *The Reputation of Jonathan Swift, 1781-1882*. Philadelphia: College Offset Press, 1941. Pp. 170.

- Brontë, Emily Jane. *The Complete Poems of*. [Edited from the manuscripts, by C. W. Hatfield.] New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xxiv + 262. \$2.80.
- Capellanus, Andreas. *The Art of Courtly Love*. [With Introduction, Translation, and Notes by John Jay Parry.] New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xi + 218. \$2.75.
- Chapman, George. *The Poems of*. [Edited by Phyllis Brooks Bartlett.] New York: Modern Language Association of America; London: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 488. \$5.00.
- Dodds, John. *Thackeray: A Critical Portrait*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 257. \$3.00.
- Hungerford, Edward B. *Shores of Darkness*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 314. \$3.00.
- Irwin, William Robert. *The Making of Jonathan Wild*. A study in the literary method of Henry Fielding. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. ix + 156. \$2.00.
- Kelley, Maurice. *This Great Argument*. A study of Milton's *De Doctrina Christiana* as a Gloss upon *Paradise Lost*. Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 269. \$5.00.
- Maxwell, Baldwin, and others. *Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hardin Craig*. Stanford University Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 339. \$3.50.
- Prescott, H. F. M. *A Spanish Tudor. The life of "Bloody Mary."* New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. ix + 562. \$5.00.
- Shine, Hill. *Carlyle and the Saint-Simonians. The Concept of Historical Periodicity*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 191. \$2.25.
- Willey, Basil. *The Eighteenth Century Background*. Studies on the idea of Nature in the thought of the period. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. viii + 302. \$3.25.

FRENCH

- Françon, Marcel. *Guide Bibliographique pour servir à l'Etude de l'Histoire Littéraire en France aux XIV^e et XV^e Siècles*. Cambridge, Mass.: Privately printed, 1941. Pp. 23.
- Roach, William [editor]. *The Didot Perceval According to the Manuscripts of Modena and Paris*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 348. \$3.50.

GERMAN

- Bang, Carol Klee. *Maske und Gesicht in den Werken Conrad Ferdinand Meyers*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1940. Pp. v + 190. \$2.50.
- Heller, Otto, assisted by Theodore H. Leon. *The Language of Charles Sealsfield—A Study in Atypical Usage*. St. Louis: Washington University Studies, Language and Literature, New Series, No. 11, July, 1941. Pp. v + 154. \$1.50.
- von Ouwe, Hartman. *Der Arme Heinrich*. [The critical text of Erich Gierach, with Introduction, Notes and Vocabulary by J. Knight Bostock.] Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1941. Pp. vii + 114. 6s.

ITALIAN

- Kennard, Joseph Spencer. *A Literary History of the Italian People*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. xii + 418. \$5.00.

PORTUGUESE

- Allen, Joseph H. D., Jr. *Portuguese Word-Formation with Suffixes*. Baltimore: Linguistic Society of America Supplement to *Language*. Linguistic Dissertation No. 33. Pp. 143.

SCANDINAVIAN

- Kierkegaard, Søren. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Princeton University Press, 1941. For American-Scandinavian Foundation. Pp. vii + 579. \$6.00.

SPANISH

- Levy, Bernard. *Present-Day Spanish* (revised ed.). New York: The Dryden Press, 1941. Pp. vii + 376. \$1.75.
- Valle-Inclán, Ramon del. *Sonata de Primavera*. [Edited by Manuel Salas.] New York: The Dryden Press, 1941. Pp. 191. \$1.15.

SPANISH-AMERICAN*

- Andrade, Jorge Carrera. *Canto al Puente de Oakland*. [To the Bay Bridge, English translation, by Eleanor L. Turnbull.] Stanford University: Hoover Library on War, Revolution and Peace, 1941.

* Books received which treat non-literary aspects of Latin-America will be found listed, and in many cases reviewed, in the *Revista Ibero-americana*.

- Balboa, Pelegrin Franganillo. *Las Aves de Cuba*. Havana, Cuba: Obsequio de Cultural, S. A., 1941. Pp. 215. \$1.50.
- Pinto, Juan. *Panorama de la Literatura Argentina Contemporánea*. Buenos Aires: Mundi, 1941. Pp. 385.

GENERAL

- Foerster, Norman, and others. *Literary Scholarship. Its Aims and Methods*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. v + 269. \$3.00.
- Joughin, G. Louis. *Basic Reference Forms*. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1941. Pp. vii + 94. 80 cents.
- Monroe, N. Elizabeth. *The Novel and Society. A critical study of the modern novel*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. v + 282. \$3.00.
- Spargo, John W. *A Bibliographical Manual* (2nd ed.). For students of the language and literature of England and the United States. Chicago: Packard & Co., 1941. Pp. v + 260. \$1.50.
- Thorndike, Lynn. *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, vols. V and VI: *The Sixteenth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Vol. V, pp. xxii + 695; Vol. VI, pp. xviii + 766. \$10.00 set.
- University of Colorado Studies, series B. *Studies in the Humanities*, vol. I, no. 4. Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado, 1941. Pp. 309-405. \$1.00.
 Contents: Paul-Louis Faye, "Dada and the Temper of 1917"; Ralph E. Warner, "Some Feminine Characters in the Novels of Alfranio Piexoto"; Roy Alan Cox, "Political Disunion as a Subject in Recent French Drama"; Gerhard Loose, "Thomas Mann and the Problem of Decadence"; Wilma Brun, "Franz Werfel."
- Wilson, Edmund, and others. *The Intent of the Critic*. [Edited, with an introduction, by Donald A. Stauffer.] Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. 147. \$2.50.
- Wilson, Edmund. *The Wound and the Bow. Seven studies in literature*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1941. Pp. 295. \$3.00.

MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

VOLUME TWO, 1941

Edited by

RAY HEFFNER

Managing Editor

DUDLEY D. GRIFFITH

FREDERICK M. PADELFORD

CURTIS C. D. VAIL

HOWARD LEE NOSTRAND

Direct contributions to
Managing Editor, Modern Language Quarterly
Parrington Hall
University of Washington
Seattle

University of Washington Press
Seattle, Washington

MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

VOLUME II—1941

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Don Cameron Allen. Latin Literature [of the Renaissance]	403
Carlos Baker. Spenser, the Eighteenth Century, and Shelley's <i>Queen Mab</i> . . .	81
Paul F. Baum. Rossetti's <i>The Leaf</i>	187
Chandler B. Beall. A Tasso Quotation in Shelley	609
Seabury M. Blair. The Succession of Lives in Spenser's Three Sons of Agape	109
August Closs. Wurzeln der Romantik bei Herder	611
Grover Cronin, Jr. The Bestiary and the Mediaeval Mind—Some Com- plexities	191
Merrell R. Davis. The Flower Symbolism in <i>Mardi</i>	625
John W. Dodds. Thackeray as a Satirist Previous to <i>Vanity Fair</i>	163
John W. Draper. Shakespeare's Orlando Innamorato	179
Z. S. Fink. Milton and the Theory of Climatic Influence. . .	67
John T. Flanagan. The Authenticity of Cooper's <i>The Prairie</i>	99
Clarence Gohdes. A Note on Whitman's Use of the Bible as a Model.	105
Francis R. Johnson and Sanford V. Larkey. Science [in the Renaissance]. .	363
Frederick A. Klemm. The Dead-Hand Motive as a Phase of Gerhart Hauptmann's Romanticism	619
Lester Gilbert Krakeur. The Problem of Malesherbes' Intervention.	551
John G. Kunstmann. German Literature [of the Renaissance]	421
Sanford V. Larkey (See Francis R. Johnson)	363
Kurt Lewent. Observations on Old Provençal Style and Vocabulary.	203
John Leon Lievsay. Braggadochio: Spenser's Legacy to the Character- Writers	475
Berthe M. Marti. Arnulfus and the <i>Faits des Romains</i>	3
Roger B. Oake. Montesquieu and Hume	25
———. Montesquieu and Hume (Part II)	225
Frederick M. Padelford. Spenser's Use of "Stour"	465
John J. Parry. A Bibliography of Critical Arthurian Literature for the Year 1940	293

Ernst A. Philippson. <i>Der Ackermann aus Böhmen</i>	263
Allen W. Porterfield. E. T. A. Hoffmann as a Lyric Writer.....	43
Lawrence Marsden Price. Holland as a Mediator of English-German Literary Influences in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.....	115
John Lancaster Riordan. The Status of the Burkhard Waldis Studies.....	279
Alan S. C. Ross. The Name of the Northern Dvina.....	199
Sister Mary Immaculate. "Sixty" as a Conventional Number and Other Chauceriana	59
Leo Spitzer. L'Impératif des Marins.....	531
Brents Stirling. Anti-Democracy in Shakespeare: A Re-survey.....	487
Leland Thielemann. The Problem of Unity and Individualism in Romain's Social Philosophy	249
Robert Warnock. Boswell and Andrew Lumisden.....	601
Stewart C. Wilcox. Hazlitt on Systematic in Contrast to Familiar Composition	185
Samuel F. Will. French Literature [of the Renaissance].....	439
Samuel L. Wolff. Milton's "Advocatum Nescio Quem": Milton, Salmasius, and John Cook.....	559
Louis B. Wright. Introduction to a Survey of Renaissance Studies.....	355

REVIEWS

Douglas W. Alden. Marcel Proust and His French Critics. [Jean David]	131
Fernand Baldensperger. La Littérature française entre deux guerres, 1919-1939. [Albert Schinz].....	664
Charles Sears Baldwin. Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice. [Frederick M. Padelford].....	123
Morris Bishop. Ronsard, Prince of Poets. [Jean David].....	339
Thomas Marshall Howe Blair (editor). The Unhappy Favourite or The Earl of Essex, by John Banks. [G. F. Sensabaugh].....	325
Cleanth Brooks. Modern Poetry and the Tradition. [Rosemond Tuve]....	147
H. Munro Chadwick and N. Kershaw Chadwick. The Growth of Literature (three volumes). [John Webster Spargo].....	307
James L. Clifford. Hester Lynch Piozzi (Mrs. Thrale). [A. T. Hazen]..	652
Ralph Stokes Collins. The Artist in Modern German Drama. [Edward F. Hauch].....	334
Olan V. Cook (compiler). Incunabula in the Hanes Collection of the Library of the University of North Carolina. [John S. Richards]....	150
Lane Cooper (translator). Plato on the Trial and Death of Socrates. [Harvey B. Densmore].....	312
E. H. Criswell. Lewis and Clark: Linguistic Pioneers. [Kemp Malone]..	137
Francis J. Crowley. Voltaire's <i>Poème sur la loi naturelle</i> , A Critical Edition. [Jean David].....	133

Herbert Davis, William C. DeVane, and R. C. Bald (editors). Nineteenth-Century Studies. [<i>Joseph Warren Beach</i>]	329
Harry A. Deferrari. Outline of a Theory of Linguistic Change. [<i>P. J. Frein</i>] (For author's comment on this review, see page 522)	345
Alberto D'Elia. A Bibliography of Italian Dialect Dictionaries. [<i>Herbert H. Vaughan</i>]	129
Michele De Filippis (editor). La Cristina, by F. M. Trevisani. [<i>A. T. MacAllister</i>]	344
Bernard De Voto (editor). Mark Twain in Eruption. [<i>E. H. Eby</i>]	654
David Finch. La Critique Philosophique de Pascal au XVII ^e siècle. [<i>Jean David</i>]	339
Allen H. Gilbert (translator). The Prince, and Other Works, by Niccolò Machiavelli. [<i>Angelo M. Pellegrini</i>]	518
Philip Babcock Gove. The Imaginary Voyage in Prose Fiction. [<i>Thomas B. Stroup</i>]	662
Henry A. Grubbs. Jean-Baptiste Rousseau. His Life and Works. [<i>H. Carrington Lancaster</i>]	342
Robert A. Hall, Jr. Bibliography of Italian Linguistics. [<i>Leo Spitzer</i>]	640
Eva Catherine Hangen. A Concordance to the Complete Works of Sir Thomas Wyatt. [<i>Frederick M. Padelford</i>]	506
Alfred Harbage. Annals of English Drama, 975-1700. [<i>James G. McManaway</i>]	141
Brice Harris. Charles Sackville, Sixth Earl of Dorset. [<i>Helene Maxwell Hooker</i>]	326
Virgil B. Heltzel and Hoyt H. Hudson (editors and translators). Nobilis or A View of the Life and Death of a Sidney, and Lessus Lugubris, by Thomas Moffet. [<i>Frederick M. Padelford</i>]	506
Eleanor Kellogg Heningham. An Early Latin Debate of the Body and Soul: Preserved in MS Royal 7 A III in the British Museum. [<i>Francis Lee Utley</i>]	503
U. T. Holmes, Jr., C. Lyons, and R. W. Linker (editors). The Works of Guillaume De Salluste Sieur Du Bartas, vol. III. [<i>A. Emerson Creore</i>]	336
Edwin Johnston Howard (editor). The Defence of Good Women, by Sir Thomas Elyot. [<i>Helen Andrews Kahin</i>]	318
Helen Sard Hughes. The Gentle Hertford: Her Life and Letters. [<i>Samuel W. Stevenson</i>]	515
F. W. Kaufmann. German Dramatists of the 19th Century. [<i>A. M. Sauerlander</i>]	134
Charles W. Kennedy (translator). Beowulf: The Oldest English Epic. [<i>Martin B. Ruud</i>]	138
S. Kierkegaard. Stages on Life's Way. [<i>J. H. Groth</i>]	314
Thomas A. Kirby. Chaucer's <i>Troilus</i> : A Study in Courtly Love. [<i>D. D. Griffith</i>]	140
Priscilla M. Kramer. The Cyclical Method of Composition in Gottfried Keller's <i>Sinngedicht</i> . [<i>Max Schertel</i>]	333
Paul V. Kreider. Repetition in Shakespeare's Plays. [<i>Hardin Craig</i>]	648

Joseph Manch. Jonathan Swift and Women. [Donald Cornu].....	328
F. O. Matthiessen. American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman. [E. H. Eby].....	655
Fred O. Nolte. Lessing's <i>Laokoon</i> . [Sophus Keith Winther].....	659
James M. Osborn. John Dryden: Some Biographical Facts and Problems. [Richard H. Perkinson].....	650
William Riley Parker. Milton's Contemporary Reputation: An Essay to- gether with <i>A Tentative List of Printed Allusions to Milton, 1641-1674</i> . [William Haller]	322
Mario A. Pei. The Italian Language. [Herbert H. Vaughan].....	643
James Emerson Phillips, Jr. The State in Shakespeare's Greek and Roman Plays. [Bretns Stirling].....	144
Julia Power. Shelley in America in the Nineteenth Century. His Rela- tion to American Critical Thought and His Influence. [Leon Howard]	516
William Ringler (commentator), and Walter Allen, Jr. (translator). <i>Oratio in Laudem Artis Poeticae</i> by John Rainolds. [Frederick M. Padelford]	123
Herbert David Rix. Rhetoric in Spenser's Poetry. [Frederick M. Padelford]	123
Paul Patrick Rogers. Goldoni in Spain. [D. Vittorini].....	644
Leonora Cohen Rosenfield. From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine. Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie. [Melvin Rader]	341
Ernest C. Ross. The Ordeal of Bridget Elia, A Chronicle of the Lambs. [Edward Wagenknecht]	332
Richard Samuel and R. Hinton Thomas. Expressionism in German Life, Literature and the Theatre. [Edmund E. Miller].....	136
Billardon de Sauvigny. <i>Vashington: ou La Liberté Du Nouveau Monde</i> . Editée avec une introduction et des notes par Gilbert Chinard, avec l'assistance de H. M. Barnes, Jr., J. Jacques Demorest, R. K. Kellen- berger, E. E. E. Sarot. [Julian Park].....	520
Donald S. Schier. Louis-Bertrand Castel, Anti-Newtonian Scientist. [George R. Havens].....	639
Friedrich Josef Schmitz. Lessings Stellung in der Entfaltung des Individ- ualismus. [William Guild Howard].....	658
William Shakespeare. <i>The Passionate Pilgrim</i> . The Third Edition, 1612, Reproduced in Facsimile from the Copy in the Folger Shakespeare Li- brary, with an Introduction by Hyder Edward Rollins. [Ernest A. Strathmann].....	319
Percy Van Dyke Shelly. <i>The Living Chaucer</i> . [Thomas A. Kirby].....	151
C. J. Sisson. <i>The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity</i> . [Arthur M. Coon].....	321
Paul M. Spurlin. Montesquieu in America, 1760-1801. [Kenneth C. Cole].	520
Some Studies of Medieval Literature and History. [Herbert Meritt].....	660
Donald A. Stauffer. <i>The Art of Biography in Eighteenth Century England</i> . [Dougald MacMillan]	512

Elmer Edgar Stoll. Shakespeare and Other Masters. [<i>Robert Adger Law</i>]	510
Elizabeth J. Sweeting. Studies in Early Tudor Criticism, Linguistic and Literary. [<i>Frederick M. Padelford</i>]	123
C. R. Thompson. The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and St. Thomas More. [<i>William Nelson</i>]	647
John Hazard Wildman. Anthony Trollope's England. [<i>Bradford A. Booth</i>]	331
Edwin Everitt Williams. Tragedy of Destiny. [<i>Lucy Lawrence</i>]	318
A. E. Zucker (translator). The Redentin Easter Play. [<i>Carl F. Bayerschmidt</i>]	656
BOOKS RECEIVED	157, 349, 525, 669

The Modern Language Quarterly

welcomes the appearance of the first number of

The Russian Review

... an American journal devoted to Russia, past and present. The announced aim of the journal is "to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture."

William Henry Chamberlin
Editor

Michael Karpovich
Associate Editor

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt
Managing Editor

Published semi-annually in November and March, by
The Russian Review, 215 W. 23d St., New York City

\$2.00 per year

\$1.00 per copy

PRAIRIE SCHOONER

The Literary Talent Scout of the Midlands

Top ranking authors of the American literary scene have won their spurs in its pages. Stories, poetry, articles that belong among the nation's best.

Editor: L. C. WIMBERLY

Quarterly . . . \$1.00 a year . . . 30c a copy

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA
Lincoln, Nebraska

